Calendar

Reading the Foucault Collège de France Lectures  with

Seyla Benhabib, Homi Bhabha, Judith Butler, Veena Das, François Ewald, Didier Fassin, James Faubion, Nancy Fraser, Frédéric Gros, Daniele Lorenzini, Nancy Luxon, Achille Mbembe, Paul Rabinow, Judith Revel, Pierre Rosanvallon, Ann Stoler, and Linda Zerilli

in conversation with Columbia University colleagues

Etienne Balibar, Partha Chatterjee, Jean Cohen, Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Katherine Franke, Robert Gooding-Williams, Stathis Gourgouris, Axel Honneth, Jeremy Kessler, Lydia Liu, Anna Lvovsky, Sharon Marcus, Alondra Nelson, John Rajchman, Emmanuelle Saada, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Kendall Thomas, Adam Tooze, and Nadia Urbinati

Moderated by  Bernard E. Harcourt and Jesús R. Velasco

Race war, biopolitics, the hermeneutics of the self, governmentality, the examination of one’s conscience, sécurité, the courage of truth, illégalismes, juridical forms, governing through truth, the “punitive society,” truth-telling, judicial apparatuses of repression, the Nu-pieds rebellions of 1639, parrhesia … Michel Foucault’s thirteen years of lectures at the Collège de France introduced us to new concepts and novel research avenues. For many of us, those avenues have been fertile ground for our own theorization, for others fertile ground for critique. They represent, as Foucault intended, rich and productive “pistes de recherches.”

With the publication of the entire series of lectures at the Collège de France—the last, Théories et institutions pénales (1971-1972) just released in May 2015—it is now time to read them chronologically:  to grasp the overall project of those lectures at the Collège, to discuss the full trajectory, and to continue to excavate our own “pistes de recherche” building on Foucault’s.

The Columbia Center for Contemporary Critical Thought and the Columbia Society of Fellows, with the support of the Maison Française, the Institute for Comparative Literature and Society, and the Department of Latin American and Iberian Cultures, are delighted to host 13 seminars on the 13 courses. The seminar series—Foucault 13/13—will extend over the full 2015-2016 academic year at Columbia University. The seminar series will be open to Columbia faculty, fellows, and students, as well as faculty and students from other New York universities.

Each seminar will be led by distinguished scholars from different disciplines. The seminars will take place on Monday evenings in the Fall semester (2015) and Thursday evenings in the Spring semester (2016) from 6:15pm to 8:45pm.

The seminars will be open to students and faculty from Columbia University and other New York universities (please bring university ID). Please RSVP at [list from Sundial, CU event listing place]. If you are interested in attending and would like a place reserved at the seminar table, please send an e-mail explaining your interest to Claire Merrill at cm3325@columbia.edu.

Event locations vary — please see event location for each seminar. The Columbia Maison Française is located on the Columbia campus in Buell Hall next to Low Library. The Heyman Center Common Room is located in the Heyman Center (in East Campus) on the second floor. The Hispanic Institute for Latin American and Iberian Cultures (Casa Hispanica) is located at 612 West 116^th Street. A campus map of Columbia University is here.

Seminar Series Schedule:  Foucault 13/13

Monday, September 14, 2015, 6:15 to 8:45pm

Lessons on the Will to Know (1970-1971)

James Faubion, Rice University

and Nancy Luxon, University of Minnesota

Maison Française

***

Monday, September 28, 2015, 6:15 to 8:45pm

Penal Theories and Institutions (1971-1972)

Etienne Balibar, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre & Columbia University

and François Ewald, Series Editor of Foucault’s Collège de France Lectures

Casa Hispánica

***

Monday, October 12, 2015, 6:15 to 8:45pm

The Punitive Society (1972-1973)

Didier Fassin, Institute for Advanced Studies (Princeton) & EHESS,

Axel Honneth, University of Frankfurt & Columbia University, and

Nadia Urbinati, Columbia University

Heyman Center Common Room

***

Monday, October 26, 2015, 6:15 to 8:45pm

Psychiatric Power (1973-1974)

Linda Zerilli, University of Chicago,

Anna Lvovsky, Columbia University, and

Alondra Nelson, Columbia University

Heyman Center Common Room

***

Monday, November 16, 2015, 7:00 to 9:00pm

Abnormal (1974-1975)

Veena Das, Johns Hopkins University,

Pierre Rosanvallon, Collège de France, Paris, and

Emmanuelle Saada, Columbia University

Maison Française

***

Monday, November 23, 2015, 6:15 to 8:45pm

“Society must be defended” (1975-1976)

Ann Stoler, The New School,

Partha Chatterjee, Columbia University, and

Robert Gooding-Williams, Columbia University

Heyman Center Common Room

***

Monday, December 7, 2015, 6:15 to 8:45pm

Security, Territory, Population (1977-1978)

Seyla Benhabib, Yale University,

Jeremy Kessler, Columbia University, and

Adam Tooze, Columbia University

Maison Française

***

Thursday, January 28, 2016, 6:15 to 8:45pm

The Birth of Biopolitics (1978-1979)

Nancy Fraser, The New School

and Kendall Thomas, Columbia University

Heyman Center Common Room

***

Thursday, February 11, 2016, 6:15 to 8:45pm

The Government of the Living (1979-1980)

Achille Mbembe, University of the Witwatersrand,

Daniele Lorenzini, Université Paris-Est Créteil, and

Jean Cohen, Columbia University

Maison Française

***

Thursday, February 25, 2016, 6:15 to 8:45pm

Subjectivity and Truth (1980-1981)

Judith Butler, University of California Berkeley,

Katherine Franke, Columbia University, and

Stathis Gourgouris, Columbia University

Maison Française

***

Thursday, March 10, 2016, 6:15 to 8:45pm

The Hermeneutics of the Subject (1981-1982)

Homi Bhabha, Harvard University,

Paul Rabinow, University of California Berkeley, and

Lydia Liu, Columbia University

Heyman Center Common Room

***

Thursday, March 31, 2016, 6:15 to 8:45pm

The Government of Self and Others (1982-1983)

Judith Revel, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre,

Sharon Marcus, Columbia University, and

John Rajchman, Columbia University

Heyman Center Common Room

***

Thursday, April 14, 2016, 6:15 to 8:45pm

The Courage of Truth (1983-1984)

Frederic Gros, Sciences Po,

Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Columbia University, and

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Columbia University

Casa Hispánica

***

All sessions moderated by Bernard E. Harcourt and Jesús R. Velasco

Contrary to Damien Keown (2001), who worries that metaphysical and epistemological inquiry may distract from ethical investigation, Bronwyn Finnigan and Koji Tanaka (2008) argue such questions may provide grounding for practical application of a Buddhist ethical path. I follow this line of inquiry into Buddhist theories of truth in order to better understand right speech as conceived in the Early Buddhist Suttas. I focus on what the Abhaya Sutta explicitly instructs and what it leaves out regarding the types of words the Tathagata does not say or has a sense of the proper time for saying them. K. N. Jayatilleke (1963) and Mark Siderits (1979) provide convincing evidence that contrary to popular characterizations of the

 Buddhist theory of truth as pragmatic, Early Buddhist Suttas rest on some form of correspondence theory of truth. Siderits shows that at the very least, there is an uneasy tension between correspondence and pragmatic theories. I contrast their position with Francisca Cho and Richard K. Squier’s (2016) argument describing the Buddhist theory of truth as pragmatic based on the use of language and lies. I supplement Cho and Squier with Jonathan Silk’s (2008) work on truth and lies in Buddhist texts in order to argue that there may be an impasse on adjudicating Buddhist theories of truth.

With a response from:

Mark Siderits (Emeritus, Illinois State University)

The Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy (CSCP) is a University Seminar dedicated to the advancement of projects that draw on both western and non-western philosophy. The CSCP meets monthly on the campus of Columbia University and occasionally hosts conferences.

Please save the following dates for our upcoming talks:

March 30: Kin Cheung (Moravian College)

April 13: Lara Braitstein (McGill University)

May 11: David Cummiskey (Bates College)

At the core of Kantian liberalism is a conception of the independent autonomous subject. On the other hand, the most central and distinguishing feature of Buddhist philosophy is the doctrine of no-self. It thus seems that Buddhists should reject Kantian liberalism. My larger project develops the connections between Buddhist perfectionism, liberalism, and principles of justice. In this paper, I focus on Buddhist and Kantian conceptions of self-constitution, but my ultimate concern is the significance of the doctrine of no-self to theories of justice.

Buddhists need some conception of a minimal self to account for the karmic-continuity of persons and also to provide an adequate account of the subjectivity of experience. I argue that we should reject the (Abhidharma) reductionist view of the self as a mere fiction that is reducible to its simpler and more basic parts. As is often noted, the Buddhist reductionist approach is similar to Derek Parfit’s view. Parfit also argues that there is no deep metaphysical self and that relations of personal identity are reducible to relations of psychological connectedness and causal continuity in a series of experiences. Christine Korsgaard has responded to Parfit’s reductionist view by developing a non-metaphysical account of Kantian agency and self-constitution. I argue that the Buddhist doctrine of no-self is consistent with a more minimal, non-substantial, emergent, view of the self. This approach, which is more fully developed by Evan Thomson, Matthew MacKenzie, Georges Dreyfus, and others, is surprisingly similar to Korsgaard’s practical conception of the self. As a result, the non-reductionist Buddhist approach is also not vulnerable to Korsgaard’s objection to reductionist views. In addition, I argue that the process of self-constitution is embedded in a recursive nexus of dependent origination, and reject Korsgaard’s conception of the independent autonomous subject, which she refers to as “over and above” its ends. In short, a Buddhist can accept Korsgaard’s basic account of self-constitution but nonetheless reject the Kantian idea of the independent autonomous subject. For Buddhists, the Kantian autonomous subject is instead part of the “primal confusion” that projects a reified subject-other division on experience. This confusion is the source of existential suffering, anxiety and stress, which characterizes too much of the human condition. The goal is to transcend the Kantian subject and internalize the pervasive interdependence of persons. Instead of the autonomous self, Buddhism embraces a perfectionist ideal, of a non-egocentric reorientation and re-constitution of the self.

Buddhists thus have reason to reject Kantian liberalism, if it is based on the autonomy and independence of persons. In his shift to Political Liberalism, John Rawls recasts the conception of the person, as “a self-originating source of valid claims,” and emphasizes that this conception is restricted to the political domain. It is part of a narrow conception of the “moral powers” of a free and equal citizen; it is not a metaphysical conception or comprehensive ideal. I conclude by exploring the contrast between Buddhist Perfectionism and Political Liberalism.

With a Response From:

Carol Rovane (Columbia University)

——————

Also, please visit our website:

http://www.cbs.columbia.edu/cscp/

Co-Chairs

Professor Jonathan Gold

Associate Professor, Princeton University, Department of Religion

jcgold@princeton.edu

Professor Hagop Sarkissian

Associate Professor, The City University of New York, Baruch College | Graduate Center, Department of Philosophy

hagop.sarkissian@baruch.cuny.edu

Rapporteur

Jay Ramesh

jr3203@columbia.edu

Convergence to the truth is viewed with some ambivalence in philosophy of science. On the one hand, methods of inquiry that lead to the truth in the limit are prized as marks of scientific rationality. But an agent who, by using some method, expects to always converge to the truth seems to fail a minimum standard of epistemic modesty. This point was recently brought home by Gordon Belot in his critique of Bayesian epistemology. In this paper I will study convergence to the truth theorems within the framework of Edward Nelson’s radically elementary probability theory. This theory provides an enriched conceptual framework for investigating convergence and gives rise to an appropriately modest from of Bayesianism.

The seminar is concerned with applying formal methods to fundamental issues, with an emphasis on probabilistic reasoning, decision theory and games. In this context “logic” is broadly interpreted as covering applications that involve formal representations. The topics of interest have been researched within a very broad spectrum of different disciplines, including philosophy (logic and epistemology), statistics, economics, and computer science. The seminar is intended to bring together scholars from different fields of research so as to illuminate problems of common interest from different perspectives. Throughout each academic year, meetings are regularly presented by the members of the seminar and distinguished guest speakers.

details tba

02/08/2019 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM

03/22/2019 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM

04/19/2018 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM

This essay tries to develop a “black radical Kantianism” – that is, a Kantianism informed by the black experience in modernity. After looking briefly at socialist and feminist appropriations of Kant, I argue that an analogous black radical appropriation should draw on the distinctive social ontology and view of the state associated with the black radical tradition. In ethics, this would mean working with a (color-conscious rather than colorblind) social ontology of white persons and black sub-persons and then asking what respect for oneself and others would require under those circumstances. In political philosophy, it would mean framing the state as a Rassenstaat (a racial state) and then asking what measures of corrective justice would be necessary to bring about the ideal Rechtsstaat.

Response by César Cabezas Gamarra.

Presented by the German Idealism Workshop

With responses from Mark Siderits (Illinois State University)

ABSTRACT: Buddhist philosophers often draw a distinction between two different kinds of truth: conventional truth (saṃvṭi-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Abhidharma Buddhists philosophers typically understand this distinction in terms of an ontological distinction between two different kinds of entities: ultimately real entities (paramārtha-sat) and conventionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat). Similar to contemporary philosophical discussions about ordinary objects, Buddhist philosophers debate the ontological status of conventional entities and the semantics of discourse concerning them. Mark Siderits (2015, 2021, 2022) has influentially argued for an eliminitivist position he calls “Buddhist reductionism” that interprets the Abhidharma position as one that denies conventional entities exist but that retains discourse involving apparent reference to them. However, in a recent article Kris McDaniel (2019), a prominent defender of ontological pluralism, challenges that view by proposing that the Abhidharma Buddhist distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth be “defined up” from a more basic distinction between two different ways an entity can exist: conventionally or ultimately. In this paper I argue that Saṃghabhadra’s account of conventional reality and truth does lends itself well to McDaniel’s proposal but I will also argue that the account of conventional and ultimate truth that results differs in important ways from the models he offers. I will end by offering a modification of McDaniel’s account of conventional truth that is derived from Saṃghabhadra’s pluralist ontology. That view will, unlike the views suggested by both Siderits and McDaniel, allow for there to be ultimate truths about what is conventionally true.

Dinner will be kindly offered by the Columbia University Seminars. 

RSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3335@columbia.edu. 

Kant and Spinoza on Prophecy, Enlightenment and Revolution

Presented by Columbia University Dept. of Philosophy

Samantha Matherne has written the first recent book in English on the philosophy of Cassirer, covering the full range of his thought. Her research also explores the reciprocal relationship between perception and aesthetics. She approaches these issues largely through a historical lens, as they are taken up by Kant and developed in Post-Kantian traditions in the 19th and 20th centuries, especially Phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism.