09.17.09

On Charitability

Posted in language, metaphysics, ontology, philosophy at 7:45 pm by nogre

There is no such thing as a private reality.  By private reality I mean any portion of reality that you alone can experience, that no one else could possibly understand.

There is, however, reality that is yet unexperienced and unknown to you.  Others may have experienced it before you, like explorers who have been to a far away place.  If a philosopher is clever, it is possible that she found a way to imbue her words with such an experience.  Since there are no private realities, it is also possible that you may be able to extract those experiences.

The allure of philosophy is then the allure of the unknown, the exotic and unexplored.  To be charitable is to approach philosophy in search of some yet unknown bit of reality.

Under these circumstances it is futile to give specific instructions on how to be charitable; each of us must understand how to prepare ourselves for adventuring beyond the relative comfort of what we know.

If anything, have faith in yourself and do not make assumptions (even charitable ones) about what you are doing.

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08.11.09

Do We Understand the Principle of Charity?

Posted in language, philosophy at 2:19 pm by nogre

When trying to understand an unknown philosophy (or philosopher) we are taught that we should give that philosophy every possible opportunity to say something relevant.  This practice is called using the Principle of Charity and there are various ways philosophers go about implementing it (via Wikipedia):

By believing

1. The other uses words in the ordinary way;
2. The other makes true statements;
3. The other makes valid arguments;
4. The other says something interesting.

I do not believe using any of these methods is sufficient if you want to be charitable.

Case 1:

We can be charitable by believing the other uses words in the ordinary way.

Even if the oracle (speaker or text) uses words in the ‘ordinary way’, it may be that those words are irrelevant to the current topic.  Conversely the oracle may not use words in the ‘ordinary way’ but those words could still be relevant to the current topic.

For instance many people do not use English words in ways I consider ‘normal’ as a native English speaker, but it’s rather common that those folks have something very relevant to say about philosophy.  On the other hand there are many people who speak English quite fluently without anything interesting to say.

Case 2:

We can be charitable by believing the other makes true statements.

Even if the oracle makes true statements, it may be that those true statements are irrelevant to the current topic.  Conversely the oracle may not make true statements, but those false/ambiguous statements could still be relevant to the current topic.

For instance someone could be wrong but for the right reasons, i.e. he or she may have identified many of the critical presuppositions that underlie a topic.  Though the person has made a mistake in deriving the conclusion, he or she may yet progress our understanding.  On the other hand is a machine that continually prints out true statements of the sort “The sky is blue iff the sky is blue” and “Grass is yellow iff grass is yellow.”  We wouldn’t find such a machine to be making relevant statements.

Case 3:

We can be charitable by believing the other makes valid arguments.

Even if the oracle makes valid arguments, it may be that those arguments are irrelevant to the current topic.  Conversely the oracle may not make valid arguments, but those arguments could still be relevant to the current topic.

For instance a person may be right but for the wrong reasons, i.e. he or she may somehow have arrived at brilliant conclusions using the shoddiest reasoning practices.  Just because this person has bad technical execution does not mean we should ignore his or her interesting results.  On the other hand is the machine from the previous example that has perfect logical execution, but says nothing worthwhile.

Case 4:

We can be charitable by believing the other says something interesting.

This is question begging.  We cannot use the concept of interesting to explain what makes something interesting or relevant.

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These examples show that the scheme illustrated above is insufficient to provide a charitable understanding of a text or philosopher.

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02.02.09

Equinumerosity

Posted in Frege, language, philosophy at 2:03 am by nogre

Why should anyone believe that the concept of equinumerosity is any more fundamental than any other concept?

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This has bugged me for years….

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01.09.09

Truth is… and other short thoughts

Posted in ethics, language, logic, metaphysics, ontology, philosophy, science at 1:04 pm by nogre

Truth is whatever you are willing to wager your sanity on.  This works because sanity is relative to people, so if you are willing to wager your sanity on something, so should other people.

Deontology has a problem because no one can definitively tell you what it is to follow a rule.  So deontologists can’t fault others for appealing to unexplained concepts without undermining their own argument.

Whereas the meanings of particular words may be conventional and subject to historical accident, there are distinctions that the words create that are not conventional.  If logical operators are conventional, but must exist is every possible world (you must define the world using such operators), then conventional loses its meaning: it ceases to be a convention and is instead a necessity of the universe.

The concept of structure in ‘structural realism’ is ontological, causing problems for ontic structural realists.  By calling the theory structural, structural realists are attempting to exploit the concepts associated with ‘structure’ from areas other than philosophy of science.  This means that the term is not being used ontically because the concept of structure is taken to have real properties.  So at every turn ontic structural realists are appealing to an ontological concept.

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oh and information aesthetics is back from break! woohoo!

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11.10.08

Part 2 of the Preterphysics: Metaphysical Ontology

Posted in art, epistemology, ethics, language, logic, metaphysics, mind, ontology, philosophy, preterphysics, science at 4:12 pm by nogre

What follows is the second part of my metaphysics, which includes the basic outline of just about everything in this world: nature, science, ethics, language and more.  Again it is impossibly short, but the overall structure is correct, so you get a flavor of how I think about everything non-preterphysical.

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1 Metaphysical Ontology

1.1 Undisciplined Substances

To be disciplined is to take other people’s ontological position into consideration. Since it is impossible, without being crazy, to do otherwise, what is meant by `undisciplined’ is the minimal position: to take other people’s ontological position into consideration as little as possible.

1.1.1 Objects, Processes and Nature

Objects cannot exists alone. To observe an object, to recognize its existence, requires observing some process that the object is part of. Rational beings can lose their rationality; the process of losing rationality identifies a rational being, because the process could not occur without the existence of one.

Objects and processes are what make up Nature.

1.1.2 Words, Descriptions and Language

Words cannot exist alone; they are inseparable from descriptions. For a word to exist is for that word to be part of some description. Without being part of a description, a word is indistinguishable from anything else.

Words and descriptions are what make up Language.

1.1.3 Commitments, Values and Responsibility

Commitments cannot exist alone; they are inseparable from values. Values are how commitments are ranked. Without values all commitments are equal, and hence non-existent.

Commitments and values are what make up Responsibility.

1.2 Disciplined Substances

When you take other people into consideration when considering substance, then you have disciplined substance.

1.2.1 Science, Art and Craft

When we describe objects and processes in a disciplined way then we are describing nature scientifically. This means that the objects and processes are described in a way that is not limited to a particular person or place.

Craft is a level of discipline that is not as universalized: when you describe nature such that it refers to a group of people or various places, then you are describing craft.

1.2.2 Grammar, Logic and Rhetoric

When we describe words and descriptions in a disciplined way then we are are talking about the language’s grammar. This means that the words and descriptions are described in a way that is not limited to a particular description. If we are describing features that all languages have, then this is called logic.

Rhetoric is a level of discipline that is not as universalized: when you describe grammar such that it refers to a group of words or descriptions, then you are describing rhetoric.

1.2.3 Ethics, Worldview and Society

When we describe commitments and values in a disciplined way then we are talking about ethical responsibilities. This means that the commitments and values are described in a way that is not limited to a particular person or place. If we are describing features that all ethics have then this is a worldview.

Society is a level of discipline that is not as universalized: when you describe ethics such that it refers to a group of commitments or values, then you are describing a society.

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09.29.08

Magic

Posted in language, philosophy, science, technology at 11:40 am by nogre

Perhaps there is magic that some people have and others do not, and cannot, have.  I do not know.  However there is more than one way to skin a cat.

Consider the maxim, “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”  What does ‘sufficiently advanced technology’ mean?   The words ‘sufficiently advanced’ imply there is something futuristic about this technology, but this is not a necessary requirement; the technology needs to be different from what is known, but not futuristic.  Any unknown technology is indistinguishable from magic.

Of course there are plenty of technologies that I am unfamiliar with that I do not count as magic.  The upshot is that knowledge is not the determining factor in distinguishing magic because any one of us may be ignorant of a particular technology, but, if we desired to, we could go find out how the unknown technologies work.  Magic requires that we cannot simply pick up a book and read how a something happens.

Therefore a more accurate description of magic is: Any unexplainable technology is indistinguishable from magic.  If some technology is unexplainable then how it works cannot be written.

We now have a question of technology and meaning: if some technology is unexplainable, then what is the purpose of calling that thing technology? To ascribe a property to some unknown object is begging the question and hence the use of the world technology in this instance is misleading:

Anything unexplainable is indistinguishable from magic.

This description of magic may seem like a non-starter because it would be impossible to learn something that is unexplainable by definition.  However, magic only requires a special kind of unexplainability: magic cannot be explained in terms of science.  So magic is not completely unexplainable, only scientifically unexplainable.

As broadly construed as possible, science is a description of the world in terms of objects made up of other objects according to some process.  Physics tries to find the smallest objects that, when combined by some process, make up all the biggest objects in the universe.  Biology looks to find the fundamental objects and processes that make up ecosystems and life.

To get around science we would need something that necessarily cannot be described in terms of another object according to any process.  This might seem impossible because of the open-ended ‘according to any process’ clause but, compositional accounts of natural language have consistently failed in certain circumstances. Therefore, if you wish to look for magic, I suggest understanding why this happens.

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