Noneism is the theory according to which some things do not exist. Following an established convention, I will call allism the negation of noneism (every thing exists). Lewis  and, more recently, Woodward  argued that the allism/noneism dispute turns on an equivocation about the meaning of ‘exists’ and would thereby be merely verbal. These arguments have been attacked by Priest [2005, 2011, 2013], who took the dispute to be genuine. In this paper, I will present two new arguments for the genuineness of the allism/noneism dispute. The first appeals to a recent version of logical pluralism defended by Kouri Kissel [Forth]: the two parties could be seen as engaging in a metalinguistic negotiation, that is, a normative disagreement about which meaning of ‘exists’ is best suited for a certain domain of discourse. Secondly, Williamson  indicated a proof-theoretic criterion the two sides should meet in order for their dispute to count as genuine: they must share enough rules of inference governing ‘exist’ to characterise it up to logical equivalence. This challenge, I argue, can be met.
Logic and Metaphysics Workshop Fall 2019 Schedule:
September 2 GC Closed NO MEETING
September 9 Yael Sharvit, UCLA
September 16 Ole Hjortland and Ben Martin, Bergen
September 23 Alessandro Rossi, St. Andrews
September 30 GC Closed NO MEETING
October 7 Dongwoo Kim, GC
October 14 GC Closed NO MEETING
October 21 Rohit Parikh, GC
October 28 Barbara Montero, GC
November 4 Sergei Aretmov, GC
November 11 Martin Pleitz, Muenster
December 2 Jessica Wilson, Toronto
December 9 Mark Colyvan, Sydney
December 16 MAYBE A MEETING; MAYBE NOT
We’re a community of philosophers of language centered in New York City. We have a meeting each week at which a speaker presents a piece of their own work relating to the philosophy of language.
Donka Farkas (Santa Cruz)
John Maackay (U Wisconsin–Madison)
Andrew Bacon (USC)
Eleonore Neufeld (USC)
Eli Alshanetsky (Temple)
Gabe Dupre (UCLA)
Dorit Bar-On (UConn)
Sam Berstler (Princeton)
Robert Henderson (Arizona)
Sam Cumming (UCLA)
Harvey Lederman (Princeton)
Sarah Fisher (Reading)
Michael Glanzberg (Northwestern)
Skye & Massimo’s Philosophy Café
Monday, September 23 at 7:00 PM
Mindfulness — whatever that means, exactly — is increasingly popular. And yet, the concept if being promoted as value-neutral while it is in fact lo…
Price: 5.00 USD
Rebecca Comay, Professor of Philosophy and Comparative Literature, The University of Toronto discusses Hegel and Beckett followed by a response from Paul Kottman of The New School for Social Research.
Meetings are held on Tuesdays at Fordham’s Lincoln Center campus in Manhattan in the Plaza View Room on the 12th floor of the Lowenstein Building (113 W 60th St).We meet from 5:30 to 6:45 and papers are read in advance. If interested in attending, contact firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, or firstname.lastname@example.org.
- September 24 – Rosaura Martínez (UNAM) “Alterability and Writing. Rethinking an Ontology of Dependency”
- October 15 – Jesús Luzardo (Fordham) “The Wages of the Past: Whiteness, Nostalgia, and Property”
- November 19 – Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson (Syracuse) “Conceptualizing Terrorism ‘From Below’: Lynching as Racial Terrorism”
- February 11 – Jill Stauffer (Haverford)
- March 10 – Sina Kramer (LMU)
- April 7 – TBD
Each colloquium is held on Wednesday at 4:15 P.M. All colloquia will take place at the Graduate Center in rooms 9205/9206 except as otherwise noted. Please call (212) 817-8615 for further information.
Download an interactive PDF version of the schedule here.
September 11 • Jonathan Adler Memorial Lecture
Philip Kitcher (Columbia University)
“Progress in the Sciences—and in the Arts”
September 18 • Note: colloquium will begin at 5:45pm
Jason Stanley (Yale University)
“Hustle: The Politics of Language”
September 25 • Note: colloquium will be held in C201/C202
Noël Carroll (CUNY Graduate Center)
Hayley Clatterbuck (University of Rochester)
“Learning Incommensurable Concepts”.
Michelle M. Dyke (New York University)
“Could Our Epistemic Reasons Be Collective Practical Reasons?”
Stephen Grover (CUNY Queens College | Graduate Center)
“The Problem of Ugliness”
Sari Kisilevsky (CUNY Queens College)
“The Ethics of Punishment in the Age of Mass Incarceration”
Taylor Carman (Columbia University)
Luvell Anderson (Syracuse University)
“Navigating Racial Satire”
November 27 • Mock Job Talk (Note: attendance limited to CUNY community)
TBD (CUNY Graduate Center)
December 4 • Mock Job Talk (Note: attendance limited to CUNY community)
TBD (CUNY Graduate Center)
December 11 • Alumni Day
Elvira Basevich (University of Massachusetts Lowell)
“Du Bois’s Theory of Justice”
About this Event
Wednesday, September 25, 2019 6:15-8:45 pm at Columbia University
Professor Axel Honneth and Bernard E. Harcourt discussing the early Frankfurt School, specifically Max Horkheimer’s 1937 essay, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” and Theodor Adorno’s 1931 essay, “The Actuality of Philosophy.”
This event is co-sponsored by the Columbia Maison Française.
Horkheimer, Max. “Traditional and Critical Theory, in Horkheimer, Max. Critical Theory: Selected Essays. New York: Continuum, 1992.
Adorno, Theodor W. “The Actuality of Philosophy.” Telos 1997, no. 31 (1997): 120-133.
These events are free and open to the public. Please RSVP.
ERIK OLIN WRIGHT spent the last years of his life thinking about ways to challenge and transform capitalist societies. He distilled his thinking in a book, How to Be an Anti-Capitalist in the 21st Century (Verso, 2019). The symposium is designed to launch a debate about the strengths and weaknesses of Wright’s approach. We seek to both honor our colleague’s memory and assure that his ideas become part of current discussions of socialism and socialist strategy. The event will consist of three panels during the day and an evening session that will include tributes to Wright and a keynote by his friend, Ira Katznelson.
This event is co-sponsored by the Robert L. Heilbroner Center for Capitalism Studies at The New School for Social Research, and the journal, Politics & Society.
In this talk, I will sketch a theory of skill, which puts control at the center of the account. First, I present a definition of skill that integrates several essential features of skill that are often ignored or sidelined on other theories. In the second section, I spell out how we should think of the intentions involved in skilled actions and in the third section, I discuss why deliberate practice and not just experience, repetition, or exposure is required for skill development. In the fourth section, I claim that practice produces control and go on to spell out the notion of control relevant for a theory of skill. In the final section, I briefly outline three kinds of control that develop as a result of practice and which manifest the skillfulness of skilled action. They are strategic control, attention control, and motor control.
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