08.19.11
Posted in biology, evolution, measurement, science at 9:25 pm by nogre
The Genial Gene: Deconstructing Darwinian Selfishness by Joan Roughgarden
In The Genial Gene Joan Roughgarden seeks to replace the competitive understanding of evolution, known as sexual selection, with a cooperative one. The first sentence of her book reads, “This book is about whether selfishness and individuality, rather than kindness and cooperation, are basic to biological nature” (p. 1).
So what is the argument? Taking this first line, she wants to conclude something about basic biological nature. To do this, one can either define what basic biological nature is and then use that definition to derive conclusions, or else survey the natural world and find the best interpretation for whatever empirical results were found. She opts for the latter strategy.
To this end she first surveys and compiles examples of what people consider to be evidence for sexual selection and argues that this evidence has been misconstrued or simply does not support the theory of sexual selection. Then she offers a few logical arguments against sexual selection with the aim to highlight contradictions within the theory.
She then develops her alternative, called Social Selection. Social Selection is fundamentally based upon cooperation, not competition, and she proceeds to reinterpret the empirical research with respect to cooperation. Given the results of this reinterpretation, she concludes that the cooperative approach provides a more accurate picture of the empirical data than the competitive approach. Therefore social selection, not sexual selection, is fundamental to biological nature.
Can this argument be maintained?
Her argument fundamentally turns on the interpretation of the empirical research. (If her logical arguments were strong enough to undermine sexual selection on their own, she would have dedicated more space to them. At best, in my opinion, they could raise questions about sexual selection, but are not inherently damaging enough, even if they are accepted uncontested, to force a major revision to sexual selection.) She interprets the research in terms of cooperation and her opponents are those who interpret the research in terms of competition. Roughgarden claims her interpretation is the correct one.
Insofar as she is making an inference saying her interpretation is the best conclusion, her argument fails. She readily admits that the defenders of sexual selection are able to consistently create explanatory fixes for apparent contradictions in the empirical research. Since they are able to explain the data, the fact that she is unsatisfied by their explanations (and likes her own better) is no grounds for convincing her opponents to give up their explanations. After all, they have history and authority on their side. Her coming up with better numbers, that is, having formulas that (she says) more accurately represent the research, is not a sufficient reason for discarding a theory that has held up for many years, especially one that continues to be an area of active research. So, she has not successfully argued that social selection should replace sexual selection.
However, if we consider a more modest conclusion, then Roughgarden may be able to maintain part of her argument. She makes the point that the core Darwinian theory does not include sexual selection; it is a later contribution (ppg. 3-4). This suggest that there may be theoretical room for cooperation in addition to competition. But how much room?
Now the interpretive problem that she set up cuts the other way. Instead of her trying to convince us that her cooperative interpetation of the empirical research is the correct one, we ask the competitive interpretation why it is the best one. Empirical research alone cannot support one conclusion over another: the data must first be interpreted before a conclusion can be reached. As mentioned above, sexual selection has history and authority on its side, but age and endorsements are not arguments for being the sole fundamental methodology of biological nature. Without history and authority, sexual selection proponents only have their ability to explain bioogical research, which is no more than Roughgarden has. Therefore, advocates of sexual selection have no further theoretical resources to support their claim that sexual selection is the fundamental method working in evolution.
This means that Roughgarden does succeed in part. Based on the arguments she provides she is unable to maintain that kindness and cooperation underpin evolution, but she is able to cut sexual selection down to her size. She has shown that it is possible to reinterpret biological research in terms that do not rely upon competition and that sexual selection has no special theoretical privelege. Therefore sexual selection proponents can no longer claim to be fundamental biological reality: even though Roughgarden was unable to fell their theory, they won’t be able to down her either, and so she has established theoretical room for cooperation in Darwinian theory.
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04.10.11
Posted in biology, evolution, fitness, philosophy, science, Special Relativity at 10:28 pm by nogre
I’ve been working hard on Special Biological Relativity and it is taking up most of my blogging energy. However, I do have some fun results:
Define Biological Energy as the ability to do work, the ability to change the environment. Then Fitness can be related to Energy because the higher the fitness the greater the ability to change the environment.
E ∝ f
If we consider an organism that lives in a place with infinite resources – a Garden of Eden – and also replicates at the speed of the chemical reaction of replication – there is no maturation process, it immediately starts to replicated as soon as it is created – then it’s life is identical to it’s replication process. Define d to be the speed of the chemical process of replication. Then the ability of this organism to change the environment is given by it’s fitness, the rate it replicates at and it’s life:
E = fd2
Or something.
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11.28.10
Posted in biology, evolution, fitness, philosophy, Special Relativity at 7:30 pm by nogre
Imagine two different tribes of biologists. The first tribe is comprised of very fast people. They survived for thousands of years by studying biology and being faster than their competitors. The second tribe is comprised of very strong people. They survived for thousands of years by studying biology and being stronger than their competitors. After all this time, the first tribe is filled with very fast biologists and the second tribe is filled with very strong biologists.
Now imagine that two biologists, one from each tribe, are evaluating the fitness of two organisms. One of the organisms is fast, the other is of average speed. Other than the difference in speed, they are identical. The strong biologist recognizes that one is faster than the other, but does not find this to be significant and assigns the two organisms equal fitness. The fast biologist recognizes that one is faster and assigns it a slightly higher fitness because of its speed advantage.
Is the difference in fitness evaluations a matter of scientific opinion? If it were an opinion that the fast organism was fitter, this would be a scientific opinion based upon environmental and competitive factors. Given different competition and environment, the evaluation would have come out differently. However, the fast biologist and her entire tribe have survived by being faster than their competition. Her evaluation is not only scientifically based but also partly based upon her evolutionary heritage and Weltanschung that is finely attuned to how speed is beneficial. It is these factors, unique to people of this tribe, that give more weight to speed as evolutionarily significant and makes it more than just a case of scientific disagreement.
Is the fast biologist unfairly biased? If we consider the perspective of the strong biologist, we can see that the strong biologist has no greater claim to her appraisal of an organism’s fitness: strength is just as arbitrary a trait as speed and this thought experiment could have equally been set up with two organisms that only differed in strength. Hence the fast biologist could equally claim the strong biologist is unfairly biased toward strength and away from speed. Generalizing, we can say that no one perspective, be it speed, strength, sight, etc., or any combination of traits, is privileged. Hence their is no unfair bias because every scientific perspective based upon evolutionary heritage and an associated Weltanschung is as legitimate as any other.
Lastly, consider that every biologist will recognize the same amount of phenotypic difference between two organisms; difference in phenotype does not permit variation in interpretation. Therefore any difference in fitness evaluation is not due to a perceived physical difference by the biologists in the organisms studied.
Therefore this thought experiment implies that our determinations of fitness are not independent of the evolutionary history of the biologist(s) making those determinations. Insofar as we cannot escape our own biology and how it shapes our views, it will determine the fitness value we assign to organisms, if only to a small extent.
Consequences:
In one sense everything on Earth has been evolving for the exact same amount of time, since the dawn of life, and hence no organism alive is any more evolved than any other.
However, from the perspective of the fast biologists, the fast organism is more evolved. Insofar as the fast biologists believe that life is evolving towards moving faster, the organism that moves faster has adapted before the other organisms. So, in the special circumstance of a population perceiving evolution to move regularly towards a trait, an organism with that trait can be considered more evolved.
—– the analogs —–
evolutionary significant events are specific adaptations :: physically significant events are light flashes
regular evolutionary change is a population with trait selection :: regular motion is a non-accelerating inertial frame
difference in phenotype does not permit variation in interpretation, regardless of observer :: failure of addition of velocities of light, regardless of observer.
upper limit to adaptation- by definition, no jumps :: speed of light in vacuum defined as c
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11.02.10
Posted in biology, evolution, fitness, General Relativity, philosophy, physics, Relativity, science at 5:53 pm by nogre
As you can see from my previous post, I now have postulated a direct relation between Natural Selection and Fitness (N.S.=F.×A.). This relation follows from the theory.
The short short short version of the theory is this general postulate: one organism’s traits are another’s environment and vice versa. Hence all competition can be viewed as environmental phenomena. This gives Natural Selection as a result of Fitness and an environmental factor, which I refer to as Acceleration.
If you want to see the paper as it stands now, you can access it here or below.[6in/120mm ebook formatted]
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10.31.10
Posted in biology, evolution, fitness, philosophy, science at 10:44 pm by nogre
Natural Selection is the force that changes species.
Fitness is the resistance to change in the rate of change of the species.
Acceleration is change in the rate of change of the species.
Natural Selection = Fitness × Acceleration
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07.22.10
Posted in biology, evolution, fitness, General Relativity, measurement, ontology, philosophy, science at 6:39 pm by nogre
4.2 Relativistic Evolution
4.2.1 Two Kinds of Fitness
To understand Natural Selection we need to understand fitness and how to calculate its value. One way the fitness of an organism can be understood is in terms of how well it will be able to interact with its ecology to acquire what it needs to live and reproduce. The traits of the organism will be crucial as it struggles to survive: every little adaptation or edge that the organism has can be the difference between survival and death. Therefore the traits of the organism determine its fitness.
However, the fitness of an organism is dependent upon its environment. The different situations an organism finds itself in, which are determined by the ecology and chance, will determine its ability to reproduce. For example being fast is meaningless if there is no secure footing to run on. Therefore it is the situation that determines the traits that matter and hence fitness is a function of environmental selection.
At this point it can look as if there are two distinct and incompatible methods for calculating the fitness of an organism: trait based selection and environmental selection.
4.2.2 The Equality of Trait Selection and Environmental Selection
Imagine a jaguar out in the jungle. Unbeknownst to anyone, however, his welfare is being carefully monitored by stealthy scientists. Any time the jaguar might be in trouble, be it a lack of food or an unfriendly competitor, the scientists step in and protect the jaguar from harm and do it without being seen.
An independent observer, someone who doesn’t know about the scientists watching over the jaguar, might think that the jaguar has an uncanny ability to find food and avoid dangerous situations. He might suspect that the jaguar has excellent ears that can hear danger from very far away and a nose that can smell even the faintest waft of food. He would believe that in the struggle for survival the jaguar was incredibly well adapted.
Ought we to smile at the man and say that he errs in his conclusion? I do not believe we should. We could be in the very same position as the jaguar. We like to think that we have evolved the way we have by struggling and adapting. However, we may have just as easily been assisted by some benevolent but reclusive extraterrestrials. They could be the reason our species has been able to accomplish all that we have, and we would not know.
Regardless of the existence of any such extraterrestrials, the example shows that we cannot tell the difference between struggling and surviving based upon traits, and nature conforming (or disconforming) to our adaptations. It is a matter of perspective to believe either that our adaptations were the cause of our success or if it was the environment that happened to favor us.
4.2.3 The Natural Selection Field
Instead of switching back and forth between environmental and trait selection, we can say that both kinds of selection create a field. This field is ontologically as basic as the two kinds of selection and it is what interacts with the individual organisms and environment. The interactions of an organism and the field determines the course of the organism’s life, and an ecology’s total field is determined by everything in it.
Although every organism and each ecology is unique, none are alien. By looking at similar organisms and similar ecologies, we can use natural history to determine important adaptations and key environmental features. Taken together these features specify the shape of the Natural Selection field of that ecology, which informs us on how an organism or species will interact with their environment.
An organism’s overall fitness will determine how great its effect will be in the Natural Selection field. Introducing a species with high fitness into a new ecosystem can cause great changes, whereas introducing a species into an environment that it cannot survive in will barely create a change at all. For example, when humans, with our high fitness, move into a new area, we will profoundly alter that ecology. However, if we bring a flower with us that can’t survive the cold nights in our new home, then the flower will die, barely registering any change in the Natural Selection field.
4.2.4 General Relativistic Natural Selection
With the existence of the field we can say how evolution acts upon a species. At every moment an organism interacts with a natural selection field created by its surrounding ecology. The constant interaction with the field will gradually modify the species by benefiting certain individuals and by putting others at a disadvantage.
Insofar as the natural selection field is indistinguishable from the struggle for survival, we will not be able to further analyze why species change: this theory is terminal in the same way as General Relativity. If we could show that the way organisms and species benefitted or were put at a disadvantaged by the environment, without regard to the individual adaptations of the organisms, or conversely show how an adaptation increased an organism’s fitness without regard to the environment, then an investigation into these specific phenomena could yield insight into why a species changes. However, since we cannot make this distinction, the natural selection field is the final answer as to why a species changes.
Unlike the previous theory, general relativistic natural selection is wider because it is applicable during rapid ecological changes. The prior theory of natural selection relied upon trait based analysis to determine future reproductive success and hence was unable to accurately predict success during rapid change. Relativized natural selection can say that the organisms and species experiencing a disaster (or utopia) are experiencing a change in the natural selection field. This change in the natural selection field manifests as a rapid change in the lives of the organisms. Once the ecological change is finished, then we can revert back to the old notion of natural selection.
[this is an excerpt from a longer paper, which can be found here]
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07.13.10
Posted in biology, epistemology, evolution, fitness, General Relativity, measurement, philosophy, physics, Relativity, science at 5:18 pm by nogre
New theory of evolution! Hooray!
Patched a bunch of things together to make a nice story. Fixed the little issue about fitness being circular. Expanded natural selection to apply more generally. Causal structure. Epistemological foundations. ooOoOO0Ooooooo.
And it’s good fun. I swear. Epistemology, history of physics, evolution… makes me happy. You should really read it.
Download here. [pdf, 304kb]
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03.24.10
Posted in biology, evolution, General Relativity, philosophy, physics, Relativity, science at 11:22 am by nogre
Newton famously wrote [1] [2]:
I have not as yet been able to discover the reason for these properties of gravity from phenomena, and I do not feign hypotheses… It is enough that gravity does really exist and acts according to the laws I have explained, and that it abundantly serves to account for all the motions of celestial bodies.
as a response to those who challenged him to provide causes of gravity. He said, “Hypotheses non fingo,” or, “I feign no hypothesis,” or if you will, “I haven’t even a guess.”
Earlier in a letter he wrote:
That one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one another, is to me so great an absurdity that, I believe, no man who has in philosophic matters a competent faculty of thinking could ever fall into it.
These passages show that Newton recognized a fundamental causal problem within his theory: that although his mathematics described gravitational physics, it did not provide a causal explanation. It was not until General Relativity 200 years later was this problem solved.
Recently another major fundamental theory of science has been accused of lacking the proper causal structure: Fodor & Piatelli-Palmarini’s attack on evolution, What Darwin Got Wrong. Consider what Fodor says in his recent reply to Block and Kitcher,
A mere chronicle of instances of adaptation would not therefore amount to a theory of adaptation. It would just be “natural history.” We haven’t the slightest doubt that Darwin thought that he had discovered a theory of adaptation. It was, to be sure, a pretty thin theory, as it would have to be in order to apply to evolving creatures as such, whatever their phenotypes and whatever their ecologies.
He is saying that evolution is a mere chronicle of natural history — not a cause of it — just as Newton’s gravitation described gravity without revealing its causal structure. Later he says,
[Biologists should] give up on the project of finding a mechanism for evolution and study the fixation of adaptive traits case by case. Since all the evidence suggests that they are extremely heterogeneous, this should keep evolutionary biologists busy well into the indefinite future.
This means that biologists should give up on repairing evolution and just try to explain individual phenomena moving forward, just as physics moved forward even as Newton knew his theory was on metaphysical shaky ground.
Hence it is Fodor now saying, “Hypotheses non fingo,” because he believes he can describe natural history accurately, but also has no guess as to what caused things to work out the way they did.
* * * * *
In light of this analysis, consider this statement from Block and Kitcher’s counter argument:
After our critique, Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini have apparently decided that the crucial point is the lack of a “theory” of natural selection. But, as we have noted here, nobody needs a “theory” of the type they demand.
And this from Sober’s recent review [pdf]:
What is the net gravitational force now acting on the earth? That depends on the mass of the sun, the moon, the stars, and of everything else. It does not follow that there are no laws of gravity, only that the laws need to have numerous placeholders. FP may object to my analogy because it is always the mass of these various objects and their distance from the earth that are relevant to the gravitational force that the earth experiences. My reply is that this makes no difference…
Neither has understood the argument as presented above. If Block and Kitcher had understood, then they would have recognized that yes, for the vast majority of people, the “‘theory’ of the type they demand” is unnecessary, but it is, nevertheless, of critical importance to the likes of Newton and Einstein. If Sober had understood, then he wouldn’t have used the worst possible example to make his point: by saying it is “always the mass of these various objects and their distance from the earth that are relevant,” and not mentioning motion, we know he was only thinking about Newtonian Mechanics.
* * * * *
Should we, with Fodor, believe that we are stuck in a philosophical absurdity?
No. What I said in my original criticism of Fodor, found in What Fodor Got Wrong (18 March 09), still applies. Though the above description of the problem is likely clearer than my analysis based on his claims that Natural Selection is statistical and that the struggle for survival is only a metaphor, the problem of causal structure is the same. My solution focuses on using individual struggles as local interactions of Natural Selection — like a gravitational field in General Relativity — and hence provides the causal structure that Fodor wanted.
[EDIT 6 April 2010: I'm thinking I gave Fodor too much credit in this post. I now think his arguments amount to saying that for each instance of evolution we have, we are merely relaying natural history, not a causal explanation. The argument I attributed to Fodor above says that evolution by natural selection is natural history. Fodor must be more agnostic about evolution's ontology because of how he says it is possible to look for some alternative to natural selection in his reply to Block and Kitcher. My solution is still viable though: since I provide causal structure, this also provides how to describe evolution in a causal way.]
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03.11.10
Posted in argumentation, biology, epistemology, evolution, ontology, philosophy, physics, science at 12:42 am by nogre
1. Biology is epistemically independent of physics:
Let’s assume that biology is not epistemically independent of physics, i.e. to know any biology we must first know something about physics. However, consider evolution as determined by natural selection and the struggle for survival. We can know about the struggle for survival and natural selection without appealing to physics — just as Darwin did when he created the theory — and hence we can fundamentally understand at least some, if not most, of biology independent of physics.
2. Physics supervenes on biology:
Whatever ability we have to comprehend is an evolved skill. Therefore any physical understanding of the world, as an instance of general comprehension, supervenes on the biology of this skill.
3. Biology is just as fundamental as physics:
If the principles involved in biology and physics are epistemically independent and each can be said to supervene on the other, then neither has theoretical primordiality.
Therefore physics is not ontologically basic.
.
.
[This argument was inspired by a discussion over at It's Only a Theory start by Mohan Matthen.
And I want it to be known that I HATE SUPERVENIENCE. Basically if you use supervenience regularly then you are a BAD PERSON. The only good argument that uses supervenience is one that reduces the overall usage of the word: it is my hope that the above argument will prevent people from saying that biology supervenes on physics. For every argument in which I thought that using supervenience might prove useful, I found a much, much superior argument that did not make use of the term. I know you always live to regret statements like this, but right now I don't care.]
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02.24.10
Posted in argumentation, biology, evolution, philosophy, random idiocy, science, wild conjecture at 10:48 pm by nogre
I was trying to figure out what Fodor could have been thinking. Here’s what I came up with:
- If we are trying to figure out what Evolution has done, then we presuppose that Evolution is capable of doing something.
- If Evolution is capable of doing something, then there must be some mechanism of Evolution that does the doing.
Now imagine yourself in the position of the mechanism of Evolution that does the doing, i.e. the mechanism that selects the traits that yield a higher fitness.
The question becomes: is it possible for you to select for a trait?
The answer is NO.
To understand why, consider what happens when we try to give an evolutionary explanation of something: we are beset by a near infinite selection of different possibilities. Only through careful study can we narrow down which traits are actually the ones that increase an organism’s fitness and, if we are in a historical context, only give a most likely candidate for such a trait.
Now imagine yourself back in the position of the mechanism. The mechanism is stuck with the exact same sort of problem that we have when trying to figure out what it has done: it has no more an ability to select a single trait than we have to figure out which trait it has selected with our first guess. Whenever it tries to select for a trait, it may mistakenly also select for another trait that is not so good for the organism, or it may not have even recognized the trait it thought it was selecting for.
Therefore, since this mechanism can’t work, evolution is bunk.
OK. Now let’s take a step back and look at this argument. Basically there are two parts: the first part is an argument that there is a mechanism that does the doing and the second part says the mechanism can’t have done anything. When I saw Fodor speak on this topic, I believe (it was a while ago now) he spent a good deal of time on arguing for the first part and I didn’t really understand what he was up to. Now it makes sense because if we accept that there is some mechanism that does the doing, then we may be committed to admitting to at least some amount of skepticism about evolution based upon the second part. Getting even some skepticism about evolution would be a sufficiently large accomplishment, and so I figure this must be Fodor’s ultimate goal.
In light of this argument I offer this wild conjecture for your reading pleasure:
Replace “mechanism” with “agent”. Now, instead of an argument against evolution, it is an argument against Intelligent Design. Intelligent Design has the designer/ agent built directly into it, and this makes the argument much more knock-down: There is no need to argue for the existence of a mechanism because it is right in the title, and since the intelligence of ID is something like our intelligence, it makes sense that it would suffer from the same problems that ours does.
What I think happened is that Fodor was sitting around thinking why intelligent design doesn’t work and realized that if he could make a strong enough argument that evolution also required some sort of agent, in the form of an evolutionary mechanism, then he could return a similar result. Since having a technical reason for discounting ID wouldn’t make much of splash, Fodor dropped the argument against ID and pursued the argument against evolution.
Personally I kind of like this argument against ID. If I ever run into some ID people, I may even bring it up.
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