Calendar

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CANCELLED – Coverage-Reliance Ignorance, Eric Bayruns Garcia (CUNY) – Logic & Metaphysics Workshop 4:15 pm
CANCELLED – Coverage-Reliance Ignorance, Eric Bayruns Garcia (CUNY) – Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 4 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Meeting Cancellation: The CUNY Graduate Center will be closed on Monday, March 4th. Therefore, the Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will not be meeting. There is no meeting I argue that racial injustice can make a subject’s news sources unreliable because of the effect of (1) racial prejudice and (2) society’s unjust structure on the news-gathering-and-disseminating processes a subject relies on.  I assume that societies with entrenched racial injustice have widespread racial prejudices and that these societies are unjustly structured.  I argue that racial injustice can undermine a subject’s capacity to be properly sensitive to her social conditions such that she is doxastically justified in her coverage-supported belief. In section one, I …

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On Frege’s Assimilation of Sentences with Names, Dongwoo Kim (CUNY) 4:30 pm
On Frege’s Assimilation of Sentences with Names, Dongwoo Kim (CUNY) @ CUNY Grad Center, 6495
Mar 7 @ 4:30 pm – 6:30 pm
I shall discuss some of the issues concerning a notorious doctrine of Frege that sentences are names of truth-values. I am interested in a problem raised by Kripke that the doctrine obscures the distinction between judgeable and unjudgeable contents. I shall present what I take to be Frege’s account of judgeable content. A proper expression of a judgeable content, for Frege, is susceptible to an analysis into a predicate and an argument-word, where a predicate is understood as a concept-word used to attribute a certain property to the referent of the argument-word. In the light of this analysis, I shall argue that the doctrine does not obscure the distinction. The …

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Gabriele Pulcini (New University of Lisbon): From Complementary Logic to Proof-Theoretic Semantics 12:00 pm
Gabriele Pulcini (New University of Lisbon): From Complementary Logic to Proof-Theoretic Semantics @ Columbia U Philosophy Dept. 716
Mar 8 @ 12:00 pm
Two proof-systems P and P* are said to be complementary when one proves exactly the non-theorems of the other. Complementary systems come as a particular kind of refutation calculi whose patterns of inference always work by inferring unprovable conclusions form unprovable premises. In the first part of my talk, I will focus on LK*, the sequent system complementing Gentzen’s system LK for classical logic. I will show, then, how to enrich LK* with two admissible (unary) cut rules, which allow for a simple and efficient cut-elimination algorithm. In particular, two facts will be highlighted: 1) for any given provable sequent, complementary cut-elimination always returns one of its simplest proofs, and …

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Jeremy Goodman (USC): Deep Structure. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop 4:15 pm
Jeremy Goodman (USC): Deep Structure. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 11 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Russell proved over a century ago that a naive conception of structured propositions is inconsistent. Hodes (2015), Dorr (2016), and Goodman (2017) have recently reformulated Russell’s argument in the language of higher-order logic, and concluded from it that distinctions in reality cannot always reflect all the syntactic structure of the language in which we draw those distinctions. But they also float the idea that such distinctions might nevertheless have sentence-like structure, so long as this structure fails to neatly correspond to the syntactic structure of the sentences we use to draw those distinction. Perhaps, that is, the popular metaphor of facts being like sentences written in God’s “book of the …

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Romina Padró (CUNY): Inferences First. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop 4:15 pm
Romina Padró (CUNY): Inferences First. Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 18 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Two ways of giving an epistemic justification of basic logical principles will be introduced, intuition-based accounts and concept or meaning constitution-based accounts. We will briefly consider different versions of these views and argue that they face parallel dilemmas. While ‘robust’ accounts are subject to what I call the ‘adoption problem,’ ‘weak’ accounts fail to ground our basic inferential dispositions. Either way, intuitions and meaning-constituting rules turn out to be irrelevant. A more general moral for the epistemology of logic and its priorities will be drawn from the discussion. The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY …

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Logic & Metaphysics Workshop 4:15 pm
Logic & Metaphysics Workshop @ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Mar 25 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 7314 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows: Feb 4. Melvin Fitting, CUNY Feb 11. Benjamin Neeser, Geneva Feb 18. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING Feb 25. Achille Varzi, Columbia Mar 4. Eric Bayruns Garcia, CUNY Mar 11. Jeremy Goodman, USC Mar 18. Romina Padro, CUNY Mar 25. Kit Fine, NYU Apr 1. Elena Ficara, Paderborn Apr 8. Chris Scambler, NYU Apr 15.  Jenn McDonald, CUNY Apr 22. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING Apr 29. Tommy Kivatinos, CUNY May 6. Daniel Durante, Natal May 13. Martina Botti, Columbia May 20. …

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