07.13.10
Posted in General Relativity, Relativity, biology, epistemology, evolution, fitness, measurement, philosophy, physics, science at 5:18 pm by nogre
New theory of evolution! Hooray!
Patched a bunch of things together to make a nice story. Fixed the little issue about fitness being circular. Expanded natural selection to apply more generally. Causal structure. Epistemological foundations. ooOoOO0Ooooooo.
And it’s good fun. I swear. Epistemology, history of physics, evolution… makes me happy. You should really read it.
Download here. [pdf, 304kb]
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03.11.10
Posted in argumentation, biology, epistemology, evolution, ontology, philosophy, physics, science at 12:42 am by nogre
1. Biology is epistemically independent of physics:
Let’s assume that biology is not epistemically independent of physics, i.e. to know any biology we must first know something about physics. However, consider evolution as determined by natural selection and the struggle for survival. We can know about the struggle for survival and natural selection without appealing to physics — just as Darwin did when he created the theory — and hence we can fundamentally understand at least some, if not most, of biology independent of physics.
2. Physics supervenes on biology:
Whatever ability we have to comprehend is an evolved skill. Therefore any physical understanding of the world, as an instance of general comprehension, supervenes on the biology of this skill.
3. Biology is just as fundamental as physics:
If the principles involved in biology and physics are epistemically independent and each can be said to supervene on the other, then neither has theoretical primordiality.
Therefore physics is not ontologically basic.
.
.
[This argument was inspired by a discussion over at It's Only a Theory start by Mohan Matthen.
And I want it to be known that I HATE SUPERVENIENCE. Basically if you use supervenience regularly then you are a BAD PERSON. The only good argument that uses supervenience is one that reduces the overall usage of the word: it is my hope that the above argument will prevent people from saying that biology supervenes on physics. For every argument in which I thought that using supervenience might prove useful, I found a much, much superior argument that did not make use of the term. I know you always live to regret statements like this, but right now I don't care.]
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10.18.09
Posted in epistemology, game theory, logic, philosophy at 6:37 pm by nogre
In the Monty Hall Problem a contestant is given a choice between one of three doors, with a fabulous prize behind only one door. After the initial door is selected the host, Monty Hall, opens one of the other doors that does not reveal a prize. Then the contestant is given the option to switch his or her choice to the remaining door, or stick with the original selection. The question is whether it is better to stick or switch.
The answer is that it is better to switch because the probability of winning after switching is two out of three, whereas sticking with the original selection leaves the contestant with the original winning probability of one out of three. Why?
The trick to understanding why this occurs is to view the situation not from the contestant’s viewpoint, but from Monty Hall’s. At the outset, from Monty’s point of view, the contestant has a one out of three chance of guessing the correct door. In the likely situation (two out of three) that the contestant chose wrongly, Monty then has to know where the prize is among the two remaining doors in order to open a door that does not reveal the prize. So Monty opens a door not revealing the prize and asks the contestant whether he or she would like to switch or not.
However, the contestant knows that in the likely (two out of three) situation that the initial choice was wrong, Monty had to know where the prize was in order to open the door that did not contain the prize. Since the contestant knows that Monty has to know where the prize is to make the correct choice, the contestant can (in this likely case) place him or herself in Monty’s shoes. At this point Monty knows that the remaining door is the one that contains the prize, and hence the contestant should switch.
If we consider the unlikely situation in which the contestant initially chose the door with the prize behind it, then this line of reasoning will not work. Imagine that Monty forgets the location of the prize every time the contestant guesses correctly. In this situation he can still open either of the remaining doors without ever ruining the game. From his perspective the location of the prize is unrelated to his actions; it played no part in his decision to open one door or another (he merely chose a door the contestant hadn’t).
So, in the one out of three case where the contestant initially selected the correct door, there is no way to deduce whether switching is beneficial based upon placing oneself in Monty’s shoes: the situation where Monty has forgotten the prize’s location is indistinguishable from a situation in which he has not forgotten. Without any way to further analyze the situation and tilt the odds to over one out of three, the contestant should always assume that he or she is in the previous, more likely, situation and take the opportunity to switch.1
.
1Imagine that the contestant has a guardian angel that will let the game run its course if the contestant switches doors, but will change the location of the prize such that if the contestant sticks with the original door the angel will make sure that the contestant wins four out of five times. Then the probability of winning while switching will stay at 2/3 but the probability of winning while sticking will be 4/5. If the contestant had some way of divining that this was happening, this would be a case in which further analysis would be of benefit.
File translated from TEX by TTH, version 3.79.
On 13 Aug 2009, 13:48.
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09.24.09
Posted in epistemology, philosophy, wittgenstein at 11:32 pm by nogre
Today I was in a shop and a young mother came in with her stroller and a handbag with an image of a sleeping rabbit in a forest of mushrooms. The rabbit had a thought bubble that read, “A rabbit in a forest of mushrooms.”
I told her I liked the bag… I don’t think she realized that it had reminded me of the last paragraph of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty:
676. “But even if in such cases I can’t be mistaken, isn’t it possible that I am drugged?” If I am and if the drug has taken away my consciousness, then I am not now really talking and thinking. I cannot seriously suppose that I am at this moment dreaming. Someone who, dreaming, says “I am dreaming”, even if he speaks audibly in doing so, is no more right than if he said in his dream “it is raining”, while it was in fact raining. Even if his dream were actually connected with the noise of the rain.
The rabbit had created a visible dream-thought bubble that had correctly identified his actual situation, though the rabbit was asleep.
Does the rabbit’s dream-thought count as justified true belief? It may well be justified because the rabbit could be observing it’s surroundings within the dream (and those images could be connected to reality through memory), it is apparently true, and the rabbit believes it (according to the rules of thought bubble attribution). So the dream-thought of the rabbit seems to qualify as Justified-True-Belief, but I don’t believe we normally count dream-thoughts as knowledge.
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05.22.09
Posted in biology, epistemology, evolution, independence friendly logic, ontology, philosophy, physics, science at 9:23 pm by nogre
Q: What is a multiple star system?
A: More than one star in a non-reducible mutual relationship spinning around each other.
Q: How did it begin?
A: Well, I guess, the stars were out in space and at some point they became close in proximity. Then their gravitations caused each other to alter their course and become intertwined.
Q: How did the gravitations cause the courses of the stars to become intertwined? Gravity does one thing: it changes the shape of space-time; it does not intertwine things.
A: That seems right. It is not only the gravities that cause this to happen. It is both the trajectory and mass (gravity) of the stars in relation to each other that caused them to form a multiple star system.
Q: Saying that it is both the trajectories and the masses in relation to each other is not an answer. That is what is in need of being explained.
A: You are asking the impossible. I have already said that the relation is non-reducible. I am not going to go back upon my word in order to reduce the relation into some other relation to explain it to you. The best that can be done is to describe it as best we can.
Here is the problem: If you have a non-reducible relation (e.g., a 3-body problem or a logical mutual interdependence) then you cannot explain how it came to exist. Explaining such things would mean that the relation was reducible. But being unable to explain some scientific phenomenon violates the principle of science: we should be able to explain physical phenomenon. Then the relation must not be non-reducible or it must have been a preexisting condition going all the way back to the origin of the universe. Either you have a contradiction or it is unexplainable by definition.
–
What can we do? You can hold out for a solution to the 3-body-problem or, alternatively, you can change what counts as explanation. The latter option is the way to go, though, I am not going into this now.
For now I just want to illustrate that this problem of non-reducibility and explanation is pervasive:
Q: What is a biological symbiotic relationship?
A: More than one organism living in a non-reducible relationship together.
Q: How did it begin?
A: Well, I guess, the organisms were out in nature and at some point they became close in proximity. Then their features caused each other to alter their evolution and become intertwined.
Q: How did the features cause the courses of their evolution to become intertwined? Physical features do one thing: they enable an organism to reproduce; they do not intertwine things.
A: That seems right. It is not only the features that cause this to happen. It is both the ecosystem and the features of the organisms in relation to each other that caused them to form a symbiosis.
Q: Saying that it is both the place the organisms are living in and their features in relation to each other is not an answer. That is what is in need of being explained.
A: You are asking the impossible. I have already said that the relation is non-reducible. I am not going to go back upon my word in order to reduce the relation into some other relation to explain it to you. The best that can be done is to describe it as best we can.
As you can see, I am drawing a parallel between a multiple body problem and multiple organisms that live together. Like the star example above, there is no way to explain the origins of organisms living together. Even in the most basic case it is impossible.
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04.26.09
Posted in epistemology, metaphysics, ontology, philosophy, wittgenstein at 7:27 pm by nogre
Of late I’ve become increasingly concerned with the meaning of identity. When we say, ‘x = x,’ we don’t mean that the x on the left is exactly identical to the x on the right because the x on the left is just that, on the left, and the x on the right is on the right, not the left. Since equality would be useless without having 2 different objects (try to imagine the use of a reflexive identity symbol, i.e., one that for whatever object it is applies to, indicates that the object is identical with itself), there is something mysterious about the use of identity.
But what is the mystery? It cannot be anything to do with the subjects being declared identical: these objects are arbitrary to the particular topic being discussed. For example if I say ‘the morning star = the evening star’ then we are talking about planets, and if I say that ’3 = y’ then I am talking about numbers. The identity sign is the same in both, even though the objects being discussed are rather different.
It is easy enough to believe that by paying attention to the different objects being declared identical we can know how to act (some sort of context principle *cringe*). But this doesn’t address the question specifically: although we can know how to use the identity symbol in specific instances, this tells us nothing about how identity works or what it means.
Take a look at this:
 |
= |
|
The picture is the same save for location on the webpage.
———–
But what if we call the one on the left a duck and the one on the right a rabbit: what is different? The features obviously don’t change, only the way we are seeing (perceiving? apprehending? looking at? interpreting?) the two images.
(Triple bonus points to anyone who can look at the two pictures at once and see one as a duck and the other as a rabbit. Hint- it is easier for me to do it if I try to see the one on the left as a rabbit and the one on the right as a duck… focus on the mouths.)
In this example, as opposed to the others discussed above, a decision was required to be made – to see one picture one way and the other another way – before the differences even existed. Now, in the above examples it appeared that there was a difference of knowledge: at one point we didn’t know that the evening star and morning star were one and the same, or that y was equal to 3. This isn’t the case when looking at identical duckrabbit pictures because there is nothing about the two pictures that is different; the difference is entirely in the mind.
Let me make a suggestion about how to describe the phenomenon of being able to see one image two different ways: the image can be instantiated in two different ways, i.e. it has an associated universe with a population of two. There are two possible descriptions associated with this image and until we make a decision about how to describe it, the image is like an uninstantiated formula.
Identity, then, is an indication that the two associated objects are things that can be generalized to the same formula. The picture of the duck and the picture of the rabbit can be called identical because they both have a single general formula (the duckrabbit picture) that can be instantiated into either. The identity symbol indicates that the two associated objects are two instantiations of the same general thing, be it a number, planet or image (but not objects in space-time because that would be self-contradictory… space-time and instantiation, a topic for another day).
How identity works can now be identified: it is to instantiate and generalize. Consider the mystery of how we see the duckrabbit one way or the other: no one can tell you how you are able to see the image one way or the other. However, you are able to instantiate the image in one way and then another, and recognize that both the duck and rabbit are shown by the same image.
Instantiation and generalization are skills and the identity symbol between the two images above indicates that you have to use that skill to generalized both to one formula. Most of the time it is non-trivial to instantiate or generalize in order to show two things (formulas) to be equal. In the case of the duckrabbit it is trivial because the work went into the instantiation process (to see the images one way or the other); in the other examples the situation is reversed, such that we had the instantiations but not the general formula. In all cases, though, only when we can go back and forth between different instantiations and a single generalization do we claim two things identical.
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01.23.09
Posted in argumentation, epistemology, logic, philosophy at 1:19 pm by nogre
Basic argument structure goes like this:
- Premise 1
- Premise 2
———————–
- Conclusion
Knowing how to argue is great, except when someone you disagree with is proving things you don’t like. In that case you have to know how to break your opponent’s argument or provide an argument that they cannot break.
First thing that most people do to break an argument is to attack premises (assuming no fallacies are present). To avoid accepting your opponent’s conclusion in line 3, if you can cast doubt on the truth of premise 1, then your opponent will never get to line 3.
Personally I think this sucks. I hate arguing about the truth of premises because many times people have no idea what the truth is and hold unbelievably stupid positions.
G. E. Moore argued that if the conclusion is more certain than the premises, then you can flip the argument:
- Conclusion
- Premise 2
———————–
- Premise 1
Instead of arguing about the truth of the premises, this strategy pits the premises against the conclusion by arguing that while the premises imply the conclusion, the conclusion also implies the premises. Hence there is a question about which should be used to prove the other, and, as long as this question remains, nothing is proved.
This leads to a kind of argument holism. An argument must first be judged on the relative certainties of its premises and conclusion before the premises can even be considered to be used to derive the conclusion.
Personally I think this is great. It is possible to just ignore whole arguments on the grounds that the person arguing hasn’t taken into account the relative certainties involved. If you haven’t ensured that your premises are more certain than your conclusion, then you can’t expect anyone to accept your conclusion based upon those premises.
However this leads to a nasty problem. If all arguments are subject to this sort of holism, then arguments can be reduced to their conclusions: if the whole argument is of equal certainty, i.e. the conclusion is just as certain as a premise, then there is no reason to bother with the premises. If we just deal with conclusions, and everyone is certain of their own conclusions, then arguing is useless.
(In practice, of course, only mostly useless. You can (try to) undermine someone’s argument by finding something more certain and incompatible with the conclusion in question (premises are always a good place to start looking). For better or worse, though, even when people’s premises have been destroyed, all too often they still are certain of their conclusions.)
Moreover, if everyone is certain of their conclusions, then no conclusion is any more certain than another. If everything has equal certainty, then nothing is certain.
How to get around this problem of equal certainty?
First let me mention that this is a strictly philosophical problem: in daily life we have greater certainty in some things than we do in others. For instance I trust certain people, and hence if they say something is true then I will be more certain of it’s truth than if someone else were to say the same thing. So fair warning: what comes next is a philosophical solution to a philosophical problem.
If something and its opposite are equally certain, then, generally, there is nothing more that we can know about it. For example if we know that it is either raining or not raining, then we really don’t know much about the weather. This applies in all cases, except for paradoxes. In a paradox something and its opposite imply each other. Hence, in a paradox, there is only one thing, not a thing and it’s negation.
Most the time paradoxes only shows us things that cannot exist. However, if what caused the paradox was the negation of something, then we can have certainty in that thing: it’s negation cannot exist on pain of paradox.
Therefore, to provided a rock solid foundation for an argument, a paradox must be appealed to such that the paradox must have been generated from the negation of the thing to be used as a premise.
As far as I can tell, this is the only argument structure that yields absolutely certain results. All other arguments styles are subject to questions about the truth of premises and the legitimacy of using those premises (even if true) for proving a particular conclusion.
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12.12.08
Posted in epistemology, logic, ontology, philosophy, preterphysics at 12:30 pm by nogre
Well, I guess this is it, the conclusion of this strange little saga which has been my foray into metaphysics. I get to go teach elementary school in rural Austria now. 2 whole pages in which you get to learn how to go from insanity to wisdom.
I have a final total version that contains the prologue and metaphysical ontology (slightly edited) here/ pdf. It’s just over 4 pages in length. I suspect I’ll edit some more and eventually I’ll have to do more with the middle section, but since it was the beginning and the end that really mattered to my current interests, I’m in no rush.
It is very odd completing everything you ever set out to complete (yes, it is a very good question why anyone should set out to write a new metaphysics and have no other plans). But I am happy I accomplished what I wanted. Truth is I never really thought I would.
1 Preterphysics
(Sometimes not everyone understands.)
Everyone has experienced misunderstanding: either you have been misunderstood, misunderstood someone else, or, more likely, both.
When some do not understand and others do, then there is something different between the two groups: one group recognizes something about the world or themselves that the other does not. It is this mutual recognition that allows for metaphysical agreement, and lack thereof for metaphysical disagreement.
To change metaphysical understanding means to recognize, discover or invent something that was not previously recognized, which likewise identifies a deficiency in the prior understanding. However, this means going outside of your prior metaphysics and thence the failure of ontological relativity.
With the denial of accepted metaphysics, some (if not all) things that everyone previously believed to exist will now be denied. The people who believe the prior metaphysics are excluded, at least initially, from understanding the new metaphysics and hence ontological relativity fails. The person who is denying the prior metaphysics may be considered insane by those that are excluded (which could be everyone).
Moreover, when ontological relativity is foregone, the denial of insanity is put into question. Making a unique claim is, at first, indistinguishable from nonsense because there is nothing comparable anyone else has ever said. If no one has ever made a similar claim then there is no way to tell whether you have become damaged, i.e. lost your mind, and if this claim is metaphysical, it can lead to changes in all other aspects of thinking. Therefore changing your metaphysics is done at the risk of going insane.
No one pulls something from the metaphysical vacuum without risking being pulled in themself.
Metaphysical research done with love discovers a new worldview in relation to responsiblity to others. Therefore, since others are included, it is possible to change your metaphysical position without the completele loss of ontological relativity.
If you love with respect to other people, then you need not fear new worldviews. Any change that you make will inherently have something in common with others, even if they do not yet recognize what you have recognized. Moreover, any inferior worldview will be apparent because it will be comparatively limited in ways to identify with others.
Without love having a fractured worldview with shattered responsibilities is possible. You can start to be worried when you are unsure of what your commitments to yourself are: if you are not commited to valuing your sanity, then you have lost your ability to deny insanity.
Metaphysical research done with force discovers a new logic in relation to the language of others. Therefore, since others are included, it is possible to change your metaphysical position without the completele loss of ontological relativity.
If you use force with respect to other people, then you need not fear new logic. Any change that you make will inherently have something in common with others, even if they do not yet recognize what you have recognized. Moreover, any inferior logic will be apparent because it will be comparatively limited in ways to change others.
Without force having a fractured logic with shattered language is possible. You can start to be worried when you are unsure of what your own words describe: if you cannot describe insanity, then you have lost your ability to deny it.
1.3 Creativity
Metaphysical research done with creativity discovers a new science in relation to other peoples’ view of nature. Therefore, since others are included, it is possible to change your metaphysical position without the completele loss of ontological relativity.
If you create with respect to other people, then you need not fear new science. Any change that you make will inherently have something in common with others, even if they do not yet recognize what you have recognized. Moreover, any inferior science will be apparent because it will be comparatively limited in ways to explore the world.
Without creativity having a fractured science with a shattered view of nature is possible. You can start to be worried when you are unsure of your own existence: if you cannot be sure of the existence of your sanity, then you cannot deny that you are insane.
2 Conclusion
If you have love, force and creativity then you are assured rationality even in unfamiliar territory. This means you have wisdom: the ability or skill to maintain and adapt your knowledge to future situations is called wisdom. Hence the greater love, force and creativity that you wield, the greater will be your wisdom.
Moreover, the basic metaphysics derived from the denial of insanity can now be built upon with confidence. Discipline is the foundation knowledge and wisdom is how we are able to extend it. If every distinction is made in such a way, then there will be no need to fear any argument.
File translated from TEX by TTH, version 3.79. On 11 Dec 2008, 14:42.
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11.10.08
Posted in art, epistemology, ethics, language, logic, metaphysics, mind, ontology, philosophy, preterphysics, science at 4:12 pm by nogre
What follows is the second part of my metaphysics, which includes the basic outline of just about everything in this world: nature, science, ethics, language and more. Again it is impossibly short, but the overall structure is correct, so you get a flavor of how I think about everything non-preterphysical.
————
1 Metaphysical Ontology
1.1 Undisciplined Substances
To be disciplined is to take other people’s ontological position into consideration. Since it is impossible, without being crazy, to do otherwise, what is meant by `undisciplined’ is the minimal position: to take other people’s ontological position into consideration as little as possible.
1.1.1 Objects, Processes and Nature
Objects cannot exists alone. To observe an object, to recognize its existence, requires observing some process that the object is part of. Rational beings can lose their rationality; the process of losing rationality identifies a rational being, because the process could not occur without the existence of one.
Objects and processes are what make up Nature.
1.1.2 Words, Descriptions and Language
Words cannot exist alone; they are inseparable from descriptions. For a word to exist is for that word to be part of some description. Without being part of a description, a word is indistinguishable from anything else.
Words and descriptions are what make up Language.
1.1.3 Commitments, Values and Responsibility
Commitments cannot exist alone; they are inseparable from values. Values are how commitments are ranked. Without values all commitments are equal, and hence non-existent.
Commitments and values are what make up Responsibility.
1.2 Disciplined Substances
When you take other people into consideration when considering substance, then you have disciplined substance.
1.2.1 Science, Art and Craft
When we describe objects and processes in a disciplined way then we are describing nature scientifically. This means that the objects and processes are described in a way that is not limited to a particular person or place.
Craft is a level of discipline that is not as universalized: when you describe nature such that it refers to a group of people or various places, then you are describing craft.
1.2.2 Grammar, Logic and Rhetoric
When we describe words and descriptions in a disciplined way then we are are talking about the language’s grammar. This means that the words and descriptions are described in a way that is not limited to a particular description. If we are describing features that all languages have, then this is called logic.
Rhetoric is a level of discipline that is not as universalized: when you describe grammar such that it refers to a group of words or descriptions, then you are describing rhetoric.
1.2.3 Ethics, Worldview and Society
When we describe commitments and values in a disciplined way then we are talking about ethical responsibilities. This means that the commitments and values are described in a way that is not limited to a particular person or place. If we are describing features that all ethics have then this is a worldview.
Society is a level of discipline that is not as universalized: when you describe ethics such that it refers to a group of commitments or values, then you are describing a society.
File translated from TEX by TTH, version 3.79. On 10 Nov 2008, 14:59.
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10.25.08
Posted in epistemology, metaphysics, ontology, philosophy, preterphysics at 3:07 pm by nogre
A word of explanation before the actual text. Besides never setting out to write something like this, I think it is at best good; likely not too bad. Perhaps it is horrible, but all these determinations I leave to others. I wrote it because I felt there was nothing else to be done, and it is the best I can do at the moment.
So what did I write? The best way to describe the Prologue is to make a comparison to Descartes Cogito. I set out the barest basics for what I believe can be used as a foundation for knowledge and inquiry, and for what exists in general. And all in less than a page…
1 Prologue: Insanity
If am insane, then I have a problem. If I believe that I am insane, then there is nothing to be done because I am irreparably damaged and won’t be able to learn or understand anything.
I do not believe myself insane.
1.1 Substances
If I affirm the previous sentence then I may infer a few things:
- Descriptions and words exist, else I wouldn’t have been able to make the above statement; I wrote it.
- Commitments exist, else I wouldn’t have been able to affirm the above statement; I’m committed to it.
- Something other than words, descriptions and commitments exist, else I wouldn’t have had anything to describe or commit to.
These three existential statements are inferred from affirming that I am not insane. So if you say you are not insane then you can also be said to believe in commitments, descriptions, and other objects.
1.2 Discipline
Being irreparably damaged is the same as being insane; if damaged you’re incapable of understanding what others can understand. Therefore if you deny that you are insane then you deny that you are damaged.
Anyone who asserts that they are not damaged, not insane, is committed to an ontology that everyone who is sane will understand.
If it were false, i.e. you claim you are not insane and you are committed to an ontology that some who are sane cannot understand, then those who you say cannot understand are damaged in some way becaues they cannot understand but are also not insane. However, claiming that someone is incapable of understanding but not insane is nonsense.
Therefore there is no preferential ontological perspective: ontology is relative to the sane. All sane people are equal in the sense that they can understand each other, are reasonable, when researching the kinds of things that exist. This is not to say that there won’t be disagreements or that understanding will not take time and effort, but that there is no third option of being niether sane nor insane. Either you understand and can be understood or you do not and cannot. and this space between sanity and insanity will be dealt with in the section on preterphysics.
File translated from TEX by TTH, version 3.79. On 25 Oct 2008, 14:43.
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