This event explores the conceptual force of metaphors in neuroscience. How do metaphors shape how we think and communicate? How are they represented in the brain? To answer these questions, this event engages with the everyday persistence of these rhetorical tools by examining scientific studies of metaphor use and metaphors in scientific discourse. Featuring perspectives from neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, and philosophy, our speakers probe the distinction between metaphors and models that emerge from thinking and reasoning. These models are further taken up in different social and political circumstances and are used to describe a range of phenomenon from mental health to climate change that articulate and obscure our efforts to make sense of the world.
Speakers:
Dedre Genter, Director of Cognitive Science Program, Northwestern University
Stephen Flusberg, Assistant Professor of Psychology at Purchase College, SUNY
Respondent:
Stephen Casper, Associate Professor of History, Clarkson University
Additional speakers to be announced shortly.
A subjective probability function is broadminded to the extent that it assigns positive probabilities to conjectures that can be possibly true. Assigning to such a conjecture the value 0 amounts to a priori ruling out the possibility of confirming the conjecture to any extent by the growing evidence. A positive value leaves, in principle, the possibility of learning from the evidence. In general, broadmindedness is not an absolute notion, but a graded one, and there is a price for it: the more broadminded the probability, the more complicated it is, because it has to assign non-zero values to more complicated conjectures. The framework which is suggested in the old Gaifman-Snir paper is suitable for phrasing this claim in a precise way and proving it. The technique by which this claim is established is to assume a definable probability function, and to state within the same language a conjecture that can be possibly true, whose probability is 0.
The complexity of the conjecture depends on the complexity of the probability, i.e., the complexity of the formulas that are used in defining it. In the Gaifman-Snir paper we used the arithmetical hierarchy as a measure of complexity. It is possible however to establish similar results with respect to a more “down to earth” measures, defined in terms of the time that it takes to calculate the probabilities, with given precisions.
A claim of this form, for a rather simple setup, was first proven by Hilary Putnam in his paper ““Degree of Confirmation” and inductive logic”, which was published in the 1963 Schilpp volume dedicated to Carnap. The proof uses in a probabilistic context, a diagonalization technique, of the kind used in set theory and in computer science. In the talk I shall present Putnam’s argument and show how diagonalization can be applied in considerably richer setups.
The second part of the talk is rather speculative. I shall point out the possibility that there might be epistemic limitations to what human science can achieve, which are imposed by certain pragmatic factors ‒ such as the criterion of repeatable experiments. All of which would recommend a skeptic attitude.
The brain is often compared to a computer. But the two are not as similar as one would think. Computers process information whereas the brain interrogates and explores. It seeks information from the environment with a purpose—to answer a question, solve a problem or make a decision. Neuroscience has made great advances in our understanding of how the brain makes decisions, why some are speedy and some are slower and more deliberative. Decisions matter for all animals. For humans, they hold the key to thought, ideation and creative expression. What was once the purview of psychology and philosophy is now a staple of biomedical science. And by elucidating the underlying neural mechanisms that make all this possible, Dr. Shadlen hopes to identify new strategies to confront the neurological and psychiatric disorders that impair cognitive function.
Dr. Shadlen argues that the brain follows simple rules to make both simple and complex decisions. To test this, he studies the brain’s parietal cortex, which helps the brain make sense of what we see in order to guide our behaviors. With implications for medicine, his research could shed light on why people with damage to the parietal cortex have trouble with various skills, such as understanding numbers. It could also lead to new ways to treat the effects of this damage.
Speaker: Michael N. Shadlen, MD, PhD, is a Professor of Neuroscience and Principal Investigator at Columbia’s Zuckerman Institute.
RSVP by Wednesday, January 31, 2018 Registration is required via EventBrite; Seating is first come, first served. This lecture will also be live streamed on February 7, 2018.
For more information about this event, please contact the Zuckerman Institute at zuckermaninstitute@columbia.edu
This talk is part of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Brain Insight Lecture series, offered free to the public to enhance understanding of the biology of the mind and the complexity of human behavior. The lectures are hosted by Columbia’s Mortimer B. Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute and supported by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation.
Speakers:
Jennifer Carr (University of California, San Diego)
Ryan Doody (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Harvey Lederman (Princeton University)
Chris Meacham (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)
Organizer:
Melissa Fusco (Columbia University)
| 9:30 – 10:00 | Breakfast (716 Philosophy Hall) |
| SESSION I | Chair: Melissa Fusco |
| 10:00 – 11:30 | Jennifer Carr: “Can Accuracy Motivate Modesty?” |
| 11:30 – 11:45 | Coffee Break I |
| SESSION II | Chair: Jessica John Collins |
| 11:45 – 1:15 | Ryan Doody: “Hard Choices Made Harder” |
| 1:15 – 2:30 | Lunch |
| SESSION III | Chair: Jennifer Carr |
| 2:30 – 4:00 | Harvey Lederman: “Verbalism” |
| 4:00 – 4:30 | Coffee Break II |
| SESSION IV | Chair: Ryan Doody |
| 4:30 – 6:00 | Chris Meacham: “Decision in Cases of Infinitely Many Utility Contributions” |
| 6:00 | Drinks |
What constitutes evidence is rarely self-evident. We need theories to make sense of evidence—to transform patterns of physical occurrences into something meaningful, i.e., data. This relationship between theory and evidence is often at least partially opaque, particularly in a field like neuroscience that often aims to use physical evidence to characterize mental, and in some cases social, events. Neuroscience navigates this relationship by purporting to offer mechanistic descriptions of “how” mental processes operate. Yet, this inquiry relies on theoretical assumptions that are not fully tethered to data. Neuroscience can certainly generate predictions from theories that have practical implications and link them with mechanistic knowledge of the physical (e.g., anatomy and physiology). But changing the basis of our assumptions can change the kinds of questions we ask and how we interpret experimental findings. So, exactly what kind of knowledge does neuroscience offer? How independent is it from psychology? How do we navigate this potential divide, particularly in cases in which we would want to use neuroscience to characterize constructs that are heavily influenced by theoretical priors?
This event addresses this question from a range of perspectives in neurology, psychiatry, philosophy, and economics. We consider the relationship between theory and evidence by exploring how practitioners, theorists, and experimentalists negotiate the multiple dimensions of evidence in neuroscience.
Speakers:
Peter Bearman, Jonathan R. Cole Professor of the Social Sciences, Columbia University
Suzanne Goh, Co-Founder & Chief Medical Officer, Cortica
Moderator:
Aniruddha Das, Associate Professor of Neuroscience, Columbia University
More speakers to be confirmed soon.
Free and open to the public, but RSVP is required via Eventbrite. This event is part of the Seminars in Society and Neuroscience series.
Psychopathy is a mental disorder closely associated with marked emotional dysfunctions, limited capacity for moral judgments, recidivistic offending, and poor treatment outcome. Considering its peculiar characteristics, the status of psychopathy in the field of law raises several disputes. While current criminal law holds psychopaths fully responsible and punishable for their misbehavior, some scholars argue that psychopathy is a condition that may severely compromise an individual’s moral agency and capacity for rationality. As such, it should be included among the potential excusing or mitigating factors for criminal responsibility and punishment. This argument finds additional support in the body of studies from neurocriminology showing that people who suffer from psychopathy exhibit (often severe) reduced functioning in the socio-emotional brain regions that are now known to be significantly involved in moral decision-making and prosocial behavior. The insights into the neurobiological roots of psychopathy seem to challenge even more the perennial dilemmas that have occupied the minds of legal scholars and philosophers for many years: Are psychopaths “bad” or “mad” (or both)? And how should criminal law and the justice system deal with them? This seminar aims to examine these issues and explore other contentious arguments about the status of psychopathy in the field law.
Three leading experts in neurocriminology, law, and philosophy will discuss recent neuroscientific findings in psychopathy research. The speakers will consider how these findings might contribute to the reconsideration of the responsibility of psychopathic offenders and how criminal justice should optimally respond to individuals suffering from such a controversial disorder.
Speakers:
Stephen J. Morse; Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law; Professor of Psychology and Law in Psychiatry; Associate Director, Center for Neuroscience & Society; University of Pennsylvania Law School
Adrian Raine; Richard Perry University Professor, University of Pennsylvania
Katrina L. Sifferd; Professor and Chair of Philosophy, Elmhurst College
Free and open to the public, but RSVP is required via Eventbrite. This event is part of the Seminars in Society and Neuroscience series.
Elliot Paul, assistant professor of philosophy, and Joan Snitzer, cochair and director of visual arts in the Department of Art History, come together to discuss the relationship between creative expression and appreciation in this installment of From the Faculty Lounge. Paul and Snitzer will explore creativity’s role in our happiness and moral choices, and how an artist’s ownership of their creativity compares to an audience’s influence.
Moderated by Provost Linda Bell
Space is limited and available on a first-come, first-served basis. Please arrive early as this event will be filmed and doors will close promptly at 6:30 PM.
From the Faculty Lounge
What is Creativity?
Thursday, May 3, 2018
6:30 PM
Sulzberger Parlor, 3rd Floor Barnard Hall
For more information, visit barnard.edu/events. View previously recorded conversations here.
Speakers:
Amanda Pustilnik, Professor of Law, University of Maryland
Tor Wager, Professor of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of Colorado Boulder
Moderators:
Federica Coppola, Presidential Scholar in Society and Neuroscience, Columbia University
Lan Li, Presidential Scholar in Society and Neuroscience, Columbia University
We will provide additional information as soon as possible.
Free and open to the public, but RSVP is required via Eventbrite. This event is part of the Seminars in Society and Neuroscience series.
Reception to follow