We’re a community of philosophers of language centered in New York City. We have a meeting each week at which a speaker presents a piece of their own work relating to the philosophy of language.
Sept 9
Donka Farkas (Santa Cruz)
Sept 16
John Maackay (U Wisconsin–Madison)
Sept 23
Andrew Bacon (USC)
Sept 30
Eleonore Neufeld (USC)
Oct 7
Eli Alshanetsky (Temple)
Oct 21
Gabe Dupre (UCLA)
Oct 28
Dorit Bar-On (UConn)
Nov 4
Sam Berstler (Princeton)
Nov 11
Robert Henderson (Arizona)
Nov 18
Sam Cumming (UCLA)
Nov 25
Harvey Lederman (Princeton)
Dec 2
Sarah Fisher (Reading)
Dec 9
Michael Glanzberg (Northwestern)
Recently, Rebecca Kukla – among others – has argued that consent language is too narrow to adequately capture the ethical obligations and failures arising in the context of sex. Instead, she offers more nuanced scripts for the kinds of communication that occur throughout sex, not just at the beginning. I agree with Kukla that consent language is too narrow; however, I argue that she overlooks the fact that intimate personal communication requires an emotional attunement to context precisely because it cannot be fully scripted. To demonstrate this I turn to Cavell’s category of the passionate utterance which gestures at this dynamic dimension of performatives, but doesn’t deliver a detailed account. In this paper I will expand on Cavell’s idea of the passionate exchange in order to shed light on the active interpretive role of the audience, and how it contributes to performative success.
We’re a community of philosophers of language centered in New York City. We have a meeting each week at which a speaker presents a piece of their own work relating to the philosophy of language.
Sept 9
Donka Farkas (Santa Cruz)
Sept 16
John Maackay (U Wisconsin–Madison)
Sept 23
Andrew Bacon (USC)
Sept 30
Eleonore Neufeld (USC)
Oct 7
Eli Alshanetsky (Temple)
Oct 21
Gabe Dupre (UCLA)
Oct 28
Dorit Bar-On (UConn)
Nov 4
Sam Berstler (Princeton)
Nov 11
Robert Henderson (Arizona)
Nov 18
Sam Cumming (UCLA)
Nov 25
Harvey Lederman (Princeton)
Dec 2
Sarah Fisher (Reading)
Dec 9
Michael Glanzberg (Northwestern)
There is a broad consensus that Aristotle introduced the concept of matter in order to develop a consistent account of substantial change. However, it is disputed which role matter fulfills in substantial change. According to the traditional interpretation, matter persists while taking on or losing a substantial form. According to a rival interpretation, matter does not persist in substantial change; instead, it is an entity from which a new substance can emerge and which ceases to exist in this process. In my view, both interpretations are problematic in the light of Aristotle’s broader ontological project and are at odds with the way Aristotle describes the substantial generation of living beings. On the basis of Aristotle’s biological theory, I will suggest that Aristotelian matter is a continuant in substantial generation, but does not satisfy the common criteria for persistence that apply to individual substances.
Anna Schriefl
Anna Schriefl is Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin (assistant professor) at the University of Bonn, and currently a visiting scholar at the New School. She has published a book about Plato’s criticism of money and wealth, and most recently an introduction into Stoicism (both in German).
We’re a community of philosophers of language centered in New York City. We have a meeting each week at which a speaker presents a piece of their own work relating to the philosophy of language.
Sept 9
Donka Farkas (Santa Cruz)
Sept 16
John Maackay (U Wisconsin–Madison)
Sept 23
Andrew Bacon (USC)
Sept 30
Eleonore Neufeld (USC)
Oct 7
Eli Alshanetsky (Temple)
Oct 21
Gabe Dupre (UCLA)
Oct 28
Dorit Bar-On (UConn)
Nov 4
Sam Berstler (Princeton)
Nov 11
Robert Henderson (Arizona)
Nov 18
Sam Cumming (UCLA)
Nov 25
Harvey Lederman (Princeton)
Dec 2
Sarah Fisher (Reading)
Dec 9
Michael Glanzberg (Northwestern)
We’re a community of philosophers of language centered in New York City. We have a meeting each week at which a speaker presents a piece of their own work relating to the philosophy of language.
Sept 9
Donka Farkas (Santa Cruz)
Sept 16
John Maackay (U Wisconsin–Madison)
Sept 23
Andrew Bacon (USC)
Sept 30
Eleonore Neufeld (USC)
Oct 7
Eli Alshanetsky (Temple)
Oct 21
Gabe Dupre (UCLA)
Oct 28
Dorit Bar-On (UConn)
Nov 4
Sam Berstler (Princeton)
Nov 11
Robert Henderson (Arizona)
Nov 18
Sam Cumming (UCLA)
Nov 25
Harvey Lederman (Princeton)
Dec 2
Sarah Fisher (Reading)
Dec 9
Michael Glanzberg (Northwestern)
We’re a community of philosophers of language centered in New York City. We have a meeting each week at which a speaker presents a piece of their own work relating to the philosophy of language.
Sept 9
Donka Farkas (Santa Cruz)
Sept 16
John Maackay (U Wisconsin–Madison)
Sept 23
Andrew Bacon (USC)
Sept 30
Eleonore Neufeld (USC)
Oct 7
Eli Alshanetsky (Temple)
Oct 21
Gabe Dupre (UCLA)
Oct 28
Dorit Bar-On (UConn)
Nov 4
Sam Berstler (Princeton)
Nov 11
Robert Henderson (Arizona)
Nov 18
Sam Cumming (UCLA)
Nov 25
Harvey Lederman (Princeton)
Dec 2
Sarah Fisher (Reading)
Dec 9
Michael Glanzberg (Northwestern)
We’re a community of philosophers of language centered in New York City. We have a meeting each week at which a speaker presents a piece of their own work relating to the philosophy of language.
Sept 9
Donka Farkas (Santa Cruz)
Sept 16
John Maackay (U Wisconsin–Madison)
Sept 23
Andrew Bacon (USC)
Sept 30
Eleonore Neufeld (USC)
Oct 7
Eli Alshanetsky (Temple)
Oct 21
Gabe Dupre (UCLA)
Oct 28
Dorit Bar-On (UConn)
Nov 4
Sam Berstler (Princeton)
Nov 11
Robert Henderson (Arizona)
Nov 18
Sam Cumming (UCLA)
Nov 25
Harvey Lederman (Princeton)
Dec 2
Sarah Fisher (Reading)
Dec 9
Michael Glanzberg (Northwestern)
The notion of an occurrence of a proposition in discourse is the subject of the following observation:
(O) A proposition may occur in discourse, now asserted, now unasserted, and yetbe recognizably the same proposition.
I shall argue that the true significance of this observation is utterly distorted by Geach’s manner of construing of it — a construal widely known today as “the Frege-Geach point”. Though it serves as a basis for a contemporary understanding of logical form, strictly thought through, this way of construing (O) can be shown to lead to absurdity. I will further argue that a straightforward, undistorted, acceptance of (O) is the key to a genuine philosophical logic.
— Irad Kimhi (The Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago)
Reception to follow.
We’re a community of philosophers of language centered in New York City. We have a meeting each week at which a speaker presents a piece of their own work relating to the philosophy of language. Anyone with an interest in philosophy of language is welcome!
3 February
Paul Pietroski (Rutgers)
10 February
Brian Leahy (Harvard)
17 February
No Workshop
24 February
Elizabeth Coppock (Boston)
2 March
Maria Biezma (UMass)
9 March
Jenn McDonald (CUNY)
16 March
No Workshop
23 March
Liina Pylkannen (NYU)
30 March
Bob Beddor (NUS)
6 April
Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (Rutgers Newark)
13 April
Masha Esipova (Princeton)
20 April
Nate Charlow (Toronto)
27 April
Eric Tracy (City College)
4 May
Dilip Ninan (Tufts)
11 May
Jim Pryor (NYU)