Logic has frequently played an exceptional role in philosophical projects. The laws of logic have been considered self-evident, obvious or a priori, and therefore epistemologically foundational. As a result, logic has been set apart from the other sciences.
According to anti-exceptionalism, however, the privileged epistemological status of logical laws has been exaggerated. Instead, both logical theories and theory-choice in logic are continuous with the theories and methods of other sciences. But what does that tell us about theory-choice in logic, and does it help us adjudicate in the many disputes between rival logical theories?
Speakers:
Jc Beall (UConn)
Christopher Blake-Turner (UNC Chapel Hill)
Ole Hjortland (University of Bergen)
Saul Kripke (CUNY)
Ben Martin (University of Bergen)
Romina Padro (CUNY)
Graham Priest (CUNY)
Marcus Rossberg (UConn)
Lionel Shapiro (UConn)
Stewart Shapiro (OSU)
Gillian Russell (UNC Chapel Hill)
Registration
Registration deadline: September 1, 2019, 9:00am EST
How to register: ole.hjortland @@@@ uib.no
September 20: Matthias Michel
Philosophy and Laboratoire Sciences, Université Paris-Sorbonne and NYU
“Consciousness and the Prefrontal Cortex”
October 4: Ryan McElhaney
Cognitive Science and Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center
“Explanation and Consciousness”
October 18: Sascha Benjamin Fink
Philosophy-Neurosciences-Cognition, University of Magdeburg and NYU
“Varieties of Phenomenal Structuralism”
November 1: Jesse Atencio
Cognitive Science and Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center
Title TBA
November 15: Frank Pupa
Philosophy, Nassau Community College
“Getting Between: Predicativism, Domain Restriction, and Binding”
December 6: Susana Martinez-Conde
Neurology and Integrative Neuroscience, Downstate Medical Center
Title TBA
https://philosophy.commons.gc.cuny.edu/cognitive-speaker-series-fall-2019/
This essay tries to develop a “black radical Kantianism” – that is, a Kantianism informed by the black experience in modernity. After looking briefly at socialist and feminist appropriations of Kant, I argue that an analogous black radical appropriation should draw on the distinctive social ontology and view of the state associated with the black radical tradition. In ethics, this would mean working with a (color-conscious rather than colorblind) social ontology of white persons and black sub-persons and then asking what respect for oneself and others would require under those circumstances. In political philosophy, it would mean framing the state as a Rassenstaat (a racial state) and then asking what measures of corrective justice would be necessary to bring about the ideal Rechtsstaat.
Response by César Cabezas Gamarra.
Presented by the German Idealism Workshop
This paper is on the topic of deliberative autonomy in (primarily) post-classical Chinese moral epistemology. By “deliberative autonomy,” I mean the epistemic state or achievement in which one’s ethical views or beliefs are those that seem right to oneself and are based on reasons or considerations that one understands for oneself. This is to be contrasted with holding a view or belief based primarily on the authority or expertise of others, without seeing for oneself that the view is correct or why it is correct. The Chinese philosophical tradition is rich in discussion of the nature, value, and function of deliberative autonomy, having much to say both in its defense and against it. I will focus my discussion by looking more closely at what Neo-Confucians have said about a particular term of art, zide 自得 (“getting it oneself”). I translate and discuss some passages on “getting it oneself” in the works and recorded lessons of influential Song, Ming, and Qing Confucians, note different types of deliberative autonomy implied by these passages, and discuss Wm. Theodore de Bary’s famous explication of “getting it oneself.” I consider whether the premium these Confucians placed on zide has the implications for liberal education that de Bary proposes and describe how proponents of zide could respond to formidable and important Xunzian arguments for deference to traditions and expertise.
With responses from: KATJA VOGT (Columbia University)
The Fall dates for the Comparative Philosophy seminar:
September 20 – Justin Tiwald (San Francisco State University)
October 11 – Richard Kim (Loyola University, Chicago
November 8 – Sungmoon Kim (City University of Hong Kong)
December 6 – Paul R. Goldin (University of Pennsylvania)
More details (such as titles, abstracts, and respondents) to follow. Looking forward to seeing you soon.
Hagop Sarkissian
Associate Professor & Chair, Department of Philosophy, The City University of New York, Baruch College
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center
Co-Director, Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy
You should come to one of the three (3) Ask a Philosopher booths we have scheduled for the month of September!
Saturday 9/7, 10:00-2:00 @ the Borough Hall Greenmarket
Saturday 9/14, 11:00-3:00 @ the Market at the Brooklyn Museum
Saturday 9/21, 10:00-2:00 @ the McCarren Park Greenmarket
Philosophy-in-Manhattan
Sunday, September 22 at 11:00 AM
Due to overwhelming interesting in this topic, we’re going to have an additional Philosophy of Math meeting on September 22. This one will be from 11a…
Price: 14.00 USD
Philosophy-in-Manhattan
Sunday, September 22 at 2:00 PM
CUNY philosophy PhD candidate Vincent Peluce will lead us. What sort of things are mathematical truths about? How do we come to know mathematical trut…
Price: 14.00 USD
Noneism is the theory according to which some things do not exist. Following an established convention, I will call allism the negation of noneism (every thing exists). Lewis [1990] and, more recently, Woodward [2013] argued that the allism/noneism dispute turns on an equivocation about the meaning of ‘exists’ and would thereby be merely verbal. These arguments have been attacked by Priest [2005, 2011, 2013], who took the dispute to be genuine. In this paper, I will present two new arguments for the genuineness of the allism/noneism dispute. The first appeals to a recent version of logical pluralism defended by Kouri Kissel [Forth]: the two parties could be seen as engaging in a metalinguistic negotiation, that is, a normative disagreement about which meaning of ‘exists’ is best suited for a certain domain of discourse. Secondly, Williamson [1987] indicated a proof-theoretic criterion the two sides should meet in order for their dispute to count as genuine: they must share enough rules of inference governing ‘exist’ to characterise it up to logical equivalence. This challenge, I argue, can be met.
Logic and Metaphysics Workshop Fall 2019 Schedule:
September 2 GC Closed NO MEETING
September 9 Yael Sharvit, UCLA
September 16 Ole Hjortland and Ben Martin, Bergen
September 23 Alessandro Rossi, St. Andrews
September 30 GC Closed NO MEETING
October 7 Dongwoo Kim, GC
October 14 GC Closed NO MEETING
October 21 Rohit Parikh, GC
October 28 Barbara Montero, GC
November 4 Sergei Aretmov, GC
November 11 Martin Pleitz, Muenster
November 18
November 25
December 2 Jessica Wilson, Toronto
December 9 Mark Colyvan, Sydney
December 16 MAYBE A MEETING; MAYBE NOT
We’re a community of philosophers of language centered in New York City. We have a meeting each week at which a speaker presents a piece of their own work relating to the philosophy of language.
Sept 9
Donka Farkas (Santa Cruz)
Sept 16
John Maackay (U Wisconsin–Madison)
Sept 23
Andrew Bacon (USC)
Sept 30
Eleonore Neufeld (USC)
Oct 7
Eli Alshanetsky (Temple)
Oct 21
Gabe Dupre (UCLA)
Oct 28
Dorit Bar-On (UConn)
Nov 4
Sam Berstler (Princeton)
Nov 11
Robert Henderson (Arizona)
Nov 18
Sam Cumming (UCLA)
Nov 25
Harvey Lederman (Princeton)
Dec 2
Sarah Fisher (Reading)
Dec 9
Michael Glanzberg (Northwestern)
Rebecca Comay, Professor of Philosophy and Comparative Literature, The University of Toronto discusses Hegel and Beckett followed by a response from Paul Kottman of The New School for Social Research.