Abstract: These lectures report on my recent work in tracing out a path through a variety of philosophical attempts to appropriate developments in contemporaneous science on behalf of an evolving conception of “scientific” philosophy beginning with Kant and extending to the present. I concentrate, in particular, on Kant and the post-Kantian tradition. This includes the Naturphilosophie of Schelling and Hegel, the neo-Kantian reaction to Naturphilosophie initiated by Helmholtz, and the ensuing contributions to nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophy and science by Mach, Poincaré, and Einstein. I then consider the neo-Kantianism of Ernst Cassirer and (yes) Thomas Kuhn, which finally leads to my own attempt to develop a post-Kuhnian approach to the philosophy of science in the light of this history.
Abstract: These lectures report on my recent work in tracing out a path through a variety of philosophical attempts to appropriate developments in contemporaneous science on behalf of an evolving conception of “scientific” philosophy beginning with Kant and extending to the present. I concentrate, in particular, on Kant and the post-Kantian tradition. This includes the Naturphilosophie of Schelling and Hegel, the neo-Kantian reaction to Naturphilosophie initiated by Helmholtz, and the ensuing contributions to nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophy and science by Mach, Poincaré, and Einstein. I then consider the neo-Kantianism of Ernst Cassirer and (yes) Thomas Kuhn, which finally leads to my own attempt to develop a post-Kuhnian approach to the philosophy of science in the light of this history.
Abstract: These lectures report on my recent work in tracing out a path through a variety of philosophical attempts to appropriate developments in contemporaneous science on behalf of an evolving conception of “scientific” philosophy beginning with Kant and extending to the present. I concentrate, in particular, on Kant and the post-Kantian tradition. This includes the Naturphilosophie of Schelling and Hegel, the neo-Kantian reaction to Naturphilosophie initiated by Helmholtz, and the ensuing contributions to nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophy and science by Mach, Poincaré, and Einstein. I then consider the neo-Kantianism of Ernst Cassirer and (yes) Thomas Kuhn, which finally leads to my own attempt to develop a post-Kuhnian approach to the philosophy of science in the light of this history.
Conventional wisdom holds that since the advent of the first full theories of quantum mechanics in the mid-1920s, the Copenhagen interpretation has been the default interpretation of quantum mechanics, and has enjoyed the support of a majority of physicists ever since. This is not the case. While it is indeed true that a majority of physicists have long professed that they subscribe to the Copenhagen interpretation, the plain fact of the matter is that there is no single coherent position known as the Copenhagen interpretation, nor has there ever been one. Moreover, none of the positions that go by the name “Copenhagen interpretation” do a good job of solving the measurement problem, the central interpretive problem at the heart of quantum foundations. Nor do they evade the nonlocality that is dictated by Bell’s theorem. In this talk, I will give an overview of the history of the Copenhagen interpretation from 1926 to the present, explain its multiple inconsistencies and failures, and attempt an answer at a persistent puzzle: why does the Copenhagen interpretation remain popular among physicists despite its manifest flaws and the existence of multiple superior alternatives
About the speaker: Adam Becker is the author of What is Real? The Unfinished Quest for the Meaning of Quantum Physics. He has a PhD in physics from the University of Michigan and he is the recipient of an Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Book Grant. He is currently a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley’s Office for History of Science and Technology.
Abstract: TBD.
Abstract: TBD.
Abstract: My main aim is to make a remark about the relation between (i) dualities between theories, as `duality’ is understood in physics and (ii) equivalence of theories, as `equivalence’ is understood in logic and philosophy. The remark is that in physics, two theories can be dual, and accordingly get called `the same theory’, though we interpret them as disagreeing—so that they are certainly equivalent, as `equivalent’ is normally understood. So the remark is simple: but, I shall argue, worth stressing—since often neglected.
My argument for this is based on the account of duality by De Haro and myself: which is illustrated here with several examples, from both elementary physics and string theory. Thus I argue that in some examples, including in string theory, two dual theories disagree in their claims about the world.
I also spell out how this remark implies a limitation of proposals (both traditional and recent) to understand theoretical equivalence as either logical equivalence or a weakening of it.
Abstract: TBD.
Abstract: TBD.
Abstract: My main aim is to make a remark about the relation between (i) dualities between theories, as `duality’ is understood in physics and (ii) equivalence of theories, as `equivalence’ is understood in logic and philosophy. The remark is that in physics, two theories can be dual, and accordingly get called `the same theory’, though we interpret them as disagreeing—so that they are certainly equivalent, as `equivalent’ is normally understood. So the remark is simple: but, I shall argue, worth stressing—since often neglected.
My argument for this is based on the account of duality by De Haro and myself: which is illustrated here with several examples, from both elementary physics and string theory. Thus I argue that in some examples, including in string theory, two dual theories disagree in their claims about the world.
I also spell out how this remark implies a limitation of proposals (both traditional and recent) to understand theoretical equivalence as either logical equivalence or a weakening of it.
Abstract: TBD.
Inflationary cosmology’s account for the emergence of the seeds of structure in the universe out of primordial quantum fluctuations is empirically successful as far as the so called scalar modes is concerned, but not so regarding the tensor modes. On the other hand, the usual account has some serious conceptual problems, connected to the quantum macro-objectification question. In the search for an approach to resolve the latter, we find substantially modified predictions (with respect to the standard ones) for one of the observables, specifically the estimates for the amplitude and shape of the spectrum primordial gravity waves. This is an interesting example, where considerations that might have initially thought to be “just of philosophical interest” actually led to novel and (so far better) predictions for empirical facts.
There will be at least three MAPS talks this semester (I am still waiting to hear back regarding a fourth). The preliminary schedule below should convey a sense of the basic plan.
A number of invited speakers asked to visit in Spring 2019 or Fall 2019 instead of this fall. In case you are interested, I list those future speakers below.
Best,
Isaac
Upcoming Talks
==============================
Massimo Pigliucci (CUNY)
Details: 4:30-6:30pm Tuesday Oct 16; 5307 CUNY Graduate Center (365 5th Ave.).
Title: The variety of scientism and the limits of science
Abstract: Science is by far the most powerful approach to the investigation of the natural world ever devised. Still, it has limits, and there are many areas and questions where the scientific approach is ill suited, or at best provides only pertinent information rather than full answers. The denial of this modest attitude about science is called scientism, which declares science to be the only form of human knowledge and understanding, attempting to subsume everything else, including all the humanistic disciplines, into “science” very broadly (mis-)construed. In this talk, I argue that this is a mistake, and that it moreover has the potential to undermine public trust in science itself.
==============================
Mario Hubert (Columbia)
Details: 4:30-6:30pm Tuesday Nov20; location TBD.
Title: When Fields Are Not Degrees of Freedom (joint work with Vera Hartenstein).
Abstract: We show that in the Maxwell–Lorentz theory of classical electrodynamics most initial values for fields and particles lead to an ill-defined dynamics, as they exhibit singularities or discontinuities along light-cones. This phenomenon suggests that the Maxwell equations and the Lorentz force law ought rather to be read as a system of delay differential equations, that is, differential equations that relate a function and its derivatives at different times. This mathematical reformulation, however, leads to physical and philosophical consequences for the ontological status of the electromagnetic field. In particular, fields cannot be taken as independent degrees of freedom, which suggests that one should not add them to the ontology.
==============================
Spring 2019
===============================================================
Nina Emery (Mount Holyoke)
===============================================================
===============================================================
Fall 2019
===============================================================
Quayshawn Spencer (UPenn)
Loewer distinguishes two approaches to laws and time: Humean accounts, which deny primitive modality and explain temporal asymmetries in scientific terms, and non-Humean accounts that take temporal asymmetry and modality to be metaphysically fundamental. I’ll argue that Loewer neglects an important third approach: deny metaphysical claims about fundamentality, and explain temporal asymmetries as well as the function of modal entities in scientific terms. This pragmatist approach provides a clear ontology to science, and, and unlike the other two accounts, doesn’t use metaphysics in place of scientific explanation.
There will be dinner after the talk. If you are interested, please send an email with “Dinner” in the heading to nyphilsci@gmail.com (please note that all are welcome, but only the speaker’s dinner will be covered). If you have any other questions, please email isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu.
I introduce a sequence which I call indefinite: a sequence every element of which has a successor but whose number of elements is bounded; this is no contradiction. I then consider the possibility of space and time being indefinitely divisible. This is theoretically possible and agrees with experience. If this is space and time’s structure, then even if the laws of nature are deterministic, the behaviour of physical systems will be probabilistic. This approach might also shed light on directionality in time and other physical phenomena.
There will be dinner after the talk. If you are interested, please send an email with “Dinner” in the heading to nyphilsci@gmail.com (please note that all are welcome, but only the speaker’s dinner will be covered). If you have any other questions, please email isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu.
Upcoming Talks
Mario Hubert (Columbia)
4:30-6:30pm Wednesday Nov 28; location TBD.
Title: When Fields Are Not Degrees of Freedom (joint work with Vera Hartenstein).
Abstract: We show that in the Maxwell–Lorentz theory of classical electrodynamics most initial values for fields and particles lead to an ill-defined dynamics, as they exhibit singularities or discontinuities along light-cones. This phenomenon suggests that the Maxwell equations and the Lorentz force law ought rather to be read as a system of delay differential equations, that is, differential equations that relate a function and its derivatives at different times. This mathematical reformulation, however, leads to physical and philosophical consequences for the ontological status of the electromagnetic field. In particular, fields cannot be taken as independent degrees of freedom, which suggests that one should not add them to the ontology.
Science is by far the most powerful approach to the investigation of the natural world ever devised. Still, it has limits, and there are many areas and questions where the scientific approach is ill suited, or at best provides only pertinent information rather than full answers. The denial of this modest attitude about science is called scientism, which declares science to be the only form of human knowledge and understanding, attempting to subsume everything else, including all the humanistic disciplines, into “science” very broadly (mis-)construed. In this talk, I argue that this is a mistake, and that it moreover has the potential to undermine public trust in science itself.
There will be dinner after the talk. If you are interested, please send an email with “Dinner” in the heading to nyphilsci@gmail.com (please note that all are welcome, but only the speaker’s dinner will be covered). If you have any other questions, please email isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu.
Upcoming Metro Area Philosophers Talks
==============================
Dustin Lazarovici (UNIL)
4:30-6:30pm Tuesday March 5, NYU 60 Fifth Avenue, room 110.
Title: TBD.
Abstract: TBD.
==============================
Elizabeth Miller (Yale)
4:30-6:30pm Date, location TBD. (sometime in April)
Title: TBD.
Abstract: TBD.
==============================
Nina Emery (Holyoke)
4:30-6:30pm Date, location TBD. (sometime in April)
Title: TBD.
Abstract: TBD.
==============================
Michela Massimi (Edinburgh)
4:30-6:30pm Thursday April 18; CUNY Graduate Center (365 5th Ave, NYC), room 5307.
Title: TBD.
Abstract: TBD.
==============================
What are laws of nature? The predominant view in contemporary philosophy of science is the Humean `best system account’ which holds that the laws of nature are merely descriptive, an efficient summary of contingent regularities that we find in the world. Using the concept of typicality, I will spell out a common anti-Humean intuition into a precise argument: A typical Humean world wouldn’t have any law-like regularities to begin with. Thus (I will argue), Humean metaphysics do not fit the objective order that we find in our universe.
There will be dinner after the talk. If you are interested, please send an email with `Dinner’ in the heading to nyphilsci@gmail.com (please note that all are welcome, but only the speaker’s dinner will be covered). If you have any other questions, please email isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu.