Abstract: Causal modeling was developed within Artificial Intelligence over the last few decades in order to formally capture causal information, which is notably absent from statistics. Aside from the undeniable impact this has had on Artificial Intelligence, where talk of causal networks has become commonplace, the resulting formalisms were also eagerly picked up by philosophers working on causation. In particular, causal modeling has been used rather successfully in constructing formal definitions of actual causation, aka token causation. Given that actual causation occupies a crucial role in many issues in philosophy, causal modeling is a helpful tool to anyone studying those issues, that much is obvious. However, I argue that even in the absence of any definition of causation, causal modeling can still be put to significant use in order to resolve these issues. Concretely, my talk will consist of three parts. First I introduce my own definition of causation using causal models. Second I illustrate how causal models can be used to clarify and possibly settle the debate about Frankfurt-style cases and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Third I use causal models to sketch the position of non-reductive physicalism, and show how this allows it to tackle the famous Exclusion Argument.
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room TBA of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows:
Sep 17. Sander Breckers, Utrecht
Sep 24. Hanoch Ben-Yami, CEU
Oct 1. Otavio Bueno, Miami
Oct 8. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING
Oct 15. Alfredo Freire, Campinas
Oct 22. Yale Weiss, GC
Oct 29. Boris Kment, Princeton
Nov 5. Melissa Fusco, Columbia
Nov 12. Amy Seymour, Fordham
Nov 19. Andrew Tedder, UConn
Nov 26. Justin Bledin, Johns Hopkins
Dec 3. Suki Finn, Southampton
Dec 10. Byong Yi, Toronto
I present a logic system I recently developed (RSL 2014), the Quantified Argument Calculus or Quarc. Quarc is closer in syntax and logical properties to Natural Language than is the Predicate Calculus, on any of its versions, and it is no less powerful than the first-order Predicate Calculus. This makes analysing the Barcan formulas and necessary existence by its means particularly interesting. As we shall see, the analogues in Quarc of the Barcan formulas and their converses are straightforwardly invalid. And, since quantification and existence in Quarc come apart, existence isn’t logically necessary. The issues with both the Barcan formulas and necessary existence were an artefact of a specific formal language, the Predicate Calculus, and they are eliminated once it is replaced by a formal language with a claim of providing an improved representation of the logic of Natural Language.
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 6494 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows:
Sep 17. Sander Breckers, Utrecht
Sep 24. Hanoch Ben-Yami, CEU
Oct 1. Otavio Bueno, Miami
Oct 8. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING
Oct 15. Alfredo Freire, Campinas
Oct 22. Yale Weiss, GC
Oct 29. Boris Kment, Princeton
Nov 5. Melissa Fusco, Columbia
Nov 12. Amy Seymour, Fordham
Nov 19. Andrew Tedder, UConn
Nov 26. Justin Bledin, Johns Hopkins
Dec 3. Suki Finn, Southampton
Dec 10. Byong Yi, Toronto
Robyn Marasco (Hunter College) will deliver a paper entitled “Hegel’s Esotericism,” and Jeremy M. Glick (Hunter College) will respond.
The Sorites paradox offers an unsettling situation in which, in light of its premises and the apparent validity of the argument, one may be inclined to take the argument to be sound. But this entails that vague concepts, ubiquitous and indispensable to express salient features of the world, are ultimately inconsistent, or at least the application conditions of these concepts seem to lead one directly into contradiction. In what follows, I argue that this inconsistent understanding of vagueness is difficult to resist, but it is also hard to accept. First, I point out that a number of approaches to vagueness that try to resist this conclusion ultimately fail. But it is also difficult to accept the inconsistency approach. After all, vague concepts do not seem to be inconsistent. Second, even if the inconsistency view turned out to be true, the phenomenology of vague concepts (and such concepts, after all, do not seem to be inconsistent at all) can be accommodated. Contextual factors force one to apply inconsistent concepts consistently by arbitrarily resisting to apply the concepts once a locally determined threshold is met. This yields the impression that vague concepts are consistent. As a result, in light of the apparent non-inconsistent nature of vagueness, on the one hand, and the Sorites argument that supports the opposite view, on the other, it is unclear how to establish whether vague concepts ultimately are inconsistent or not. This explains why the Sorites paradox, despite centuries of reflection, does not go away, and why it is unclear how to settle, in one way or another, a significant aspect of the nature of vagueness.
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 6494 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows:
Sep 17. Sander Breckers, Utrecht
Sep 24. Hanoch Ben-Yami, CEU
Oct 1. Otavio Bueno, Miami
Oct 8. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING
Oct 15. Alfredo Freire, Campinas
Oct 22. Yale Weiss, GC
Oct 29. Boris Kment, Princeton
Nov 5. Melissa Fusco, Columbia
Nov 12. Amy Seymour, Fordham
Nov 19. Andrew Tedder, UConn
Nov 26. Justin Bledin, Johns Hopkins
Dec 3. Suki Finn, Southampton
Dec 10. Byong Yi, Toronto
The Saul Kripke Center is delighted to announce that Brian Cross Porter (PhD student, CUNY) will give the second talk in our Young Scholars Series, on October 11th, 2pm – 4pm, in room 3207.
The title is “Kripke’s Fixed Point Construction and the V-Curry Paradox.”
The series is an opportunity for graduate students and early career faculty from throughout the CUNY system to present material on philosophy, computer science and linguistics that is connected to Saul’s work.
n his seminal work Counterfactuals, David Lewis presents a family of systems of conditional logic—his V-family—which includes both his preferred logic of counterfactuals (VC/C1) and Stalnaker’s conditional logic (VCS/C2). Graham Priest posed the problem of finding systems of (labeled) tableaux for logics from Lewis’s V-family in his Introduction to Non-Classical Logic (2008, p. 93). In this talk, I present a solution to this problem: sound and complete (labeled) tableaux for Lewis’s V-logics. Errors and shortcomings in recent work on this problem are identified and corrected (especially close attention is given to a recent paper by Negri and Sbardolini, whose approach anticipates my own). While most of the systems I present are analytic, the tableaux I give for Stalnaker’s VCS and its extensions make use of a version of the Cut rule and, consequently, are non-analytic. I conjecture that Cut is eliminable from these tableaux and discuss problems encountered in trying to prove this.
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 6494 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows:
Sep 17. Sander Breckers, Utrecht
Sep 24. Hanoch Ben-Yami, CEU
Oct 1. Otavio Bueno, Miami
Oct 8. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING
Oct 15. Alfredo Freire, Campinas
Oct 22. Yale Weiss, GC
Oct 29. Boris Kment, Princeton
Nov 5. Melissa Fusco, Columbia
Nov 12. Amy Seymour, Fordham
Nov 19. Andrew Tedder, UConn
Nov 26. Justin Bledin, Johns Hopkins
Dec 3. Suki Finn, Southampton
Dec 10. Byong Yi, Toronto
Alfredo Ferrarin, professor of Philosophy at the University of Pisa on “Hegel and the Actuality of Thinking”.
Since the discovery of the Loweinheim-Skolem theorem, it has been largely held that there is no purely formal way of fixing a model for any first order theory. Because of this, many have focused on having a relative account of models, establishing the expressive power of one model in its ability to internalize models for other theories. One can, for instance, define a plurality of models for PA from a given model for ZF, and this may be understood as evidence for the ontology of arithmetics being reducible to the ontology of set theory. In this presentation, I argue that a close attention to what it means to reduce an ontology shows that methods of reduction are generally not neutral and make it possible for weaker models to reduce stronger ones. For this, I analyze the known model-theoretical reduction of NBG into ZF proved by Novak, showing that a more demanding method makes it impossible for ZF to internalize NBG. We finish this presentation by showing how this view, together with some technical results, provide a positive account in defense of the multiversalist perspective on set theory.
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 6494 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows:
Sep 17. Sander Breckers, Utrecht
Sep 24. Hanoch Ben-Yami, CEU
Oct 1. Otavio Bueno, Miami
Oct 8. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING
Oct 15. Alfredo Freire, Campinas
Oct 22. Yale Weiss, GC
Oct 29. Boris Kment, Princeton
Nov 5. Melissa Fusco, Columbia
Nov 12. Amy Seymour, Fordham
Nov 19. Andrew Tedder, UConn
Nov 26. Justin Bledin, Johns Hopkins
Dec 3. Suki Finn, Southampton
Dec 10. Byong Yi, Toronto
The Department of German at NYU and Deutsches Haus at NYU present a discussion between Slavoj Žižek, Rebecca Comay, and Frank Ruda which will revolve around Comay and Ruda’s book The Dash—The Other Side of Absolute Knowing.
Event information
In The Dash—The Other Side of Absolute Knowing (MIT Press, 2018), the authors present a reading of Hegel’s most reviled concept, absolute knowing. Their book sets out from a counterintuitive premise: the “mystical shell” of Hegel’s system proves to be its most “rational kernel.” Hegel’s radicalism is located precisely at the point where his thought seems to regress most. Most current readings try to update Hegel’s thought by pruning back his grandiose claims to “absolute knowing,” but Comay and Ruda invert this deflationary gesture by inflating what seems to be most trivial: the truth of the absolute is grasped only in the minutiae of its most mundane appearances. What if everything turns out to hinge on the most inconspicuous and trivial detail—a punctuation mark?
About the speakers
Slavoj Žižek, is a senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, and a visiting professor at a number of American Universities (Columbia, Princeton, New School for Social Research, New York University, University of Michigan). He obtained his Ph.D. in Philosophy in Ljubljana studying Psychoanalysis. He also studied at the University of Paris. Slavoj Zizek is a Hegelian philosopher, Lacanian psychoanalyst, and Marxist social analyst. He is the author of The Indivisible Remainder, The Sublime Object of Ideology, The Metastases of Enjoyment, Looking Awry: Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture, The Plague of Fantasies, and The Ticklish Subject. His latest publications are Disparities, and Antigone (both at Bloomsbury Press, London).
Rebecca Comay, is Professor of Philosophy and Comparative Literature at the University of Toronto. Other publications include Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution (Stanford, 2011) and Hegel and Resistance, co-ed with Bart Zandtvoort (Bloomsbury, 2018).
Frank Ruda, is Senior Lecturer for Philosophy at the University of Dundee, UK. Other publications include: Reading Marx (with Slavoj Žižek and Agon Hamza)(Polity, 2018); Abolishing Freedom: A Plea for A Contemporary Use of Fatalism (Nebraska UP, 2016); For Badiou: Idealism without Idealism (Northwestern UP, 2015).
Attendance information
Events at Deutsches Haus are free of charge. If you would like to attend this event, please send us an email to deutscheshaus.rsvp@nyu.edu. Space at Deutsches Haus is limited, please arrive ten minutes prior to the event. Thank you!
“A Dash of Hegel: A Discussion with Slavoj Žižek, Rebecca Comay, and Frank Ruda” is a DAAD supported event.
This paper discusses a cluster of interrelated paradoxes, including the semantic and property-theoretic paradoxes (such as the paradox of heterologicality), as well as the set-theoretic paradoxes and the Russell-Myhill paradox. I argue that an independently motivated theory of metaphysical grounding provides philosophically satisfying treatments of these paradoxes. It yields as corollaries a version of the iterative conception of set and an analogous solution to Russell-Myhill. Moreover, it generates a paracomplete solution to the property-theoretic paradoxes. This solution also applies to the semantic paradoxes, which can be subsumed under the property-theoretic ones. The treatment of the property-theoretic paradoxes has structural similarities to Kripke’s approach to the Liar, and it promises to resolve the main outstanding difficulties for this position, such as revenge cases and the problem of adding a conditional with a sufficiently strong logic.
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 in room 6494 of the Graduate Center, CUNY (365 5th Avenue). The (provisional) schedule is as follows:
Sep 17. Sander Breckers, Utrecht
Sep 24. Hanoch Ben-Yami, CEU
Oct 1. Otavio Bueno, Miami
Oct 8. GC CLOSED. NO MEETING
Oct 15. Alfredo Freire, Campinas
Oct 22. Yale Weiss, GC
Oct 29. Boris Kment, Princeton
Nov 5. Melissa Fusco, Columbia
Nov 12. Amy Seymour, Fordham
Nov 19. Andrew Tedder, UConn
Nov 26. Justin Bledin, Johns Hopkins
Dec 3. Suki Finn, Southampton
Dec 10. Byong Yi, Toronto