Monday November 2
Tuesday November 3
All attendees are invited to join us to continue conversations over 4:15 afternoon tea at Measure (400 5th Avenue at 36th) following the presentation. RSVP for tea is required by November 1st. RSVP here.
Details on the talks and event are below.
Women in Philosophy Conference: Student Talks
Monday November 2, 2015
Four graduate student women working in analytic philosophy — Bianca Crewe, Louise Daoust, Emily Sullivan, and Christine Susienka — will present their work in Room 5414 at the Graduate Center, CUNY, 365 5th Avenue. Details on the speakers and their talks, including abstracts, are below.
Bianca Crewe (University of British Columbia) “Beyond ‘Bad Data’: Data and Normativity in a Naturalized Scientific Framework”
Louise Daoust (University of Pennsylvania) “Constancy, Relationalism, and Color Science”
Emily Sullivan (Fordham University) “Inter-System Casual Explanations: Rethinking Renormalization Group”
Christine Susienka (Columbia University) “Invoking Rights and Communicating Wrongs”
ABSTRACTS:
Crewe, “Beyond ‘Bad Data’: Data and Normativity in a Naturalized Scientific Framework”
Within feminist science studies, it is generally acknowledged that value-free science is neither possible nor desirable. Following this acknowledgement, feminist naturalized empiricism suggests that it is possible to determine which values are justified in science by treating them like scientific hypotheses, subject to empirical testing and subsequently confirmed or disconfirmed by the relevant data. Thus, it is claimed that values have empirical content and can be evaluated as such. Furthermore, many scholars in this tradition argue that there is empirical evidence for commitments to gender and racial equality, and that therefore feminism can be vindicated from within a scientific framework. This account likewise claims to allow for the dismissal of racist, androcentric, or otherwise oppressive worldviews as disproved rather than as violating the objectivity of science. I contend that assumptions surrounding data and evidence are a central and unexplored problem for feminist naturalized empiricism, and that these assumptions precede and undergird the problem of adjudicating between political values in the sciences. Specifically, I argue that many feminist naturalized empiricists’ appeals to data as evidence for the justification of certain political commitments are premised on a specific, though unacknowledged, conception of data itself—namely, as neutral, objective, and outside of the workings of the power structures such theorists seek to expose. Ultimately, I argue that if our conception of the natural world is expanded to include political values, then the data used to justify our engagement with specific political commitments will also be value-laden. Overall, I hope to highlight both the insufficiency of a wholly naturalized empiricist evaluative framework in the sciences and the necessity of non-revisable political commitments designed to structure scientific endeavors and the treatment of data.
Daoust, “Constancy, Relationalism, and Color Science”
A longstanding puzzle in philosophy concerns how to fit colors into our scientificworldview. Explicitly or implicitly, color science has tended to rely upon an objectivist account of color according to which colors are mind-independent, physical properties. Color systems are modeled as striving to discount contextual factors, such as facts about illumination, in order to present or represent colors constantly: as invariant despite dramatic changes in proximal stimulation. Objectivism is motivated by an interest in explaining how perception guides action — an interest that has remained at the heart of color science. It also has a rich philosophical pedigree.
There is increasing acknowledgment among philosophers, however, that color vision isn’t perfectly constant: surfaces don’t look exactly the same under different viewing conditions, and this ought not necessarily be understood as a perceptual shortcoming. In response, there’s been a resurgence of interest in relationalism about color, the view that color is a property that exists between a perceiver and a physical surface. Instead of appealing to perceptual constancy to account for the similarity in how a particular surface appears across contexts, relationalists are motivated by the fact that surfaces appear differently under different viewing conditions. They embrace experiential variation, identifying color properties with the fleeting, particular relations that are manifest between perceivers and their environments, or with properties of these relations.
I argue that in embracing color as a maximally fine-grained phenomenon, these relational theories fail to acknowledge perceptual constancy as a feature of color vision at all. The result is less than innocuous: the action-guiding component of color is rendered merely parasitic on our account of color perception. Moreover, these views fail to speak to what makes color a subject worthy of scientific inquiry, a fact that helps to explain why relationalism remains peripheral to the methodological choices of color science. In conclusion, I appeal to phylogenetic history in proposing a novel kind of relationalism, one I argue results in better congruence between our metaphysical ambitions and the more practical interests of color science.
Sullivan, “Inter-System Casual Explanations: Rethinking Renormalization Group”
General explanations abstract away from irrelevant causal details. After abstraction we are still left with a causal explanation. For example, in explaining how water changes from a liquid to a gas we might abstract away from the spin of the microlevel particles. This leaves us with a more general explanation that points out macrolevel causes that bring about a phase change, such as the influence of heat.
However, when we want to explain why there are macrolevel similarities between disparate systems, then it is less clear if abstracting away from irrelevant causal details still leaves us with a causal explanation. Many have argued that Renormalization Group explanations of phase transitions that explain macrobheaviors of diverse systems are non-causal explanations. The challenge is that when we explain similarities between systems we are not only abstracting away from irrelevant causal details of the specific systems, but that we are ignoring causal details altogether. It seems that we are left with a non-
causal mathematical or structural explanation.
In this paper, I argue that inter-system explanations are in fact causal explanations. I take a close look at Renormalization Group explanations of phase transitions and argue contra Robert Batterman (2010) and Alexander Reutlinger (2014). that abstracting away from microlevel causal irrelevancies on the system specific level is not different in kind from how the causal irrelevancies are abstracted in inter-system explanations. This means that universal macrobehavior can in fact be explained through a macrolevel cause. I argue that this is so without doing away with our common sense intuitions about causality.
Susienka, “Invoking Rights and Communicating Wrongs”
What role does the invocation of rights and duties play in personal relationships? And how do the duties that correlate with rights fit into the broader landscape of relational responsibilities? The kinds of cases I have in mind are close relationships – those between friends, family members, or partners. As agents actively engaged in and committed to reciprocal personal relationships, we rely on the knowledge that our relatives care for us and will be responsive to reasons concerning our well-being or the well-being of our relationships. In this context, appeals to rights and duties seem to get the responsibilities generated by personal relationships descriptively wrong. Instead, they might be better characterized by commitments, shared values, or care for one another.
Nonetheless, I argue, rights do exist in these contexts, and they play what I refer to as a background role. Though it is not often fitting to invoke them in healthy relationships, they provide background conditions of trust and security that make more robust personal relationships possible. I proceed by identifying three reasons why rights claims are often unfitting, and I then develop a general positive account of when rights claims are fittingly invoked. I argue: (1) Rights claims are coercive—they make direct demands upon one’s relative rather than engage her in reasoning, and in doing so express distrust that appeals to one’s own well-being or that of the relationship will be motivating; (2)They invoke more general relationship types and fail to acknowledge the particularities of relationships; and (3),they fail to fully characterize the wrongings that occur between close relatives. These same features make it possible for rights to provide recourse when other means of response are insufficient. A further upshot of this approach is that it scales up to more general social relationships and ultimately can be used to characterize the role of human rights in our broader normative practices.
Women in Philosophy Conference: Negotiations, Publishing, & Purpose
Tuesday November 3, 2015
Building on the success of last year’s panel, SWIP-Analytic will again host an event on women in philosophy in Room 5414 at the Graduate Center, CUNY, 365 5th Avenue.
Tuesday Nov 3 Schedule
10:30 – 12:00: Guided Q&A Roundtable on Women in Philosophy with Jessica Gordon-Roth, Miriam Schoenfield, and Adriana Renero
12:00 – 1:00: Lunch
1:00 – 2:30: Presentation on Imposter Syndrome with Alice Mangan
2:30 – 4:00: Presentation on Negotiations with Kim Keating
4:00: Tea
All attendees are invited to join us to continue conversations over 4:15 afternoon tea at Measure (400 5th Avenue at 36th) following the presentation. RSVP for tea is required by November 1st. RSVP here.
Jessica Gordon-Roth, Participant in Rountable on Women in Philosophy
Jessica Gordon-Roth, PhD, received her doctorate from the University of Illinois at Chicago and is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Lehman College. Her field of interest is the history of early modern philosophy, especially Locke. Currently her research is focused on the ways in which different conceptions of “substance” and “mode” inform the early modern debate over personal identity. Gordon-Roth’s “Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s Defense of Locke” was recently published in The Monist, and her joint work with Nancy Kendrick, “Including Early Modern Women Writers in Survey Courses: A Call to Action”, appeared in Metaphilosophy this year. She will teach a course on Locke at the Graduate Center this spring.
Kimberly Keating, Presentation on Negotiations.
Kimberly Keating, MBA, CEO of Keating Advisors, received her M.B.A. from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration and a B.B.A. in Finance from Southern Methodist University. Keating is currently a board member of Leanin.org Foundation and a contributor to Sheryl Sandberg’s best-selling book, Lean In For Graduates, where she dispenses advice on how negotiate a fair and decent salary for your first job. Through Keating Advisors, she gives speeches and workshops to help professionals with proven negotiation tactics.
Alice Mangan, Presentation on the Imposter Syndrome.
Alice Mangan, M.Phil., M.S., Ph.D., recently completed her doctorate in Clinical Psychology at The Graduate Center, CUNY. Mangan works clinically with children, adolescents and young adults in individual, group and couples treatment, and has a private practice as a learning specialist, parent and educational consultant in New York City. Mangan’s clinical and research interests span the intersections of learning disability, parent and child development, and the effects of learning disabilities on the psychological development of the child, parent and family system. She is a former member of the graduate faculty at Bank Street College of Education. Mangan presented to SWIP-Analytic November 2014.
Adriana Renero, Participant in Rountable on Women in Philosophy
Adriana Renero, MA, is a doctoral candidate at the CUNY Graduate Center and holds an MA from Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). Her areas of specialization are philosophy of mind and aesthetics, and she has additional research interests in epistemology, metaphysics, and cognitive science. Renero has presented her work at Harvard University, UNAM, and Columbia University. Her “Consciousness and Mental Qualities for Auditory Sensations” was published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in 2014.
Miriam Schoenfield, Participant in Rountable on Women in Philosophy
Miriam Schoenfield, PhD, received her doctorate from MIT. She is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at The University of Texas at Austin and currently Bersoff Fellow at New York University. Her primary research interests are in epistemology and ethics and normativity more broadly. Schoenfield’s “Chilling Out on Epistemic Rationality: A Defense of Imprecise Credences (and other imprecise doxastic attitudes)” appeared in Philosophical Studies in 2012 and her “Bridging Rationality and Accuracy” is forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy.
“I don’t know where the line is. … In most religions you’re taught that you’re not going to be judged by your actions; you’re going to be judged by your intent. … So if your intent is to gay-bash, yes, you are a gay-basher. Even when you don’t do it. If your intent is to not, then it’s not.
Now, it can still be offensive, but once you explain that to the person that made the mistake, you can pretty much be sure they will go back on that and try to rectify hurting you. Does this make sense?”
– Chris Rock on Fresh Air, 12/8/14
On Tuesday, November 3rd, Jennifer Ware (CUNY Graduate Center) comes to Brooklyn Public Philosophers to answer Chris Rock’s question. (The answer is no.) She’ll talk about stereotypes, slurs, and the psychological and social mechanisms through which jokes can hurt.
Here’s a bit more about the talk in Ware’s own words:
Unjust Kidding: The Insufficiency of Good Intentions
Careful analysis of humor is important because of the amnesty often granted to humorous speech acts. When someone tells a joke, they seemingly separate themselves from that which they express, and consequently we typically do not hold individuals to the same standards when they are apparently telling a joke. George Carlin, a comic famous for his off-color humor, made the following observation,
“Stand-up is a socially acceptable form of aggression. You get to name the targets, you get to fire the bullets… and the wonderful part is, after you’ve finished, you then say, ‘Hey, can’t you take a joke? This is humor, sir! What’s the matter with you?”
Individuals intending to express a vicious position without having to take full responsibility for their words may use this greater forgiveness divisively, and therefore we should be careful about granting such amnesty.
In this presentation, I will review some of the more common formal and colloquial accounts that aim to explain why and when jokes are offensive. I will go on to develop a position informed by empirical evidence that challenges the view that facts about the speaker largely, if not entirely, determine the moral character of a joke. Instead, I suggest the effects of jokes play a significant role in determining their moral characters.
Tell your friends/students/strangers! Bring someone who knows lots of jokes! See you there, I hope!
The Liberal Studies department at the New School for Social Research and the Culture & Media Department at Eugene Lang College are pleased to jointly present “Appetite for Distraction: Social Media and Today’s Attention-Economy,” an evening lecture by Chair and faculty memeber Dominic Pettman, which also marks the publication his forthcoming book Infinite Distraction (Polity Press, 2016).
It is often argued that contemporary media homogenize our thoughts and actions, without us being fully aware of the restrictions they impose. But what if the problem is not that we are all synchronized to the same motions or moments, but rather dispersed into countless different emotional micro-experiences? What if the effect of so-called social media is to calibrate the interactive spectacle so that we never fully feel the same way as other potential allies at the same time? While one person is fuming about economic injustice or climate change denial, another is giggling at a cute cat video. And, two hours late, vice versa. The nebulous indignation which constitutes the very fuel of true social change can be redirected safely around the network, avoiding any dangerous surges of radical activity.
Infinite Distraction examines the deliberate deployment of what Pettman calls hypermodulation, as a key strategy encoded into the contemporary media environment. His account challenges the various narratives that portray social media as a sinister space of synchronized attention, in which we are busily clicking ourselves to death. This critical reflection on the unprecedented power of the Internet requires us to rethink the potential for infinite distraction that our latest technologies now allow.
A Q&A will follow the lecture and refreshments will be on hand.
Women in academia, law, medicine, and business earn less than men in most subfields and are promoted more slowly. Women in academia are underrepresented among invited speakers at conferences and among award winners. Two concepts – gender schemas and the accumulation of advantage – together explain women’s slower advancement compared to men’s. A review of current observational and experimental data suggests that although people have meritocratic and egalitarian intentions, those very intentions interfere with meritocratic and egalitarian behavior. Valian presents experimental data that demonstrate how gender schemas – held by men and women alike – produce subtle overvaluations of men and undervaluations of women. She reviews the small imbalances in the treatment of men and women that add up to major disparities in success. She offers a hypothesis about the origin of gender schemas.
There are remedies, both at an institutional level and at an individual level. Institutions can improve their procedures for hiring, retaining, and promoting men and women to achieve genuinely fair organizations that make full use of everyone’s talents. Individuals can act more in keeping with their values and be more effective in their professional lives.
Virginia Valian is Distinguished Professor of Psychology at Hunter College and is a member of the doctoral faculties of Psychology, Linguistics, and Speech-Language-Hearing Sciences at the CUNY Graduate Center. She is the director of the Language Acquisition Research Center, which has been funded by the NSF and NIH. She is also the director of the Hunter College Gender Equity Project, which has been funded by NSF, NIH, and the Sloan Foundation.
Dr Valian works in the psychology of language and gender equity. In language, Dr Valian works in two areas. One area is first language acquisition, where Dr Valian performs research with the aim of developing a model of acquisition that specifies what is innate, how input is used by the child, and how the child’s syntactic knowledge interacts with knowledge in other linguistic and extra-linguistic domains. Dr Valian’s second language area is the relation between bilingualism and higher cognitive functions in adults.
In gender equity Dr Valian performs research on the reasons behind women’s slow advancement in the professions and proposes remedies for individuals and institutions. She is currently particularly interested in who receives awards and prizes, and invitations to speak at conferences. In a 2014 Chronicle of Higher Education article on ‘What book changed your mind?’, Valian’s book, Why So Slow? The Advancement of Women was one of 12 non-fiction books published in the last 30 years that was showcased. Her current book with Abigail Stewart, titled, The Inclusive Academy: Achieving Diversity and Excellence, will be published by MIT Press.
Dr Valian’s most recent talks were at Stony Brook University, the University of Illinois, Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona, and Birkbeck College in London. Her evidence-based approach has been featured in the New York Times, the Washington Post, Nature, Scientific American, The Women’s Review of Books, and many other journals and magazines.
Sue Weinberg Lecture
Public Health Skepticism and Respect for Women’s Voices
Anne Barnhill (Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy, University of Pennsylvania)
Jessica Martucci (Fellow in Advanced Biomedical Ethics, University of Pennsylvania)
OCTOBER 28, 2016, 4:30-6:30pm
The Graduate Center, CUNY
Room TBA
Metro Area Philosophy of Science Presents:
Elizabeth Miller (Yale),
Title: TBA.
Jonathan Bain (NYU)
What Explains the Spin-Statistics Connection?
The spin-statistics connection plays an essential role in explanations of non-relativistic phenomena associated with both field-theoretic and non-field-theoretic systems (for instance, it explains the electronic structure of solids and the behavior of Einstein-Bose condensates and superconductors). However, it is only derivable within the context of relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) in the form of the Spin-Statistics Theorem; and moreover, there are multiple, mutually incompatible ways of deriving it. This essay attempts to determine the sense in which the spin-statistics connection can be said to be an essential property in RQFT, and how it is that an essential property of one type of theory can figure into fundamental explanations offered by other, inherently distinct theories.
SWIP-Analytic’s session, “Women in Philosophy: Publishing, Jobs, & Fitting In” will be a roundtable featuring Elise Crull (City College, CUNY), Una Stojnic (NYU), and Denise Vigani (Drew University). They will discuss work habits, publishing, and job searches, among other things.
Elise Crull is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy, City College, CUNY. She received a B.Sc in Physics from Calvin College, and holds an M.A. in Philosophy and Ph.D. in History and Philosophy of Science from the University of Notre Dame. Among her primary interests is the historical and philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics (cf. her book, The ‘Einstein Paradox’: Debates on Nonlocality and Incompleteness in 1935, Cambridge University Press 2017, and an edited volume, Grete Hermann: Between Physics and Philosophy, Springer 2017 – both with G. Bacciagaluppi). She has also published on the metaphysics of quantum decoherence and on interpretational issues within quantum gravity and relativistic cosmology, and enjoys puzzling over more general topics at the intersection of physics and ontology.
Una Stojnic is a Bersoff Assistant Professor/ Faculty Fellow in Philosophy at NYU and a Research Fellow in Philosophy at the School of Philosophy at ANU. In fall 2017, she will join the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University as an Assistant Professor of Philosophy. She earned her PhD in Philosophy and a Certificate in Cognitive Science from Rutgers University in 2016. She mainly works in philosophy of language, formal semantics and pragmatics of natural languages, and philosophical logic. Her research aims at understanding and modeling language and linguistic communication. This situates her work within a network of traditional questions in philosophy of language, as well as within a set of empirical questions in linguistics and cognitive sciences.
Denise Vigani is currently an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Drew University. She recently earned her Ph.D. in Philosophy and Certificate in Women’s Studies from The Graduate Center, City University of New York. Her primary areas of research are virtue ethics and moral psychology. Her current research agenda is to offer an empirically plausible moral psychology of neo-Aristotelian virtue. While virtue may be an ideal that is hard to cultivate and perhaps rarely fully attained, she contends that it is very much a human ideal. It does not, as some have alleged, require us to become super-human or to cultivate traits that are beyond our psychological capabilities.
Everyone (men & women, philosophers & non-philosophers) is welcome at our public events.
Andrea Pitts, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, Charlotte, gives a lecture entitled:
“Carceral Medicine and Prison Abolition: Trust and Truth-telling in Correctional Healthcare”
The United States Supreme Court ruled in 1976 that the privation of healthcare for incarcerated persons would constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. While that ruling, in effect, mandated a standard of care for incarcerated persons, the institutional means through which healthcare is provided in federal, state, and private detention facilities have been neither uniform nor without their share of problems. A number of human rights organizations and prisoner advocacy groups have documented patterns of neglect and malpractice within the nation’s prisons, jails, and detention facilities, including basic sanitary concerns, undertreatment for severe illnesses and injuries, and the structural incapacity of many correctional healthcare systems to meet the needs of their aging patients. Alongside the literature outlining concerns in correctional healthcare, a distinct and theoretically dense body of evidence on the structural patterns of racism operating through carceral systems in the U.S. has also demanded scholarly and political attention. Much of this work marks the continuities that mass incarceration in the U.S. has with historical patterns of disenfranchisement, exploitation, and state-sanctioned violence inflicted on communities of color, and especially Black Americans. Within this discourse, arguments for penal abolition have become prominent alongside critiques of structural racism. In this vein, a number of scholars and activists have been calling for the comprehensive dismantling of penal institutions, legislative measures, and associated corporations that have built the very carceral networks that perpetually inflict harm on communities of color both in the U.S. and abroad. In dialogue with contemporary research on correctional healthcare and literature on institutional racism in the context of clinical and colonial medicine, this presentation analyzes trust and truth-telling among patients and providers in correctional settings with the aim of developing an argument for the abolition of systems of incarceration. While the improvement of systems of healthcare has been defended as an important goal within the field of correctional medicine, structural epistemic injustices operating through race, gender, and disability within correctional medicine point toward a broader argument for the dismantling of carceral systems of punishment more generally.
Bio:
Andrea J. Pitts is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, Charlotte. Their research interests include philosophy of race and gender, social epistemology, Latin American and U.S. Latina/o philosophy, and philosophy of medicine. Their publications appear in Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Radical Philosophy Review, and Inter-American Journal of Philosophy. Dr. Pitts is also currently co-editing two forthcoming volumes: one on the reception of the work of Henri Bergson in decolonial thought, feminism, and critical race studies, and a volume on contemporary scholarship in U.S. Latina and Latin American feminist philosophy.
Prof. Vardit Ravitsky, Ph.D.
Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing (NIPT) is a new technology that allows genetic testing of a fetus with a simple maternal blood test, by isolating cell-free fetal DNA in the mother’s plasma. Introduced in 2011, it is now available globally, its cost is declining, and the number of conditions it can test for is increasing. Technically, this technology can be used to sequence the entire genome of a fetus early in the first trimester of pregnancy. Should this use of prenatal testing be banned? Limited? Offered? Encouraged? Covered by insurance? This talk will explore some ethical implications of this possibility. It will focus on reproductive autonomy and the transition from ‘knowledge is power’ to ‘knowledge is vulnerability’ in the context of informed choice.
Vardit Ravitsky, PhD, is Associate Professor at the Bioethics Programs within the Department of Social and Preventive Medicine of the School of Public Health at the University of Montreal. She is also Director of the Ethics and Health Branch of the CRE, an interuniversity research center in ethics. Prof. Ravitsky’s research focuses on reproductive ethics and the ethical aspects of genetic and genomics. Her research interests in bioethics also include health policy and cultural perspectives. She is particularly interested in the various ways in which cultural frameworks shape public debate and public policy in the area of bioethics. Her research projects are funded by CIHR, FRQSC, SSHRC, and Genome Canada. She published over 100 articles, book chapters and commentaries on bioethical issues, and is lead-editor of “The Penn Center Guide to Bioethics”.
Born and raised in Jerusalem, Ravitsky brings international perspectives to her research and teaching. She holds a BA in philosophy from the Sorbonne University in Paris, an MA in philosophy (with a specialization in bioethics) from the University of New Mexico in the US, and a PhD in philosophy (with a specialization in bioethics) from Bar-Ilan University in Israel. She was a post-doctoral fellow at the Department of Bioethics of the NIH and at the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI).
Ravitsky is an elected Board member and Treasurer of the International Association of Bioethics (IAB). She is a member of Canadian Institutes of Health Research (the ‘Canadian NIH’) Standing Committee on Ethics. She is also member of the University of Montreal’s Public Health Research Institute (IRSPUM), the Quebec Reproduction Network (RQR), and of the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society (CFAS). Previously, she was faculty at the Department of Medical Ethics, School of Medicine, at the University of Pennsylvania. She was also a Senior Policy Advisor at CIHR’s Ethics Office and a GE3LS consultant to Genome Canada.
SWIP-Analytic Schedule for Spring 2018
Here is a sneak peak at our exciting line-up of speakers and events for Spring 2018. Some times and rooms TBA.
Elanor Taylor, February 8, CUNY Graduate Center, The Committee for Interdisciplinary Science Studies, Room 5307, 4:00-6:00pm
Virginia Aspe Armella and Ma. Elena García Peláez Cruz (co-sponsored with SWIP-Analytic Mexico), March 2, NYU Room 202, 2:00-4:30pm
Round Table Women in Philosophy: Publishing, Jobs, and Fitting In (co-sponsored with NYSWIP), March 8, CUNY Graduate Center, The Committee for Interdisciplinary Science Studies, Room 5307, 4:30-7:30pm
Graduate Student Essay Prize Winner Presentation, April 12
Sophie Horowitz (UMass, Amherst), April 26