April 25, Saray Alaya-Lopez (Cal. State, Sacramento), “Agency in Structural Explanations of Injustice.” 6:30-8:00pm, CUNY Graduate Center 5414.
May 23, Karen Jones (U. Melbourne), “Radical Consciousness and Epistemic Privilege.” 6:30-8:00pm, CUNY Graduate Center 5414.
I’ve argued that the Indian Buddhist tradition, broadly construed, has tended to endorse a unique view of freedom and responsibility, a view I’ve called Buddhist Perspectivalism. According to this view, we should always regard ourselves as genuinely free and responsible agents, because we have good reason to do so, while we should never regard others in this way, because we have equally good reason to see them as neither free nor responsible. In this talk, I clarify Buddhist Perspectivalism as a theory of moral responsibility and defend it against some concerns that scholars like Christopher Gowans and Charles Goodman have raised.
With a response from:
Rick Repetti (Kingsborough Community College, CUNY)
Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy:
Oct. 6: Jake Davis (New York University)
Nov. 3: Daniel Breyer (Illinois State University)
Dec. 8: Nico Silins (Cornell University) and Susanna Siegel (Harvard University)
People feel on occasion that life should be embraced in a certain way. You only live once, carpe diem, #YOLO: we commonly associate the thought of our limited lives with the thought that we should take adventures, risks, or break with our routines and norms. But how, if at all, does the thought that you only live once motivate adventurous, risky, or unusual behavior? After all, having only one life seems to equally well motivate the exact opposite of adventure and risk. I consider several ways of supporting the thought that life should be embraced. All are found wanting, except one.
Join us for an evening of accessible philosophical thought and erudite fun. Former pro skater and USD philosophy professor Nick Riggle’s debut title, On Being Awesome: A Unified Theory of How Not to Suck draws on pop culture, politics, history, and sports to to illuminate the ethics and culture of awesomeness and pinpoint its origins in America. Philosopher Aaron James (UC Irvine), a longtime globetrotting surfer and author of the bestselling Assholes: A Theory, returns with Surfing with Sartre: An Aquatic Inquiry Into a Life of Meaning, using the experience and the ethos of surfing to explore key concepts in philosophy. Join Nick and Aaron in conversation followed by a reception and book signing.
‘Philosophy begins in wonder. And at the end, when philosophic thought has done its best, the wonder remains. There have been added, however, some grasp of the immensity of things, some purification of emotion by understanding. Yet there is a danger in such reflections. An immediate good is apt to be thought of in a degenerate form of a passive enjoyment. Existence (life) is activity ever merging into the future. The aim of philosophical understanding is the aim of piercing the blindness of activity in respect to its transcendent functions.’ (A.N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, Capricorn Books, New York, 1938, 232).
Please read Anthony O’Hear work titled Philosophy – Wisdom or Technique? starting on page 351. Please click here.
Please remember to bring $3 for the Setauket Neighborhood House.
Randomized acts play a marginal role in traditional Bayesian decision theory, essentially only one of tie-breaking. Meanwhile, rationales for randomized decisions have been offered in a number of areas, including game theory, experimental design, and machine learning. A common and plausible way of accommodating some (but not all) of these ideas from a Bayesian perspective is by appeal to a decision maker’s bounded computational resources. Making this suggestion both precise and compelling is surprisingly difficult. We propose a distinction between interesting and uninteresting cases where randomization can help a decision maker, with the eventual aim of achieving a unified story about the rational role of randomization. The interesting cases, we claim, all arise from constraints on memory.
UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON LOGIC, PROBABILITY, AND GAMES
On the Rational Role of Randomization
Thomas Icard (Stanford)
State-dependent utility is a problem for decision theory under uncertainty. It questions the very possibility that beliefs be revealed by choice data. According to the current literature, all models of beliefs are equally exposed to the problem. Moreover, the problem is solvable only when the decision-maker can influence the resolution of uncertainty. This paper shows that these two views must be abandoned. The various models of beliefs are unequally exposed to the problem of state-dependent utility. The problem is solvable even when the decision-maker has no influence over the resolution of uncertainty. The implications of such reappraisal for a philosophical appreciation of the revealed preference methodology are discussed.
Jean Baccelli (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy).
A standard way to challenge convergence-based accounts of inductive success is to claim that they are too weak to constrain inductive inferences in the short run. We respond to such a challenge by answering some questions raised by Juhl (1994). When it comes to predicting limiting relative frequencies in the framework of Reichenbach, we show that speed-optimal convergence—a long-run success condition—induces dynamic coherence in the short run. This is joint work with Eric Wofsey.
Michael Nielsen (Columbia University).
4:10 pm, Friday, November 16th, 2018
Faculty House, Columbia University
In Philosophy in the Library, philosophers from around the world tackle the big questions. In February, we hear from Ethan Hallerman.
None of us today can avoid reflecting on the way our thoughts and habits relate to the tools we use, but interest in how technologies reshape us is both older and broader than contemporary concerns around privacy, distraction, addiction, and isolation. For the past hundred years, scholars have investigated the historical role of everyday technologies in making new forms of experience and senses of selfhood possible, from at least as early as the invention of writing. In recent years, philosophers have considered how our understanding of agency and mental states should be revised in light of the role that the technical environment plays in our basic activities. Here, we will look at how some models of the mind illuminate the results of the philosophy of technology to clarify the relationship between technology and the self.
Ethan Hallerman is a doctoral student in philosophy at Stony Brook University. He lives in New York where he prowls the sewers at night, looking for his father.
There are two approaches to life. The first one, which we are identifying with Sir Karl Popper, is to think before we act and to let our hypotheses die in our stead when the overall outcome is likely to be negative. We act now for a better future, and we think now which action will bring the best future. Both decision theory and backward induction are technical versions of this train of thought. The second approach, which we will identify with the Buddha, is to live in the present and not allow the future to pull us away from living in the ever present Now. The Buddha’s approach is echoed in many others who came after him, Jelaluddin Rumi, Kahlil Gibran, and even perhaps Jesus. It occurs in many contemporary teachers like Eckhart Tolle and Thich Nhat Hanh. We may call Popper’s approach “futurism” and the Buddha’s approach “presentism.”
In this talk, we will discuss various aspects of the discourse on presentism and futurism. The purpose is to contrast one with the other. We will not attempt to side with one against the other, and instead leave it as a future project to find a prescriptive action-guiding choice between the two. We merely conjecture that a better optimal choice between these two positions may be somewhere in between. (This is joint work with Jongjin Kim.)