A number of puzzles concerning how truth-ascriptions are grounded have recently been discovered by several theorists, following Fine (2010). Most previous commentators on these puzzles have taken them to shed light on the theory of ground. In this paper, I argue that they also shed light on the theory of truth. In particular, I argue that the notion of ground can be deployed to clearly articulate one strand of deflationary thinking about truth, according to which truth is “metaphysically lightweight.” I will propose a ground-theoretic explication of the (entirely bearable) lightness of truth, and then show how this broadly deflationary view yields a novel solution to the puzzles concerning how truth is grounded. So, if the proposal I sketch is on target, the theory of truth and the theory of ground interact fruitfully: we can apply the notion of ground to offer a clear explication of the deflationist claim that truth is “metaphysically lightweight” that both captures the motivations for that claim and solves the puzzles.
In public discourse, but also in political theory, the opinion prevails, that democracy is incompatible with aspirations of truth. Some assume, in the Hobbesian tradition, that civic peace requires that truth assertions be restricted to science and religion (normative positivism), whereas the political sphere is constituted by interests, bargaining and collective decisions based on interests, bargaining and rules of aggregation, be they implicit or explicit. In this perspective Collective Choice as preference aggregation is paradigmatic for the understanding of democracy. Postmodernist and neo-pragmatist thought dismisses truth, because it threatens solidarity and belonging. Libertarian political thought relies on market mechanisms reducing citizens to consumers and producers of material and immaterial goods like security and welfare. Accounts of deliberative democracy focus on reasoning in the public sphere but dismiss a realistic understanding of truth, because it is thought to threaten collective and individual self-determination.
In my talk I will argue that a realistic understanding of empirical and normative truth is compatible, even necessary, for an adequate understanding of democracy, that truth assertions do not threaten civic peace, that postmodernist relativity undermines democratic practice, that libertarian market-orientation is incompatible with the status of citizens in democracy and that even deliberative, but anti-realist, accounts of democracy do not allow for an adequate understanding of democracy. My argument is based on a Davidsonian, or pragmatist, understanding of truth, therefore one might say: it critizises normative positivism, postmodernism, libertarianism, and critical theory using pragmatist insights.
Julian Nida-Rümelin presently holds a chair for philosophy and political theory at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, is a member of the European Academy of Sciences, was president of the German Philosophical Association (DGphil) and state-minister for culture and media in the first government of Gerhard Schröder. The topics of his books include Democracy as Cooperation (1999); Democracy and Truth (2006), translated in Chinese and Italian, Philosophy and the form of Life (2009), Realism (2018) and A Theory of Practical Reason (2020, forthcoming, de Gruyter and PUP).
Generous support provided by the New York Institute of Philosophy.
The Saul Kripke Center is pleased to announce that James Walsh (Assistant Professor, Philosophy, NYU) will deliver a talk on Friday, May 10th, 2024, from 4:15 to 6:15 pm at the CUNY Graduate Center (Room 9207). The talk is free and open to all.
Title: Modal definability and Kripke’s theory of truth
Abstract: In Outline of a Theory of Truth, Kripke introduces some of the central concepts of the logical study of truth and paradox. He informally defines some of these–such as groundedness and paradoxicality–using modal locutions. We introduce a modal language for regimenting Kripke’s informal definitions and characterize the modally definable sets. Though groundedness and paradoxicality are expressible in the modal language, we prove that intrinsicality–which Kripke emphasizes but does not define modally–is not.
Registration is free but required. Registration will open online in early October. All questions about the event should be sent to philo.modernconference@nyu.edu.
Friday, November 15
9:30–9:55 Check–in and Coffee
9:55 Welcome
10:00–12:00 Baruch Spinoza
Speaker: Kristin Primus (University of California, Berkeley)
“Spinoza and Our Eternal Mind”
Commentator: John Grey (Michigan State University)
12:00–2:00 Lunch Break
2:00–4:00 Margaret Cavendish
Speaker: Marcy Lascano (University of Kansas)
“‘There is nothing I Dread More than Death’: Cavendish on Death and the Afterlife”
Commentator: Deborah Boyle (College of Charleston)
4:00–4:30 Coffee Break
4:30–6:00 Immanuel Kant
Speaker: Andrew Chignell (Princeton University)
“Kant’s Theoretical Argument for a Future Life”
Commentator: Jochen Bojanowski (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
6:30–7:30 Reception
Saturday, November 16
9:30–10:00 Check–in and Coffee
10:00–12:00 Søren Kierkegaard
Speaker: Clare Carlisle (King’s College London)
“Close to Death: Kierkegaard on Im/mortality and Philosophy”
Commentator: John J. Davenport (Fordham University)
12:00–2:00 Lunch Break
2:00–4:00 Martin Heidegger
Speaker: Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford University)
“Heidegger and the Possibility of Death”
Commentator: Sean Kelly (Harvard University)
4:00–4:30 Coffee Break
4:30–6:30 Contemporary
Speaker: Michael Cholbi (University of Edinburgh)
“Immortal Lives and the Varieties of Agency”
Commentator: Ben Bradley (Syracuse University)
6:30–7:30 Reception
Don Garrett, Anja Jauernig, John Richardson,
Sponsored by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and the Department of Philosophy.