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Evidence and Theory in Neuroscience – Seminars in Society and Neuroscience 4:15 pm
Evidence and Theory in Neuroscience – Seminars in Society and Neuroscience @ Faculty House, Columbia U
Mar 5 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
What constitutes evidence is rarely self-evident. We need theories to make sense of evidence—to transform patterns of physical occurrences into something meaningful, i.e., data. This relationship between theory and evidence is often at least partially opaque, particularly in a field like neuroscience that often aims to use physical evidence to characterize mental, and in some cases social, events. Neuroscience navigates this relationship by purporting to offer mechanistic descriptions of “how” mental processes operate. Yet, this[...]
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Cognitive Science Speaker Series 1:00 pm
Cognitive Science Speaker Series @ CUNY Grad Center, rm 7-102
Mar 9 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm
February 9: Jessie Munton Philosophy, New York University “How Long Is ‘a’ Visual Experience?” March 9: Taylor Webb Neuroscience Institute and Cognitive Science, Princeton University Title TBA April 13: Eleni Manolakaki Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens “Propositions as Measures of Mind” For spring 2018, the CUNY Cognitive Science Speaker Series will meet once a month. We’ll return to weekly talks in fall 2018. All talks are at the CUNY Graduate Center, 365[...]
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Consistency Conditions on Fundamental Physics – Rachel Rosen (Columbia University). 2:10 pm
Consistency Conditions on Fundamental Physics – Rachel Rosen (Columbia University). @ Columbia University Philosophy Dept.
Mar 20 @ 2:10 pm – 4:00 pm
as our understanding of the universe and its basic building blocks extends to shorter and shorter distances, experiments capable of probing these scales are becoming increasingly difficult to construct. Fundamental particle physics faces a potential crisis: an absence of data at the shortest possible scales. Yet remarkably, even in the absence of experimental data, the requirement of theoretical consistency puts stringent constraints on viable models of fundamental particles and their interactions. In this talk I’ll[...]
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Scientific Philosophy from Kant to Kuhn and Beyond – Michael Friedman (Stanford) 6:15 pm
Scientific Philosophy from Kant to Kuhn and Beyond – Michael Friedman (Stanford) @ NYU Law School, Lipton Hall
Mar 21 @ 6:15 pm – 8:15 pm
Abstract: These lectures report on my recent work in tracing out a path through a variety of philosophical attempts to appropriate developments in contemporaneous science on behalf of an evolving conception of “scientific” philosophy beginning with Kant and extending to the present.  I concentrate, in particular, on Kant and the post-Kantian tradition.  This includes the Naturphilosophie of Schelling and Hegel, the neo-Kantian reaction to Naturphilosophie initiated by Helmholtz, and the ensuing contributions to nineteenth and early[...]
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Scientific Philosophy from Kant to Kuhn and Beyond – Michael Friedman (Stanford) 6:15 pm
Scientific Philosophy from Kant to Kuhn and Beyond – Michael Friedman (Stanford) @ NYU Law School, Lipton Hall
Mar 23 @ 6:15 pm – 8:15 pm
Abstract: These lectures report on my recent work in tracing out a path through a variety of philosophical attempts to appropriate developments in contemporaneous science on behalf of an evolving conception of “scientific” philosophy beginning with Kant and extending to the present.  I concentrate, in particular, on Kant and the post-Kantian tradition.  This includes the Naturphilosophie of Schelling and Hegel, the neo-Kantian reaction to Naturphilosophie initiated by Helmholtz, and the ensuing contributions to nineteenth and early[...]
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Scientific Philosophy from Kant to Kuhn and Beyond – Michael Friedman (Stanford) 6:15 pm
Scientific Philosophy from Kant to Kuhn and Beyond – Michael Friedman (Stanford) @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 202
Mar 28 @ 6:15 pm – 8:15 pm
Abstract: These lectures report on my recent work in tracing out a path through a variety of philosophical attempts to appropriate developments in contemporaneous science on behalf of an evolving conception of “scientific” philosophy beginning with Kant and extending to the present.  I concentrate, in particular, on Kant and the post-Kantian tradition.  This includes the Naturphilosophie of Schelling and Hegel, the neo-Kantian reaction to Naturphilosophie initiated by Helmholtz, and the ensuing contributions to nineteenth and early[...]
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