Calendar

The workshop, which is now in its 10th year, aims to foster exchange and collaboration among scholars, students, and anyone with an interest in Early Modern Philosophy. This year’s workshop will focus on the topic of “Mind, Body, Passion” in Early Modern Philosophy (roughly the period from 1600-1800).

We welcome submissions on the conference topic, which may be broadly construed to include mind-body identity, mind-body interaction, embodiment, philosophy of emotion, aesthetics, etc. For consideration, please submit abstracts of 250-300 words to newyorkcityearlymodern@gmail.com no later than December 31, 2019.

Keynote speakers:

Organisers:

Our 12th annual workshop will take place entirely on-line. The workshop will focus on the topic of “Expanding the Early Modern Canon.” We are calling for papers on figures, topics, texts, and genres that have been standardly neglected within the study of early modern philosophy; e.g., women philosophers, philosophy of education, letters, and novels.

Please submit anonymized abstracts of 250-500 words to newyorkcityearlymodern@gmail.com by April 1st, 2022.

Speakers:

Organisers:

Keynote: Naomi Zack (Lehman College, CUNY)
One of philosophy’s original questions still plagues us: to what extent are beings the same and to what extent do they differ? Arising in thinkers as diverse as Parmenides, Aquinas, and De Beauvoir and in arenas from social and political philosophy to phenomenology and metaphysics. This conference aims to gather graduate student scholars from a variety of specializations to discuss their work on identity and difference. Some of the many questions we may pursue together are the following:

What constitutes identity and difference? What makes someone who they are? How do we understand ourselves to be alike enough to communicate, yet different enough that we must work to understand another’s point of view? How do identity and difference shape belonging–within a community, within a social institution, within a political structure? Similarly, how do differences among the members of a group enrich the identity of that collective? How might overlapping identities of an individual give rise to one’s sense of self? How does identity inform a given group’s philosophical thought? How might one form their identity and sense of self when, as in the case of many marginalized groups/ minorities, the “self” is oppressed?

These questions additionally motivate ontological considerations. To what extent can we describe two objects that are in fact identical? What grants an object’s or a person’s identity over time: metaphysical characteristics, temporal continuity, or certain brain states? Upon what aspects of an entity do we predicate differences? When are two things metaphysically or logically identical? Are mereological composites more than the sum of their parts? Are they identical to matter? To what extent do beings differ from Being? How might experiences or acts of reason help ground an identity claim such as A=A?

Other questions broadly related to “Identity and Difference” are also welcome.

Please submit a 300-500 word abstract prepared for blind review to fordhamgradconference@gmail.com in PDF format. In the body of the email, please include:

• Name
• Email
• Paper title
• Institutional Affiliation

Submissions are due by Friday, December 30, 2022. After anonymous review, applicants will be notified by Tuesday, January 17, 2023. Presentations will be limited to 20 minutes.

The conference will take place in person on March 3-4, 2023 on Fordham University’s Rose Hill campus located at 441 East Fordham Road, Bronx, NY 10458.

For questions, please contact the conference organizers at fordhamgradconference@gmail.com

Richard J. Bernstein first encountered John Dewey’s pragmatist naturalism as a graduate student at Yale University, where  “Dewey’s naturalistic vision of the relation of experience and nature—how human beings as natural creatures are related to the rest of nature—spoke deeply to me.” This early enthusiasm for Dewey’s naturalistic vision never left him. During the final years of his long life, Bernstein finished two books that return to issues of pragmatist naturalism.

·       His Pragmatic Naturalism: John Dewey’s Living Legacy (2020), traces differing versions of Deweyan naturalism in the works of contemporary philosophers, including Robert Brandom, John McDowell, Richard Rorty, Wilfrid Sellars, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Philip Kitcher, Bjorn Ramberg, David Macarthur, Steven Levine, Mark Johnson, Robert Sinclair, Huw Price, and Joseph Rouse.

·       In his final book, The Vicissitudes of Nature (2022), Bernstein clarifies his own pragmatist naturalism in relation to the thinking of earlier modern philosophers: Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.

This conference will critically assess and expand the legacy of Bernstein’s final pragmatic naturalism as expressed in these two books. Accepted papers will be collected for publication.

The New York Pragmatist Forum

Paper topics may include: 

●      Bernstein’s discussion of Dewey’s thinking in relation to contemporary philosophers’ formulations of naturalism in Pragmatic Naturalism: John Dewey’s Living Legacy.

●      Bernstein’s interpretation of an earlier thinker’s understanding of naturalism or nature in The Vicissitudes of Nature (Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, or Freud).

●      A larger theme or problem that brings one of these Bernstein’s texts into conversation with philosophical naturalism, either particular expressions or conceptual issues.

●      The consequences of one or both of these texts for questions of naturalism in relation to wider social and political questions, e.g., democracy, praxis, critique.

Abstracts: Please submit an abstract of no more than 500 words to tara@newschool.edu.

Submission Deadline: May 22, 2023 

NYPF Conference Committee:

Sergio Gallegos, John Jay College of Criminal Justice

Judith Green, Fordham University
Brendan Hogan, New York University

Tara Mastrelli, New School for Social Research

David Woods, New York University

Ideas about “identity” and “difference” proliferate in the news media, in higher education, in political disputations, and in critical theories of society.  Claims about “identity” and “difference” can readily be found at work in a wide variety of typologies, including those of race, class, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, religion, nationality, political affiliation, ability and disability, animality and humanity, etc.  But what exactly do we mean when we speak of “identity” or “difference”?  And if we achieve greater clarity about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “identity” and “difference,” what difference would that make?

A serious metaphysical examination of “identity” and “difference” will expectedly generate a wide variety of questions.  Is discourse about what is “identical” reducible to discourse about what is “the same”?  Is discourse about what is “different” reducible to discourse about what is “other”?  Can something be “the same” without being “identical,” and can something be “other” without being “different”?  When we speak about “being,” does our speaking about it have many different senses (is it spoken of analogically), or instead does our speaking about being always have the same sense (is it spoken of univocally)?  Does the “identity” of a thing depend mainly on the thing’s status as an individual, or does it depend instead on the thing’s membership in a general kind?  Does an understanding of identity depend on some reference to what is different?  Or does an understanding of difference depend on some reference to identity?  What is the relation of knowing to being: is it one of identity, or difference, or some combination of both?  Is it possible for a knower to discern real differences between things without discerning intelligible differences, or does the indiscernibility of intelligible differences imply that there are no real differences at all but rather an identity?  Does difference depend on negation, or can one assert that there is difference without having to assert that something is “not”?  Does it make sense to speak of an ontological difference, i.e., a difference between Being and beings, or is it senseless  – maybe even useless – to speak of a difference between Being and beings?  Is “being” different from “nothing,” or is it possible for differences to exist only among beings (in which case there apparently cannot be a difference between “being” and “nothing”)?

In spite of the virtual ubiquity of discourses about identity and difference, there is a dearth of discourse about the metaphysical presuppositions and implications of “identity and difference.”  With its choice of conference theme for 2024 (“Identity, Difference, and the Difference that Metaphysics Makes”), the Metaphysical Society of America wishes to provoke deeper thinking about the metaphysics of identity and difference, with the hope that such deeper thinking will make a meaningful difference in both theory and practice.

Proposals for papers on the conference theme are especially encouraged, but papers on other metaphysical topics are also welcome.  Please note: when selecting which submissions to accept for this conference, the Program Committee will regard “relevance to theme” as one important criterion among others.

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Guidelines for the Submission of Abstracts, and for Aristotle and Plato Prize Candidates

Abstracts of approximately 500 words should be submitted electronically by September 30, 2023, to: secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.

Aristotle Prize: Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize of the Metaphysical Society should submit full papers along with their abstracts.  Eligibility for the Aristotle Prize extends only to persons who have not yet earned a Ph.D..  Those wishing to be considered for the Aristotle Prize should express this wish clearly in the email note that accompanies their submission.  Papers submitted for the Aristotle Prize are subject to a 3,750 word limit; this word limit applies to the body of the text to be read at the meeting, and not to footnotes or other supporting material.  The Aristotle Prize carries a cash award of $500, inclusion in the program, and assistance with the costs associated with attending the meeting.  To be considered for the Aristotle Prize, full papers and abstracts must be submitted by September 30, 2023 to:secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.

Plato Prize: Those wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize of the Metaphysical Society should submit full papers along with their abstracts.  Eligibility for the Plato Prize extends only to persons who received a Ph.D. degree within six years of the conference submission date (i.e., persons who hold a Ph.D. degree which was conferred after September 30, 2017).  Those wishing to be considered for the Plato Prize should express this wish clearly in the email note that accompanies their submission.  Papers submitted for the Plato Prize are subject to a 3,750 word limit; this word limit applies to the body of the text to be read at the meeting, and not to footnotes or other supporting material.  The Plato Prize carries a cash award of $500, inclusion in the program, and assistance with the costs associated with attending the meeting.  To be considered for the Plato Prize, full papers and abstracts must be submitted by September 30, 2023 to:secretary@metaphysicalsociety.org.

Travel Grants: Thanks to the generous support of past presidents of the MSA and a grant from the Hocking-Cabot Fund for Systematic Philosophy, the Metaphysical Society is pleased to be able to offer reimbursements for travel expenses up to $350 to graduate students whose papers are selected for the conference program (those wishing to receive such reimbursements must provide the Metaphysical Society with all relevant expense-receipts).

Those who submit abstracts, and those who submit full papers plus abstracts for the Aristotle Prize or Plato Prize, will receive notice of the Program Committee’s decision on their submission no later than December 1, 2023.

Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon began as a multidisciplinary, web-based journal in which an assemblage of contributions focused on a single concept with the express intention of re-situating its meaning in the field of political discourse. By reflecting on what has remained unquestioned or unthought in that concept, this all-around collection of essays seeks to open pathways for another future—one that is not already determined and ill-fated.

From this forum for engaged scholarship, a succession of academic conferences have sprung as a space for conversation and constructive debate, including its Graduate Conference at the New School for Social Research organized by students of the Departments of Anthropology, Economics, Philosophy, Politics, and Sociology. Political Concepts invites graduate students from all fields of study to participate in our upcoming conference in Spring 2024. Held at NSSR over March 29-30, the conference will serve as a workshop of ideas on the multiplicity of powers, structures, problems, and orientations that shape our collective life.

Because Political Concepts does not predetermine what does or does not count as political, the conference welcomes essays that fashion new political concepts or demonstrate how concepts deserve to be taken as politically significant. Papers should be dedicated to a single political concept, like an encyclopedia entry, but the analysis of the concept does not have to abide to traditional approaches. Some of the concepts contended with in previous years’ vibrant conferences included abolition, survival, catastrophe, resentment, money, dependence, trans, imaginary, and solidarity. Other examples can be found in the published papers on the Political Concepts website.

Abstracts should be no longer than 750 words in a pdf format, and prepared for blind review, so please ensure that your abstract is free from any identifying personal details. Please title your abstract with your concept. Abstracts must be submitted through this google form (https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfyVC0H0LSpcyJ3QpcbAvZjEkcUYoS-TCp0kPc6ObTg4YFSiQ/viewform) by December 7, 2023 EST. Any inquiries can be sent to politicalconceptsNSSR@gmail.com.

Applicants must be advanced graduate students and their concept must be a central part of a longer term project in order to be accepted. Results will be informed in January.

2024 Fordham University Philosophy Graduate Student Conference

March 29 & 30, 2024

Hosted by the Fordham Philosophical Society

Keynotes: Dr. Serene J. Khader (CUNY), Dr. Michael Baur (Fordham)

Beginning in 18th Century Europe, the idea of progress emerged as a central theme in philosophy, finding its clearest expression in thinkers like Kant, Hegel and Marx. However, a growing skepticism towards the notion of progress emerged in 20th Century thought, intensified particularly by the critical insights of philosophers such as Adorno, Lyotard and Derrida. In more recent studies, some decolonial philosophers have problematized or rejected the idea of progress, whereas other philosophers associated with the Frankfurt school (Habermas, Honneth, Forst) have defended it.

This conference will provide a platform to examine, debate, and reevaluate the concept of progress along with its meaning, its challenges, and its potential for shaping a more promising future against our contemporary backdrop of global challenges. We invite graduate students in philosophy to submit abstracts that explore the “Possibility of Progress” through the aforementioned frameworks and any other relevant discourse. We welcome your participation and look forward to your contributions.

Possible topics may include, but are not limited to:

• Progress and Freedom
• Progress in Human Rights and Social Justice
• Progress and Political Struggle
• The Role of Language in Shaping Power and Progress
• Notions of Moral Progress
• Progress and Happiness
• Progress as an Imperative
• The Dark Side of Progress and Its Unintended Consequences
•  Critiques from Postcolonial and Decolonial Perspectives
• Progress in Feminist Theory
• The Future of Progress
• Pre-modern Notions of Progress
• Teleological Versus Non-teleological Progress
• Historicism and Progress
• Progress in Religious Thought
• Progress and Enlightenment Thought
• Progress in the History of Philosophy
• Theories in Scientific Progress
• The Pursuit of Progress and the Search for Meaning

Other work broadly related to “The Possibility of Progress” is also welcome.

Please submit a 300-500 word abstract prepared for blind review to fordhamgradconference@gmail.com in PDF format. In the body of the email, please include:

Name

Email

Paper title

Keywords (maximum five)

Institutional Affiliation

Submissions are due by December 30, 2023. After anonymous review, applicants will be notified by January 20, 2024. Presentations will be limited to 20 minutes followed by a 10 minute Q&A.

The conference will take place in person on March 29 & 30, 2024 on Fordham University’s Rose Hill campus located at 441 East Fordham Road, Bronx, NY 10458.

For questions, please contact the conference organizers at fordhamgradconference@gmail.com

https://philevents.org/event/show/114750

Speakers:

Organisers: