Calendar

Abstract: These lectures report on my recent work in tracing out a path through a variety of philosophical attempts to appropriate developments in contemporaneous science on behalf of an evolving conception of “scientific” philosophy beginning with Kant and extending to the present.  I concentrate, in particular, on Kant and the post-Kantian tradition.  This includes the Naturphilosophie of Schelling and Hegel, the neo-Kantian reaction to Naturphilosophie initiated by Helmholtz, and the ensuing contributions to nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophy and science by Mach, Poincaré, and Einstein.  I then consider the neo-Kantianism of Ernst Cassirer and (yes) Thomas Kuhn, which finally leads to my own attempt to develop a post-Kuhnian approach to the philosophy of science in the light of this history.

Conventional wisdom holds that since the advent of the first full theories of quantum mechanics in the mid-1920s, the Copenhagen interpretation has been the default interpretation of quantum mechanics, and has enjoyed the support of a majority of physicists ever since. This is not the case. While it is indeed true that a majority of physicists have long professed that they subscribe to the Copenhagen interpretation, the plain fact of the matter is that there is no single coherent position known as the Copenhagen interpretation, nor has there ever been one. Moreover, none of the positions that go by the name “Copenhagen interpretation” do a good job of solving the measurement problem, the central interpretive problem at the heart of quantum foundations. Nor do they evade the nonlocality that is dictated by Bell’s theorem. In this talk, I will give an overview of the history of the Copenhagen interpretation from 1926 to the present, explain its multiple inconsistencies and failures, and attempt an answer at a persistent puzzle: why does the Copenhagen interpretation remain popular among physicists despite its manifest flaws and the existence of multiple superior alternatives

About the speaker: Adam Becker is the author of What is Real? The Unfinished Quest for the Meaning of Quantum Physics. He has a PhD in physics from the University of Michigan and he is the recipient of an Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Book Grant. He is currently a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley’s Office for History of Science and Technology.

February 9: Jessie Munton Philosophy, New York University “How Long Is ‘a’ Visual Experience?”

March 9: Taylor Webb Neuroscience Institute and Cognitive Science, Princeton University Title TBA

April 13: Eleni Manolakaki Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens “Propositions as Measures of Mind”

For spring 2018, the CUNY Cognitive Science Speaker Series will meet once a month. We’ll return to weekly talks in fall 2018.

All talks are at the CUNY Graduate Center, 365 Fifth Avenue, room 7-102, Fridays, 1-3 pm. http://bit.ly/cs-talks

PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.

Summer Program:

In perception, the world is represented by me. So goes a very naive thesis about perception. Yet when faced with phenomena of hallucination and illusion many theorists come to accept that in perception one merely represents a possible world that can more or less accurately match the actual world. Recently, a much more radical thesis arose: Perception is probabilistic. This would mean that in perception one does not simply represent one possible world, but one represents multiple possible worlds at the same time each to a certain degree. Should we come to accept this preposterous claim? I argue for the conservative position that perception is not probabilistic. We do find sub-personal probabilistic representations in certain neural populations of the perceptual apparatus. Yet, contrary to what has been suggested elsewhere, for instance the role perception plays in justifying beliefs merely requires a degreed notion which is not of probabilistic structure. And, most importantly, our phenomenology does not involve conflicting alternative hypothesis with certain degrees.

PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.

Summer Program:

PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.

Summer Program:

PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.

Summer Program: