Rebecca Comay, Professor of Philosophy and Comparative Literature, The University of Toronto discusses Hegel and Beckett followed by a response from Paul Kottman of The New School for Social Research.
We live in an era of aesthetics. Art has become both pervasive and powerful – it is displayed not only in museums and galleries but also on the walls of corporations and it is increasingly fused with design. But what makes art so powerful, and in what does its power consist?
According to a widespread view, the power of art – its beauty – lies in the eye of the beholder. What counts as art appears to be a function of individual acts of evaluation supported by powerful institutions. On this account, the power of art stems from a force that is not itself aesthetic, such as the art market and the financial power of speculators. Art expresses, in a disguised form, the power of something else – like money – that lies behind it. In one word, art has lost its autonomy.
In his talk, Markus Gabriel rejects this view. He argues that art is essentially uncontrollable. It is in the nature of the work of art to be autonomous to such a degree that the art world will never manage to overpower it. Ever since the cave paintings of Lascaux, art has taken hold of the human mind and implemented itself in our very being. Thanks to the emergence of art we became human beings, that is, beings who lead their lives in light of an image of the human being and its position in the world and in relation to other species. Due to its structural, ontological power, art itself is and remains radically autonomous. Yet, this power is highly ambiguous, as we cannot control its unfolding.
Markus Gabriel holds the chair for Epistemology, Modern and Contemporary Philosophy at the University of Bonn and is also the Director of the International Center for Philosophy in Bonn as well as the director of the Center for Science at Thought at Bonn.
Presented by The New School for Social Research and Philosophy Department and it is co-sponsored with the Liberal Studies Department.
According to a pervasive and widespread literature, we came, whether we want it or not, to surround our existences with all sorts of narratives: retrospective interpretations of what came before us and how we were born, anticipative stories about what is to come and what we should expect, and, most of all, restless attempts to describe what our present is made of so that we know how to make sense of it. First-person narratives occupy a central position amongst these varieties of narratives, as they give each of us a chance to provide meaning to our lives and achieve some kind of self-understanding.
Taking a resolutely opposite stance, Sartre (in)famously declared through the voice of the main character of his novel La Nausée that stories cannot but betray the lives they claim to describe, and necessarily fail to be faithful to the very experiencing of life that constitutes its specific grain and texture. In which sense is this failure a failure? In which sense must we consider it a failure, if narratives are the privileged device we use to make sense of existences in general, and ours in particular? Wouldn’t it be both tragic and ironical, from that perspective, that we live our lives in a way that remains impervious to our attempts to bring some meaning over our existence, and that first-person narratives should be regarded as fundamentally inadequate to account for life as we live it?
This paper will address these questions in light of the definition of ‘tragic irony’ that Richard Moran draws from his interpretation of Sartre, understanding tragedy as a clash between forms of significance displayed by incompatible perspectives. We will examine in particular the problem raised by first-person narratives, which conflate the seemingly incompatible perspectives of the narrator and of the character of the story. I will argue that Moran’s view fails to show in which sense the failure of first-person narratives are also, according to Sartre, the condition of their success, and that the irony of life might rely first and foremost on its ability to succeed even when and where it fails. After all, isn’t it the most ironical of it all that Sartre, notwithstanding his harsh critique of the fundamental inadequacy of life narratives, ended his literary career with the publication of his most acclaimed autobiography?
Bio:
Pierre-Jean Renaudie is Assistant Professor of philosophy (phenomenology and contemporary German philosophy) at the University of Lyon. He is the author of a book on Husserl’s theory of knowledge (Husserl et les categories. Langage, pensée et perception, Paris, Vrin, 2015), co-edited a book on phenomenology of matter (Phénoménologies de la matière, with C.V. Spaak, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2020) and published many articles, in French and in English, on the phenomenological tradition and its connection with contemporary issues in philosophy of mind. He is a member of the Institut de recherches philosophiques de Lyon (IRPHIL) and an associate member of the Husserl Archives in Paris.
Luca Corti (University of Padua) – March 6
Amy Allen (Penn State) – March 27
Andreja Novakovic (UC Berkeley) – April 3
Alberto Siani (University of Pisa) – May 8
Luca Corti (University of Padua) – March 6
Amy Allen (Penn State) – March 27
Andreja Novakovic (UC Berkeley) – April 3
Alberto Siani (University of Pisa) – May 8
The New York German Idealism Workshop is pleased to announce the first talk of the semester. Alison Stone (Lancaster University) will be giving a talk entitled, “Bettina von Arnim’s Romantic Philosophy in Die Günderode” on September 17 from 10am-12pm EST. Giulia Valpione (Università degli Studi di Padova) will be providing comments.
Join Zoom Meeting https://NewSchool.zoom.us/j/93096095303?pwd=ZjVWaTdLZ0VlNTlPUHFuWmJDVE9DZz09
Please email nygermanidealism@gmail.com to request the paper (and join our listserv), which has already been distributed (as of 9/8/21).
The second talk of the semester will be by Elisa Magrì (Boston College), who will be giving a talk entitled, “Sedimentation and Ethical Memory in Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit.” The talk will take place on October 15 from 4:30-6:30pm EST.
A Zoom link will be provided in advance. Please stay tuned for a poster containing all the events for the fall semester.
We are excited to announce that the first workshop of the semester will take place in person on Friday, September 23rd from *4-6pm* (please note the change in the usual time). Robert Stern (University of Sheffield) will be giving a talk entitled, “Found or Sought? Hegel vs MacIntyre on the Good Life and the Virtues.” Please note that the talk will take place at The New School, Room M104 (The Bark Room), Sheila C. Johnson Design Center (The Sheila C. Johnson Design Center is on the southwest corner of 5th ave and 13th street)
To attend the talk in person you will need to be up-to-date with vaccinations and boosters and set up a CLEAR Health Pass account in advance. Directions for visitor access are below.
The event has been organized by the Wittgenstein Workshop.
Abstract: This paper draws a contrast between Hegel and MacIntyre, treating both as post-Kantian perfectionists. The claim is that while Hegel treats the good life as something found, and to be implemented in the rational state, MacIntyre treats it as something to be sought. This difference, it is argued, is reflected in their respective accounts of the virtues: for Hegel, the key virtue becomes rectitude, whereas for MacIntyre a wider range of virtues is required, to make this quest for the good achievable. Using the characters of Walt and Travis from Paris, Texas to illustrate the argument, it is suggested that the MacIntyrean option is to be preferred.
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15 Feb, 4pm:
James Kreines (Claremont McKenna)
From Shapeless Abyss Towards Self-Developing Thought: Taking Hegel on Spinoza Seriously
@ The New School, Room L502, at 2 W 13th Street
Guests and visitors policies at the New School can be accessed via this website. You will have to download CLEAR and upload proof of vaccination or the results of a rapid test. Please try to arrive 15 minutes earlier so we can help you in case of complications.
Feb 24:
Georg Spoo (Freiburg)
Grounds and Limits of Immanent Critique: Kant, Hegel, Marx
@ Columbia
Mar 3:
Heikki Ikaheimo
Hegel, Humanity, and Social Critique
@ Zoom
Mar 24:
Stephen Howard (KU Leuven)
Kant’s Late Philosophy of Nature: The Opus Postumum
@ Columbia
Apr 11:
Karin de Boer
Does Kant’s Antinomy of Pure Reason Amount to an A Priori History of Rational Cosmology?
@ Columbia
Apr 15, 4pm:
Eva von Redecker
Co-sponsored by the New School Graduate Student Conference
@ The New School
Apr 21:
Giulia Battistoni
NAture, Life, Organizm: The Legacy of Romanticism and Classical German Philosophy in Jonas’ Philosophical Biology
@ The New School
Book discussion on Gwenda-lin Grewal’s, Thinking About Death in Plato’s Euthydemus. A Close Reading and New Translation (OUP 2022)
Speakers:
Gwenda-lin Grewal (NSSR)
Cinzia Arruzza (NSSR)
Nicholas Pappas (CUNY)
Thinking of Death places Plato’s Euthydemus among the dialogues that surround the trial and death of Socrates. A premonition of philosophy’s fate arrives in the form of Socrates’ encounter with the two-headed sophist pair, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, who appear as if they are the ghost of the Socrates of Aristophanes’ Thinkery. The pair vacillate between choral ode and rhapsody, as Plato vacillates between referring to them in the dual and plural number in Greek. Gwenda-lin Grewal’s close reading explores how the structure of the dialogue and the pair’s back-and-forth arguments bear a striking resemblance to thinking itself: in its immersive remove from reality, thinking simulates death even as it cannot conceive of its possibility. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus take this to an extreme, and so emerge as the philosophical dream and sophistic nightmare of being disembodied from substance. The Euthydemus is haunted by philosophy’s tenuous relationship to political life. This is played out in the narration through Crito’s implied criticism of Socrates-the phantom image of the Athenian laws-and in the drama itself, which appears to take place in Hades. Thinking of death thus brings with it a lurid parody of the death of thinking: the farce of perfect philosophy that bears the gravity of the city’s sophistry. Grewal also provides a new translation of the Euthydemus that pays careful attention to grammatical ambiguities, nuances, and wit in ways that substantially expand the reader’s access to the dialogue’s mysteries.