Abstract: It is widely recognized by proponents of the notion that grounding can be, indeed is, overdetermined. Further to this, it seems safe to suppose that something of a consensus has emerged: grounding is overdetermined and there is nothing about it, either conceptually or metaphysically, that we ought to find concerning. But from a small sampling of alleged cases no such conclusions can responsibly be drawn. This paper aims to demonstrate that there is nothing obvious or straightforward about grounding overdetermination and that the topic is deserving of much more serious philosophical attention.
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
The Saul Kripke Center is pleased to announce that William Nava (PhD student, Philosophy, NYU) will deliver the eighth Saul Kripke Center Young Scholars Series talk on Friday, October 8, 2021, from 1:00 to 3:00 pm (NY time) via Zoom. The talk is free and open to all, but those interested in attending should email the Saul Kripke Center in advance to register if they are not already on the Saul Kripke Center’s mailing list.
Title: The significance and scope of the adoption problem
Abstract: The adoption problem is an argument purporting to show that certain logical inference rules cannot be rationally ‘adopted’—roughly because one would need to already be guided by the inference rules in question to go about adopting them. In this talk, I’ll first argue that this argument is best understood as showing that certain rules are necessary for adoption of rules in general (where their own unadoptability is then a corollary). I’ll then defend the argument from the objection that the notion of adoption is too narrow for the argument to be relevant to logical debates. Finally, I’ll consider the question of just which rules the argument applies to. I conclude that the argument does not apply to any classical inference rules in full generality, but only to somewhat ad hoc restrictions of some of them. On the other hand, I’ll also show that the argument does apply to the transparent truth rules—or, more precisely, to restrictions of them that suffice to generate paradox. What falls out of these considerations is an ur-logic to which everyone must subscribe on pain of inability to adopt any new rules at all; and which, though quite minimal, is incompatible with classical logic by virtue of including the truth rules.
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
A number of authors have pointed out that the standard arguments for perception’s having nonconceptual content tell us nothing about the content of a state per se, but only instead about the sorts of capacities a subject must have in order to be in some state (i.e., whether the subject need or need not possess the specifying concepts in order to be in some state). Others have argued in response that the only reason for two states to require different conceptual capacities of the subject is precisely because they have different sorts of contents, and so there is no substantive difference between a ‘content’ view and a ‘state’ view. Here, I present evidence for states that do, in fact, share the same content but differ in the required conceptual capacities: exogenous perceptual states, and endogenous, voluntarily produced perceptual states. I argue that this functional difference—voluntary versus involuntary production—constitutes the difference in concept-dependence. I then look to three possibilities for how this claim could affect our understanding of the relationship between cognition and perception.
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)