How can we know what it’s like to be someone else? Classical Indian philosophers found the answer in theater, arguing that it’s not just a form of entertainment, but a source of knowledge of other minds. In this talk, I’ll explore how this theme is developed in Śrī Śaṅkuka (c. 850 CE) and examine the reasons his views were rejected in the later tradition. I’ll argue that those reasons are unsound, and that we can see why by turning to contemporary studies of the relationship between knowledge and luck.
Jonardon Ganeri is the Bimal. K. Matilal Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He is a philosopher whose work draws on a variety of philosophical traditions to construct new positions in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics and epistemology. His books include Attention, Not Self (2017), a study of early Buddhist theories of attention; The Concealed Art of the Soul (2012), an analysis of the idea of a search for one’s true self; Virtual Subjects, Fugitive Selves (2020), an analysis of Fernando Pessoa’s philosophy of self; and Inwardness: An Outsiders’ Guide (2021), a review of the concept of inwardness in literature, film, poetry, and philosophy across cultures. He joined the Fellowship of the British Academy in 2015, and won the Infosys Prize in the Humanities the same year, the only philosopher to do so.
This series is curated and co-presented by Brooklyn Public Philosophers, aka Ian Olasov.
Kant and Spinoza on Prophecy, Enlightenment and Revolution
Presented by Columbia University Dept. of Philosophy
This talk explores the reflexive nature of consciousness, which consists primarily in the fact that a state of consciousness has a reflexive relation to the subject who has that state, so that the subject can typically be aware of itself as having that state. Comparing Kant’s, Fichte’s, and selected contemporary analytic theories of this reflexivity shows that there is a crucial difference in the way the relation between form (or mode) and content of a state of consciousness is conceived. The first part examines Kant’s formal theory of consciousness: reflexivity is understood not in terms of a self-referential content resulting from a reflection on the state of the subject, but as the universal transcendental form that any content must have in order to be representationally significant and potentially conscious to the subject. The second part examines Fichte’s departure from Kant in his theory of a self-positing consciousness: in the original act of self-positing, the mere form of reflexivity is turned into a self-referential content that determines the subject as an object from the absolute standpoint of consciousness. The third part examines analytic theories that explain the reflexivity (or what is often called the subjective character) of consciousness on a model of mental indexicality. These theories tend to reduce reflexivity to an objective constituent of content that, although often implicit, can be read off from the subject’s contextual situatedness in nature. In conclusion, Kant’s theory can be understood as a moderate, human-centered kind of perspectivism that navigates between Fichtean absolute subjectivity and a naturalist absolute objectivity.
Registration is free but required. A registration link will be shared via email with our department mailing lists a few weeks before the event. Please contact Jack Mikuszewski at jhm378@nyu.edu if you did not receive a registration link.
The Philosophy Department provides reasonable accommodations to people with disabilities. Requests for accommodations should be submitted to philosophy@nyu.edu at least two weeks before the event.
In Sanskrit epistemology, philosophers are preoccupied with the notion of pramā. A pramā, roughly, is a mental event of learning or knowledge-acquisition. Call any such mental event a knowledge-event. In A Confection of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya), the 12th century philosopher and poet Śrīharṣa argued that knowledge-events are indefinable. Any satisfactory (and therefore non-circular) definition of knowledge-events will have to include an anti-luck condition that doesn’t appeal back to the notion of learning or knowledge-acquisition itself. But there is no such anti-luck condition. What is novel about Śrīharṣa’s argument is that it is motivated by his commitment to a certain “knowledge first” approach to epistemology: the view that knowledge-events are epistemically prior to other non-factive mental states and events. On this view, when we are trying to determine whether an agent has undergone a knowledge-event, we don’t initially ascribe to them some other non-factive mental event, and then check if that event meets some further conditions (like truth or reliability) necessary for it to count as a knowledge-event; rather, we treat certain mental events by default as knowledge-events until a defeater comes along. Surprisingly, Śrīharṣa argues that this kind of “knowledge first” epistemology should give us reason to doubt whether our ordinary attributions of knowledge-events are reliably tracking any sui generis psychological kind. In this talk, I reconstruct Śrīharṣa’s position.
With responses from Rosanna Picascia (Swarthmore College)
RSVP is required for dinner. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Lucilla at lm3335@columbia.edu for further information.
Anja Jauernig’s recently published The World According to Kant (Oxford, 2021) defends an interpretation of Kant’s critical idealism as an ontological position, according to which Kant can be considered a genuine idealist about empirical objects, empirical minds, and space time. Yet in contrast to other intentional objects, appearances genuinely exist, which is why Kant can also be considered a genuine realist about empirical objects, empirical minds, and space and time. This book spells out Kant’s case for critical idealism thus understood and clarifies Kant’s conception of appearances and things in themselves in relation to Kant’s Leibniz-Wolffian predecessors.
Anja Jauernig (NYU)
Bio:
Anja Jauernig is Professor of Philosophy at New York University. She obtained her Ph.D. from Princeton University, and held academic positions at the philosophy departments of the University of Notre Dame and the University of Pittsburgh before coming to NYU. Her research interests include Kant, Early Modern Philosophy, 19th and early 20th century German Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Animal Ethics.
Patricia Kitcher (Columbia)
Bio:
Patricia Kitcher is Roberta and William Campbell Professor Emerita of Humanities and Professor Emerita of Philosophy at Columbia. She has written two books on Kant’s theory of cognition and the self and is editor of the Oxford Philosophical Concepts volume on The Self.
Andrew Chignell (Princeton)
Bio:
Andrew Chignell is Laurence S. Rockefeller Professor in Religion, Philosophy, and the University Center for Human Values at Princeton. Prior to that he was a Professor of Philosophy at Penn and Associate and Assistant Professor in the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell. His research interests are in early modern philosophy (especially Kant) and in philosophy of religion, moral psychology, epistemology, and food ethics. From 2020-2023 he served as President of the North American Kant Society.
Desmond Hogan (Princeton)
Bio:
Desmond Hogan is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. He received his Ph.D. from Yale University. His research interests include metaphysics, philosophy of science, ethics, and aesthetics, with a focus on the modern period and nineteenth century.
Samantha Matherne has written the first recent book in English on the philosophy of Cassirer, covering the full range of his thought. Her research also explores the reciprocal relationship between perception and aesthetics. She approaches these issues largely through a historical lens, as they are taken up by Kant and developed in Post-Kantian traditions in the 19th and 20th centuries, especially Phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism.
We are seeking submissions for our 14th annual conference hosted in Spring, 2024.
Send abstracts to newyorkcityearlymodern [at] gmail.com by December 8, 2023.
https://philevents.org/event/show/114750