There is a broad consensus that Aristotle introduced the concept of matter in order to develop a consistent account of substantial change. However, it is disputed which role matter fulfills in substantial change. According to the traditional interpretation, matter persists while taking on or losing a substantial form. According to a rival interpretation, matter does not persist in substantial change; instead, it is an entity from which a new substance can emerge and which ceases to exist in this process. In my view, both interpretations are problematic in the light of Aristotle’s broader ontological project and are at odds with the way Aristotle describes the substantial generation of living beings. On the basis of Aristotle’s biological theory, I will suggest that Aristotelian matter is a continuant in substantial generation, but does not satisfy the common criteria for persistence that apply to individual substances.
Anna Schriefl
Anna Schriefl is Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin (assistant professor) at the University of Bonn, and currently a visiting scholar at the New School. She has published a book about Plato’s criticism of money and wealth, and most recently an introduction into Stoicism (both in German).
Contact Professor Wolfgang Mann for more info.
Abstract. The Noble Lie proposed by Plato for the Just City in Republic III has been much misunderstood. Its agenda is twofold: to get the citizens of the City to see their society as a natural entity, with themselves as all ‘family’ and akin; and to get the Guardians in particular to make class mobility, on which the justice of the City depends, a top priority. Since the second is taken to depend on the first, the Lie passage amounts to an argument (1) that the survival of a just community depends on the existence of social solidarity between elite and mass, which allows for full class mobility and genuine meritocracy; (2) that this solidarity in turn depends on an ideology of natural unity; and (3) that such ideologies are always false. So the Lie really is a lie, but a necessary one; as such it poses an awkward ethical problem for Plato and, if he is right, for our own societies as well.
Presented by SWIP-NYC
What makes right acts right? A Stoic answer to Ross’s question.
When W.D. Ross poses the question, “what makes right acts right?” (The Right and the Good ch. 2), he is asking a question that is prior to the deliberative question, “how do I determine the right thing to do?” The Stoics recognize this: in De Officiis 1.7, Cicero says that every inquiry about duty has two parts: (1) a theoretical part concerned with the end of goods and evils, which addresses such matters as whether all duties are perfect, whether some are more important than others, and what are the kinds of duties, and (2) a practical part which sets out rules (praecepta) by which our conduct can be made to conform with the end. This paper focuses on (1) and in particular asks Ross’s question about Stoic right actions (kathêkonta).
The endpoint of Stoic deliberation is determining what token action is the right action. The paper begins with the Stoic distinction between a thing’s choiceworthiness, its intrinsic disposition to elicit a choice response in a suitable subject, and its possession being to-be-chosen. The determination of what is to-be-done is made by weighing against each other all the values of the relevant action types specified by their content (the so-called ‘intermediate actions’) that are in accordance with nature, as Stoic value theory says that according with nature is an objective reason to do an action. What constitutes the rightness of the token right action, and is given in its reasonable defense, is the same as what constitutes the rightness of a perfect (katorthôma) action. The Stoic distinction between right and perfect action depends on the action’s moral goodness—not rightness—which is due to its causal origin.
Presented by Professor Rachana Kamtekar (Cornell University)
Book discussion on Gwenda-lin Grewal’s, Thinking About Death in Plato’s Euthydemus. A Close Reading and New Translation (OUP 2022)
Speakers:
Gwenda-lin Grewal (NSSR)
Cinzia Arruzza (NSSR)
Nicholas Pappas (CUNY)
Thinking of Death places Plato’s Euthydemus among the dialogues that surround the trial and death of Socrates. A premonition of philosophy’s fate arrives in the form of Socrates’ encounter with the two-headed sophist pair, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, who appear as if they are the ghost of the Socrates of Aristophanes’ Thinkery. The pair vacillate between choral ode and rhapsody, as Plato vacillates between referring to them in the dual and plural number in Greek. Gwenda-lin Grewal’s close reading explores how the structure of the dialogue and the pair’s back-and-forth arguments bear a striking resemblance to thinking itself: in its immersive remove from reality, thinking simulates death even as it cannot conceive of its possibility. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus take this to an extreme, and so emerge as the philosophical dream and sophistic nightmare of being disembodied from substance. The Euthydemus is haunted by philosophy’s tenuous relationship to political life. This is played out in the narration through Crito’s implied criticism of Socrates-the phantom image of the Athenian laws-and in the drama itself, which appears to take place in Hades. Thinking of death thus brings with it a lurid parody of the death of thinking: the farce of perfect philosophy that bears the gravity of the city’s sophistry. Grewal also provides a new translation of the Euthydemus that pays careful attention to grammatical ambiguities, nuances, and wit in ways that substantially expand the reader’s access to the dialogue’s mysteries.
If you are reading this, you are likely someone who has done philosophy through the pandemic.
This conference is intended as a forum for voices of those who have done philosophy during this time. We invite abstracts on any topic for presentations of 30 minutes with 15 minute Q&A sessions. Please send abstracts to pandemicgenerationphilosophy@gmail.com
The keynote will be delivered by Eric Bayruns García.
We welcome any who would like to attend.
Location:
CUNY Graduate Center, Room TBA
Date and time:
Friday, April 21, 2023, 9am-5pm
When W.D. Ross poses the question “what makes right acts right?” (The Right and the Good, ch. 2), he is asking a question that is prior to, and has a bearing on, the practical question “how do I determine the right thing to do?” The Stoics recognize this. Cicero (De Officio, where he is referring to Panaetius’ work Peri Kathêkontos) tells us that every inquiry about duty has two parts: (1) a theoretical part concerned with the end of good and evil deeds, which addresses such matters as whether all duties are perfect (omniane official perfecta sint), whether some are more important than others, and what the kinds of duties are, and (2) a practical part which sets out rules (praecepta) by which our conduct can be made to conform with the end (De Officiis, 1.7). While Cicero himself focuses on the second, this paper seeks the answer to the first part.
Rachana Kamtekar is a Professor of Philosophy and Classics at Cornell University and has written on many topics in ancient philosophy and contemporary moral psychology. Her monograph, Plato’s Moral Psychology: Intellectualism, the Divided Soul and the Desire for Good, was published in 2017. She is currently working on the relationship between action and character in ancient Greek ethics.
Verity Harte is a specialist in ancient philosophy, with particular research interests in ancient metaphysics, epistemology and psychology, especially of Plato and Aristotle. She is the author of Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure, and is the editor of several important books on ancient philosophy.
To this day, many theorists regard the commodity theory and the credit theory as the two main rival accounts of the nature of money. Yet cryptocurrency has revolutionized the institution of money in ways that most commodity and credit theorists could hardly have anticipated. Assuming that cryptocurrency is a new form of money, the question arises whether the commodity and credit theories can adequately account for it. This talk argues that they cannot. It first offers an interpretation of the commodity and credit theories according to which these theories uphold differing claims about the origin of money, the ontology of money, and the function of money. It then argues that thus understood, neither theory can accommodate cryptocurrency. Finally, it proposes a novel hybrid hylomorphic account of money which draws on aspects of both the commodity and credit theories, and it argues that this hybrid account can accommodate cryptocurrency.
Interviewer: Graham Hubbs (University of Idaho)
We are pleased to announce the launch of a new and thought-provoking interview series: “In Conversation: Exploring the Philosophy of Money and Finance”. The series kicks off with a selection of esteemed contributors to the recently published book, The Philosophy of Money and Finance (OUP, 2024).
Each interview will be followed by a live debate, encouraging active audience participation. The sessions (interview plus debate) will be 30 minutes long.
chair: Emiliano Ippoliti (Sapienza University of Rome)
organization: Emiliano Ippoliti (Sapienza University of Rome); Joakim Sandberg (University of Gothenburg); Lisa Warenski (CUNY Graduate Center and University of Connecticut)
info: phinancenet@gmail.com; lwarenski@gc.cuny.edu ; emiliano.ippoliti@uniroma1.it
Philosophers tend to assume that money has only an instrumental relation to state legitimacy. This discussion explains how money raises state legitimacy issues of its own. Assuming a credit/debt theory of money, the state can be seen as an active participant in a credit economy of its own making. Insofar as a state issues or recognizes a money as a means of ruling people’s lives, it is subject to promissory requirements of redemption. This has significant implications for its legitimate and equitable management of a modern economy, the centerpiece of a social compact.
Interviewer: Richard Endörfer (University of Gothenburg)
We are pleased to announce the launch of a new and thought-provoking interview series: “In Conversation: Exploring the Philosophy of Money and Finance”. The series kicks off with a selection of esteemed contributors to the recently published book, The Philosophy of Money and Finance (OUP, 2024).
Each interview will be followed by a live debate, encouraging active audience participation. The sessions (interview plus debate) will be 30 minutes long.
chair: Emiliano Ippoliti (Sapienza University of Rome)
organization: Emiliano Ippoliti (Sapienza University of Rome); Joakim Sandberg (University of Gothenburg); Lisa Warenski (CUNY Graduate Center and University of Connecticut)
info: phinancenet@gmail.com; lwarenski@gc.cuny.edu ; emiliano.ippoliti@uniroma1.it