Mar
29
Fri
Bjorndahl: The Epistemology of Nondeterminism. Logic, Probability, and Games Seminar @ Faculty House, Columbia U
Mar 29 @ 4:00 pm

Propositional dynamic logic (PDL) is a framework for reasoning about nondeterministic program executions (or, more generally, nondeterministic actions). In this setting, nondeterminism is taken as a primitive: a program is nondeterministic iff it has multiple possible outcomes. But what is the sense of “possibility” at play here? This talk explores an epistemic interpretation: working in an enriched logical setting, we represent nondeterminism as a relationship between a program and an agent deriving from the agent’s (in)ability to adequately measure the dynamics of the program execution. More precisely, using topology to capture the observational powers of an agent, we define the nondeterministic outcomes of a given program execution to be those outcomes that the agent is unable to rule out in advance. In this framework, determinism coincides exactly with continuity: that is, determinism is continuity in the observation topology. This allows us to embed PDL into (dynamic) topological (subset space) logic, laying the groundwork for a deeper investigation into the epistemology (and topology) of nondeterminism.

The seminar is concerned with applying formal methods to fundamental issues, with an emphasis on probabilistic reasoning, decision theory and games. In this context “logic” is broadly interpreted as covering applications that involve formal representations. The topics of interest have been researched within a very broad spectrum of different disciplines, including philosophy (logic and epistemology), statistics, economics, and computer science. The seminar is intended to bring together scholars from different fields of research so as to illuminate problems of common interest from different perspectives. Throughout each academic year, meetings are regularly presented by the members of the seminar and distinguished guest speakers.

details tba

02/08/2019 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM

03/29/2019 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM

04/19/2018 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM

Apr
5
Fri
German Idealism Workshop @ Columbia University, Philosophy rm 716
Apr 5 @ 4:30 pm – 6:30 pm

8 February @Columbia

Patricia Kitcher: The Fact of Reason in Kant’s Moral Psychology

Response: Jessica Tizzard

22 February @NSSR

Matters of Love: A Conference

5 April @Columbia

Beatrice Longuenesse: Residues of First Nature

19 April @NSSR

Angelica Nuzzo: Approaching Hegel’s Logic Obliquely: Melville, Moliere, Beckett

Response: David Carlson

10 May @Columbia

Amy Allen: Turning Dead Ends into Through Streets: Psychoanalysis and the Idea of Progress

Apr
19
Fri
German Idealism Workshop @ Columbia University, Philosophy rm 716
Apr 19 @ 4:30 pm – 6:30 pm

8 February @Columbia

Patricia Kitcher: The Fact of Reason in Kant’s Moral Psychology

Response: Jessica Tizzard

22 February @NSSR

Matters of Love: A Conference

5 April @Columbia

Beatrice Longuenesse: Residues of First Nature

19 April @NSSR

Angelica Nuzzo: Approaching Hegel’s Logic Obliquely: Melville, Moliere, Beckett

Response: David Carlson

10 May @Columbia

Amy Allen: Turning Dead Ends into Through Streets: Psychoanalysis and the Idea of Progress

Apr
26
Fri
Huttegger: Rethinking Convergence to the Truth. Simon Huttegger (UC Irvine) @ Faculty House, Columbia U
Apr 26 @ 4:10 pm

Convergence to the truth is viewed with some ambivalence in philosophy of science. On the one hand, methods of inquiry that lead to the truth in the limit are prized as marks of scientific rationality. But an agent who, by using some method, expects to always converge to the truth seems to fail a minimum standard of epistemic modesty. This point was recently brought home by Gordon Belot in his critique of Bayesian epistemology. In this paper I will study convergence to the truth theorems within the framework of Edward Nelson’s radically elementary probability theory. This theory provides an enriched conceptual framework for investigating convergence and gives rise to an appropriately modest from of Bayesianism.

The seminar is concerned with applying formal methods to fundamental issues, with an emphasis on probabilistic reasoning, decision theory and games. In this context “logic” is broadly interpreted as covering applications that involve formal representations. The topics of interest have been researched within a very broad spectrum of different disciplines, including philosophy (logic and epistemology), statistics, economics, and computer science. The seminar is intended to bring together scholars from different fields of research so as to illuminate problems of common interest from different perspectives. Throughout each academic year, meetings are regularly presented by the members of the seminar and distinguished guest speakers.

details tba

02/08/2019 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM

03/22/2019 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM

04/19/2018 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM

May
10
Fri
German Idealism Workshop @ Columbia University, Philosophy rm 716
May 10 @ 4:30 pm – 6:30 pm

8 February @Columbia

Patricia Kitcher: The Fact of Reason in Kant’s Moral Psychology

Response: Jessica Tizzard

22 February @NSSR

Matters of Love: A Conference

5 April @Columbia

Beatrice Longuenesse: Residues of First Nature

19 April @NSSR

Angelica Nuzzo: Approaching Hegel’s Logic Obliquely: Melville, Moliere, Beckett

Response: David Carlson

10 May @Columbia

Amy Allen: Turning Dead Ends into Through Streets: Psychoanalysis and the Idea of Progress

Sep
28
Sat
Isaac Levi Conference and Memorial @ Columbia University, Philosophy rm tba
Sep 28 all-day

Conference Schedule

10AM       Teddy Seidenfeld – Conditional Probability, Conditionalization, and Total Evidence

11AM       Eleonora Cresto – Beyond Indeterminate Utilities. The Case of Neurotic Cake-Cutting

11:20AM  Ignacio Ojea Quintana – Unawareness and Levi’s Consensus as Common Ground

11:40AM  Rush Stewart – Uncertainty, Equality, Fraternity

1PM         Nils-Eric Sahlin – Levi’s Decision Theory: Lessons Learned

1:45PM    Wilfried Sieg – Scientific Theories as Set-Theoretic Predicates?

2:45PM    Panel Discussion – Learning from Levi

Abstracts available in attached documents under “Supporting material.”

Memorial

A memorial service will be held at 5PM at St. Paul’s Chapel on the Columbia campus. Reception to follow on the 7th floor of Philosophy Hall.


https://philevents.org/event/show/75850

Nov
15
Fri
Foundations of Physics Workshop, In Celebration of David Albert’s Birthday @ Columbia U Hamilton Hall 717
Nov 15 – Nov 16 all-day

David Albert’s work has been of seminal importance to the foundations of physics, exerting central influence on the direction the field and laying foundations for much of its ongoing development. In celebration of David’s many past and continuing contributions, we will be hosting a conference at Columbia University on the foundations of physics. We expect talks on a range of topics, including the foundations of quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics, the possible emergence of space and time, the metaphysics of science, and the nature of agency.

Confirmed Speakers

Jeff Barrett (UC Irvine)

Gordon Belot (Michigan)

Craig Callender (UC San Diego)

Sean Carroll (Caltech)

Eddy Chen (UC San Diego)

Sidney Felder (Rutgers)

Alison Fernandes (Dublin)

Shelly Goldstein (Rutgers)

Ned Hall (Harvard)

Barry Loewer (Rutgers)

Tim Maudlin (NYU)

Michael Miller (Toronto)

Alyssa Ney (UC Davis)

Lev Vaidman (Tel Aviv)

David Wallace (Pittsburgh)

Nino Zanghi (Genoa)

Organizing Committee

Alison Fernandes (alison.fernandes@tcd.ie)

Michael Miller (mike.miller@utoronto.ca)

Porter Williams (porterwi@usc.edu)

.

The conference is open to the public. Please direct any questions to Porter Williams (porterwi@usc.edu).

Friday, November 15

8:45 am: Breakfast

9:30 am: Jeff Barrett (UC Irvine): Quantum Randomness and Empirical Underdetermination

10:15 am: Shelly Goldstein (Rutgers): Typicality, Humean Probability, and the Mentaculus

11:00: Coffee Break

11:20 am: Craig Callender (UC San Diego): No Time for Time from No-Time

12:05 pm: Alyssa Ney (UC Davis): WFR or QFT?

12:50: Lunch

2:20 pm: Gordon Belot (Michigan): The Mach-Einstein Principle of 1917-1918

3:05 pm: Sean Carroll (Caltech): The Mentaculus as a Causal Network

3:50: Coffee Break

4:10 pm: David Wallace (Pittsburgh): TBA

4:55 pm: Ned Hall (Harvard): Respectful Deflationism

5:45 pm: Adjourn

Saturday, November 16

8:45 am: Breakfast

9:30 am: Lev Vaidman (Tel Aviv): The many-worlds interpretation and the Born rule

10:15 am: Eddy Chen (UC San Diego): Nomic Vagueness

11:00: Coffee Break

11:20 am: Michael Miller (Toronto): Infrared Cancellation and Measurement

12:05 pm: Alison Fernandes (Trinity College Dublin): The Direction of Records

12:50: Lunch

2:20 pm: Sidney Felder (Rutgers): Gödel’s Rotating Solutions, Bilking, and Natural Laws

3:05 pm: Nino Zanghi (INFN Genova): TBA

3:50: Coffee Break

4:10 pm: Tim Maudlin (NYU): S = k ln(B(W)): Boltzmann entropy, the Second Law, and the Architecture of Hell

4:55 pm: Barry Loewer (Rutgers): The Consequence Argument Meets the Mentaculus

5:45 pm: Adjourn

Mar
27
Fri
New York German Idealism Workshop @ Columbia U, tba
Mar 27 @ 4:30 pm – 6:30 pm

Luca Corti (University of Padua) – March 6

Amy Allen (Penn State) – March 27

Andreja Novakovic (UC Berkeley) – April 3

Alberto Siani (University of Pisa) – May 8

Apr
3
Fri
New York German Idealism Workshop @ Columbia U, tba
Apr 3 @ 4:30 pm – 6:30 pm

Luca Corti (University of Padua) – March 6

Amy Allen (Penn State) – March 27

Andreja Novakovic (UC Berkeley) – April 3

Alberto Siani (University of Pisa) – May 8

Sep
27
Mon
Robert Iliffe – ‘A Thousand Fictions’: Cultism and Delusional Metaphysics in the Newton-Leibniz Disputes @ ZOOM - see site for details
Sep 27 @ 6:00 pm – 7:30 pm

The rich philosophical and mathematical disputes that took place between Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz at the start of the eighteenth century have received more historical attention than any other exchange in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless, in this talk, Robert Iliffe discusses a prominent but neglected aspect of their disagreement, namely the mutual claim that their opponents’ conceptual foundations were fictional, and were the product both of diseased thinking and of illegitimately organized intellectual structures. Newton assailed Leibniz’s allegedly debased metaphysics in various prominent places, and mobilized allies such as Roger Cotes and John Keill to do the same. Nevertheless, by far the most sophisticated critique of illicit philosophical assumptions was launched against Newton by Leibniz in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke. In the Fifth letter to Clarke, Leibniz identified core Newtonian positions as infantile, vulgar, and profoundly irreligious, asserting that they were dangerous fictions that were less plausible and much less edifying than the rational romances of writers in the previous century. Although Leibniz saved his most potent intellectual weapons for his final letter to Clarke, Robert Iliffe suggests that his attack on the fictional status of Newton’s work was no mere codicil to his general critique of Newton’s philosophy, but instead lay at the heart of it. This famous debate, while of course somewhat sui generis, is indicative of more general and dynamic features of intellectual debate.

Event Speaker

Robert Iliffe, Professor of the History of Science at the University of Oxford

Event Information

This event is free and open to the public; Registration required. Please contact scienceandsociety@columbia.edu with any questions.

This event is part of the New York History of Science Lecture Series.