Apr
20
Mon
Rebecca Traynor: SWIP-Analytic Prize Winner Presentation @ NYU Philosophy Dept. Room 202
Apr 20 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm

Rebecca Traynor, winner of the SWIP-Analytic 2015 Graduate Student Essay Prize, will present “Accurate Representation is Accurate Distortion” at SWIP-Analytic Monday, April 20, 2015 in room 202 in the NYU Philosophy Department. We encourage attendees to read the winning paper in advance of the presentation. Please email swipanalytic@gmail.com to request a copy.

ABSTRACT: Picasso’s ‘Woman Ironing’ captures the drudgery of ironing in virtue of depicting a woman so grey and emaciated she fails to correspond to the visual appearance of any actual woman. The painting distorts visual appearance in order to accurately represent a feature of the world—drudgery—for which we have no independent sense. I hypothesize that perception can similarly distort but accurately represent the external world. Orthodox accounts of representation split perceiving subjects from perceived objects; they take mental representation to represent the external world as it is in itself such that the former is transparent to the latter. But this means perceptual content is often in error. For example, researchers found that participants standing at the base of a hill while carrying a heavy backpack regularly overestimate steepness (Proffitt, et al. 1995). I argue that exaggerating steepness is accurate insofar as it corresponds to a relational feature of the world—arduousness—for which we have no independent sense. I argue that representational content admits of accurate distortions because accuracy is a matter of capturing relational facts about the world.

I argue artistic and mental representations admit of accurate distortions. However, distortions in artistic representation differ from those in mental representation because they aim at aesthetic goals. This means that the two cases admit of different functions. And it means that instances of artistic distortions are frequently—though not always—a result of conscious deliberation. I propose that when artists distort the external world, the choices they make exploit and thereby highlight cases of accurate distortion in mental representation. I hypothesize that cases of accurate distortion in art are parasitic on cases of accurate distortion in mental representation and that artistic skill is correlated with the ability to manipulate perceptual distortions.

Feb
12
Fri
Expression and Recognition – Daniel Putnam (Yale University) @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 202
Feb 12 @ 3:30 pm – 4:30 pm
The idea that people should stand in relationships of equal respect is almost a truism. But controversy begins the moment we try to specify what this means and what this requires. In this paper, I argue that a relatively modest assumption about respect for persons has some surprising implications for freedom of expression. If nothing else, respecting someone as a person requires recognizing her important interests as reasons for action in one’s practical deliberation. At least in a great many cases, the way we learn about other people’s interests is through their expression in behavior. So limitations on freedom of expression reduce a person’s opportunities to be recognized by others. And unequal freedom of expression generates unequal access to relationships of recognition. The link between expression and recognition reveals a category of limitations on freedom of expression that goes beyond the traditional First Amendment conception of a state-imposed restriction on people’s freedom to assert their beliefs. At the same time, it demonstrates by example that the relational view of equality does indeed have substantive normative implications.
Dec
9
Fri
Elizabeth Miller (Yale), Jonathan Bain (NYU): What Explains the Spin-Statistics Connection? @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 101
Dec 9 @ 2:30 pm – 4:30 pm

Metro Area Philosophy of Science Presents:

Elizabeth Miller (Yale),

Title: TBA.

Jonathan Bain (NYU)

What Explains the Spin-Statistics Connection?

The spin-statistics connection plays an essential role in explanations of non-relativistic phenomena associated with both field-theoretic and non-field-theoretic systems (for instance, it explains the electronic structure of solids and the behavior of Einstein-Bose condensates and superconductors). However, it is only derivable within the context of relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) in the form of the Spin-Statistics Theorem; and moreover, there are multiple, mutually incompatible ways of deriving it. This essay attempts to determine the sense in which the spin-statistics connection can be said to be an essential property in RQFT, and how it is that an essential property of one type of theory can figure into fundamental explanations offered by other, inherently distinct theories.

Sep
27
Wed
(Information) Paradox Regained? Jim Weatherall, UC Irvine @ NYUAD event space
Sep 27 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Abstract: I will discuss some recent work by Tim Maudlin concerning Black Hole Information Loss. I will argue that there is a paradox, in the straightforward sense that there are propositions that appear true but which are incompatible with one another, and discuss its significance. I will also discuss Maudlin’s response to the paradox.

Jim Weatherall (University of California, Irvine)

 

There will be dinner after the talk. If you are interested, please send an email with “Dinner” in the heading to nyphilsci@gmail.com (please note that all are welcome, but only the speaker’s dinner will be covered). If you have any other questions, please email isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu.

 

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Metro Area Philosophy of Science group (MAPS) Presents:

 

Heather Demarest (University of Colorado, Boulder)

4:15-6:15pm, Tuesday October 3, CUNY room 5307 (365 5th Ave, New York NY).
Title: It matters how you slice it: relativity and causation

Abstract: I argue that if we take the standard formulation of special relativity seriously, causation is frame-dependent. Thus, many ordinary causal claims require a parameter to specify the relevant frame of reference. This is in contrast to the widely-accepted belief that the causal structure of the world is objectively and absolutely determined by the light cone structure. Any event that can affect another (so the thought goes) must do so via light or matter, and the spacetime structure will tell us which of those came first, absolutely. For instance, according to Carl Hoefer (2009, 694, italics in original), if we assume that all signals travel slower than or equal to the speed of light, “we may take the light-cone structure of Minkowski spacetime as equally representing the causal structure of spacetime.” I argue that causation in relativistic spacetime is not so simple. Events can be extended in space and time, and events can be related to one another by distance and duration. Yet, according to special relativity, extension in space and time (i.e., distances and durations) are not invariant—they depend upon relative motion. Therefore, when ordinary events enter into causal relations, they do so relative to frames of reference, which can yield different causes and different effects. If you want to keep your promises, or bring about one outcome rather than another, you should take note of your reference frame.

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Jeff Barrett (University of California, Irvine).
4:15 – 6:15pm, Tuesday November 7, Location TBD.
Title: Typical Quantum Worlds

Abstract: Hugh Everett III’s pure wave mechanics, sometimes known as the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, was proposed as a solution to the quantum measurement problem. Both physicists and philosophers of physics have repeatedly claimed to be able to deduce the standard quantum probabilities from pure wave mechanics alone. We will consider why this is impossible, then consider how Everett himself understood quantum probabilities. This will involve clearly distinguishing between typical and probable quantum worlds.

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Kevin Coffey (New York University, Abu Dhabi).
Time/Date TBD Location TBD.
Title: TBD.
Abstract: TBD.

 

Feb
15
Fri
Political Theology Today as Critical Theory of the Contemporary: Reason, Religion, Humanism @ Deutsches Haus, NYU
Feb 15 – Feb 17 all-day
Oct
24
Thu
IS ACTIVITY IN PREFRONTAL CORTEX IMPORTANT FOR CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION? @ Deutsches Haus at NYU
Oct 24 @ 5:00 pm – 7:00 pm

Speakers:

Biyu Jade He (NYU Medical Centre)
Hakwan Lau (UCLA)
Victor Lamme (University of Amsterdam)
Johannes Fahrenfort (University of Amsterdam)

Where in the brain are the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness?  Some leading theories of consciousness, including global workspace and higher-order thought theories, hold that these correlates centrally involve prefrontal cortex.  Other leading theories, including first-order and integrated information theories, hold that these correlates centrally involve sensory cortices, with prefrontal cortex playing at most a secondary role.  In recent years much experimental evidence has been brought to bear on both sides of the question.

In this debate, Hakwan Lau (UCLA) and Biyu Jade He (NYU) will defend the view that neural activity in prefrontal cortex is important for conscious perception, while Victor Lamme (Amsterdam) and Johannes Fahrenfort (Amsterdam) will argue that prefrontal activity is not important for conscious perception.