Abstract: It is widely recognized by proponents of the notion that grounding can be, indeed is, overdetermined. Further to this, it seems safe to suppose that something of a consensus has emerged: grounding is overdetermined and there is nothing about it, either conceptually or metaphysically, that we ought to find concerning. But from a small sampling of alleged cases no such conclusions can responsibly be drawn. This paper aims to demonstrate that there is nothing obvious or straightforward about grounding overdetermination and that the topic is deserving of much more serious philosophical attention.
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
The rich philosophical and mathematical disputes that took place between Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz at the start of the eighteenth century have received more historical attention than any other exchange in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless, in this talk, Robert Iliffe discusses a prominent but neglected aspect of their disagreement, namely the mutual claim that their opponents’ conceptual foundations were fictional, and were the product both of diseased thinking and of illegitimately organized intellectual structures. Newton assailed Leibniz’s allegedly debased metaphysics in various prominent places, and mobilized allies such as Roger Cotes and John Keill to do the same. Nevertheless, by far the most sophisticated critique of illicit philosophical assumptions was launched against Newton by Leibniz in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke. In the Fifth letter to Clarke, Leibniz identified core Newtonian positions as infantile, vulgar, and profoundly irreligious, asserting that they were dangerous fictions that were less plausible and much less edifying than the rational romances of writers in the previous century. Although Leibniz saved his most potent intellectual weapons for his final letter to Clarke, Robert Iliffe suggests that his attack on the fictional status of Newton’s work was no mere codicil to his general critique of Newton’s philosophy, but instead lay at the heart of it. This famous debate, while of course somewhat sui generis, is indicative of more general and dynamic features of intellectual debate.
Event Speaker
Robert Iliffe, Professor of the History of Science at the University of Oxford
Event Information
This event is free and open to the public; Registration required. Please contact scienceandsociety@columbia.edu with any questions.
This event is part of the New York History of Science Lecture Series.
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
A number of authors have pointed out that the standard arguments for perception’s having nonconceptual content tell us nothing about the content of a state per se, but only instead about the sorts of capacities a subject must have in order to be in some state (i.e., whether the subject need or need not possess the specifying concepts in order to be in some state). Others have argued in response that the only reason for two states to require different conceptual capacities of the subject is precisely because they have different sorts of contents, and so there is no substantive difference between a ‘content’ view and a ‘state’ view. Here, I present evidence for states that do, in fact, share the same content but differ in the required conceptual capacities: exogenous perceptual states, and endogenous, voluntarily produced perceptual states. I argue that this functional difference—voluntary versus involuntary production—constitutes the difference in concept-dependence. I then look to three possibilities for how this claim could affect our understanding of the relationship between cognition and perception.
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
The Logic and Metaphysics Workshop will be meeting on Mondays from 4:15 to 6:15 (NY time) entirely online, unless otherwise noted. The provisional schedule is as follows:
Sep 13. Ricki Bliss (Lehigh University)
Sep 20. Teresa Kouri Kissel (Old Dominion University)
Sep 27. Rashed Ahmad (University of Connecticut)
Oct 4. Yale Weiss (CUNY GC)
Oct 11. NO MEETING
Oct 18. Rohit Parikh (CUNY GC)
Oct 25. Noah Friedman-Biglin (San José State University)
Nov 1. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (University of Amsterdam)
Nov 8. Roman Kossak (CUNY GC)
Nov 15. Sara Uckelman (Durham University)
Nov 22. Konstantinos Georgatos (John Jay)
Nov 29. Martin Pleitz (Münster)
Dec 6. Dirk Batens (University of Ghent)
Dec 13. Dolf Rami (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)