The notion of an occurrence of a proposition in discourse is the subject of the following observation:
(O) A proposition may occur in discourse, now asserted, now unasserted, and yetbe recognizably the same proposition.
I shall argue that the true significance of this observation is utterly distorted by Geach’s manner of construing of it — a construal widely known today as “the Frege-Geach point”. Though it serves as a basis for a contemporary understanding of logical form, strictly thought through, this way of construing (O) can be shown to lead to absurdity. I will further argue that a straightforward, undistorted, acceptance of (O) is the key to a genuine philosophical logic.
— Irad Kimhi (The Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago)
Reception to follow.
“The issue of anarchy is at once metaphysical and political. Nevertheless, (French) philosophy and politics have always turned their backs on each other when defining it. One of the fundamental motivations of my lectures is to understand the reason of such a non-dialogue.
Different, sometimes contradictory, signs are making manifest the necessity of a new interrogation on anarchy in the current global political situation, far beyond the idea of a violent strategy against the State. How are we to understand and interpret those signs?”
– Catherine Malabou
Catherine Malabou is a Professor in the Philosophy Department at the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy (CRMEP) at Kingston University, at the European Graduate School, and in the department of Comparative Literature at the University of California Irvine, a position formerly held by Jacques Derrida.
Her last books include Morphing Intelligence, From IQ To IA, CUP (2018), Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016, trans. Carolyn Shread), Self and Emotional Life: Merging Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience (with Adrian Johnston; New York: Columbia University Press, 2013); with Judith Butler, You Be My Body For Me, For, Corporeity, Plasticity in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (London: Blackwell, 2012).
In English
Sponsored by Department of French Literature, Thought, and Culture
This talk explores the reflexive nature of consciousness, which consists primarily in the fact that a state of consciousness has a reflexive relation to the subject who has that state, so that the subject can typically be aware of itself as having that state. Comparing Kant’s, Fichte’s, and selected contemporary analytic theories of this reflexivity shows that there is a crucial difference in the way the relation between form (or mode) and content of a state of consciousness is conceived. The first part examines Kant’s formal theory of consciousness: reflexivity is understood not in terms of a self-referential content resulting from a reflection on the state of the subject, but as the universal transcendental form that any content must have in order to be representationally significant and potentially conscious to the subject. The second part examines Fichte’s departure from Kant in his theory of a self-positing consciousness: in the original act of self-positing, the mere form of reflexivity is turned into a self-referential content that determines the subject as an object from the absolute standpoint of consciousness. The third part examines analytic theories that explain the reflexivity (or what is often called the subjective character) of consciousness on a model of mental indexicality. These theories tend to reduce reflexivity to an objective constituent of content that, although often implicit, can be read off from the subject’s contextual situatedness in nature. In conclusion, Kant’s theory can be understood as a moderate, human-centered kind of perspectivism that navigates between Fichtean absolute subjectivity and a naturalist absolute objectivity.
Registration is free but required. A registration link will be shared via email with our department mailing lists a few weeks before the event. Please contact Jack Mikuszewski at jhm378@nyu.edu if you did not receive a registration link.
The Philosophy Department provides reasonable accommodations to people with disabilities. Requests for accommodations should be submitted to philosophy@nyu.edu at least two weeks before the event.
exact location TBA.
Registration is free but required. Registration will open online in early April.
Friday, May 10
9:00–9:25 Check–in and Coffee
9:25 Welcome
9:30–11:30 Environment I
Speaker: Zachary Vereb (Mississippi University)
Commentator: Kimberly Brewer (Princeton University)
11:45–12:45 Animals I (Virtual)
Speaker: Nico Dario Mueller (University of Basel), Précis of Radical Kantianism for Animals
12:45–2:15 Lunch Break
2:15–4:15 Animals II
Speaker: Patrick Kain (Purdue University)
Commentator: Michelle Kosch (Cornell University)
4:15–4:30 Coffee Break
4:30–6:30 Environment II
Speaker: Angela Breitenbach (Cambridge University)
Commentator: Haley Brennan (New York University)
6:30–7:30 Reception
Saturday, May 11
9:30-10 Check–in and Coffee
10:00–12:00 Environment III
Speaker: Toby Svoboda (Colgate University)
Commentator: Desmond Hogan (Princeton University)
12:00–1:30 Lunch Break
1:30–3:30 Animals III
Speaker: Matthew Altman (Central Washington University)
Commentator: Anja Jauernig (New York University)
3:30–3:45 Coffee Break
3:45–5:45 Animals IV
Speaker: Helga Varden (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
Commentator: Andrew Chignell (Princeton University)
5:45–6:45 Reception
Andrew Chignell (Princeton) and Anja Jauernig (NYU)
Sponsors: NYU, Princeton University Center for Human Values