Neurogenetics and Behavior, The Rockefeller University
“The Structure of Olfactory Appearance”
Philosophy, University of Bayreuth
“Persons, First-Person Authority, and Self-Knowledge”
Philosophy and the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness
New York University
“Content Plurality in Mental Action”
Philosophy, Central European University and
Visiting Scholar, CUNY Graduate Center
“On the Nature of Representational Relation in the
Higher-Order Thought Theory: Extrinsicality,
Directness and Transitivity”
Philosophy, City College of New York, CUNY
“Transparency and Cognitive Phenomenology”
**NOTE DIFFERENT ROOM THIS ONE DAY: 9-206**
Music, CUNY Graduate Center
“Graphical Representations of Timbre Similarity:
Problems and Prospects”
Psychology and the Center for Neural Science,
New York University
“The Dynamics of Temporal Attention”
November 23: No talk—Thanksgiving
What does it mean that an event C “actually caused” event E? The problem of defining actual causation goes beyond mere philosophical speculation. For example, in many legal arguments, it is precisely what needs to be established in order to determine responsibility. (What exactly was the actual cause of the car accident or the medical problem?) The philosophy literature has been struggling with the problem of defining causality since the days of Hume, in the 1700s. Many of the definitions have been couched in terms of counterfactuals. (C is a cause of E if, had C not happened, then E would not have happened.) In 2001, Judea Pearl and I introduced a new definition of actual cause, using Pearl’s notion of structural equations to model counterfactuals. The definition has been revised twice since then, extended to deal with notions like “responsibility” and “blame”, and applied in databases and program verification. I survey the last 15 years of work here, including joint work with Judea Pearl, Hana Chockler, and Chris Hitchcock. The talk will be completely self-contained.
I argue that we do not understand gauge theory as well as we think we do, when boundaries are present. I will briefly explain the conceptual and technical issues that arise at the boundary. I will then propose a tentative resolution, which requires us to think of theories not in space-time, but in field-space.
Daniel King (BS, Lafayette College. MS, PhD, University of Virginia) is a mathematics scholar with special interests in mathematics education, game theory, history and philosophy of mathematics, and the outreach of mathematics to the social sciences and the humanities. He currently teaches an undergraduate course, Game Theory: The Study of Strategy and Conflict.
In this talk, King will focus on two particularly intriguing “games:” Newcomb’s Problem and the Prisoners’ Dilemma. The analysis of both games leads us to a curious paradox of sorts. Fascinating and perplexing, these games and the paradoxes they unleash serve to challenge some of our most cherished beliefs and philosophical viewpoints. No prior knowledge of game theory (or advanced-level mathematics) is required in order to enjoy and fully engage with the ideas we explore in this talk.
This event is sponsored by Friends of Sarah Lawrence College and is open to the public.
To register for this event, or for more information on the Friends of Sarah Lawrence College, please e-mail friends@sarahlawrence.edu or call 914.323.6154.
Science is by far the most powerful approach to the investigation of the natural world ever devised. Still, it has limits, and there are many areas and questions where the scientific approach is ill suited, or at best provides only pertinent information rather than full answers. The denial of this modest attitude about science is called scientism, which declares science to be the only form of human knowledge and understanding, attempting to subsume everything else, including all the humanistic disciplines, into “science” very broadly (mis-)construed. In this talk, I argue that this is a mistake, and that it moreover has the potential to undermine public trust in science itself.
Presented by Metro Area Philosophers of Science
The seminar is concerned with applying formal methods to fundamental issues, with an emphasis on probabilistic reasoning, decision theory and games. In this context “logic” is broadly interpreted as covering applications that involve formal representations. The topics of interest have been researched within a very broad spectrum of different disciplines, including philosophy (logic and epistemology), statistics, economics, and computer science. The seminar is intended to bring together scholars from different fields of research so as to illuminate problems of common interest from different perspectives. Throughout each academic year, meetings are regularly presented by the members of the seminar and distinguished guest speakers.
details tba
02/08/2019 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM
03/22/2019 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM
04/19/2018 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM
There are two approaches to life. The first one, which we are identifying with Sir Karl Popper, is to think before we act and to let our hypotheses die in our stead when the overall outcome is likely to be negative. We act now for a better future, and we think now which action will bring the best future. Both decision theory and backward induction are technical versions of this train of thought. The second approach, which we will identify with the Buddha, is to live in the present and not allow the future to pull us away from living in the ever present Now. The Buddha’s approach is echoed in many others who came after him, Jelaluddin Rumi, Kahlil Gibran, and even perhaps Jesus. It occurs in many contemporary teachers like Eckhart Tolle and Thich Nhat Hanh. We may call Popper’s approach “futurism” and the Buddha’s approach “presentism.”
In this talk, we will discuss various aspects of the discourse on presentism and futurism. The purpose is to contrast one with the other. We will not attempt to side with one against the other, and instead leave it as a future project to find a prescriptive action-guiding choice between the two. We merely conjecture that a better optimal choice between these two positions may be somewhere in between. (This is joint work with Jongjin Kim.)
Science is by far the most powerful approach to the investigation of the natural world ever devised. Still, it has limits, and there are many areas and questions where the scientific approach is ill suited, or at best provides only pertinent information rather than full answers. The denial of this modest attitude about science is called scientism, which declares science to be the only form of human knowledge and understanding, attempting to subsume everything else, including all the humanistic disciplines, into “science” very broadly (mis-)construed. In this talk, I argue that this is a mistake, and that it moreover has the potential to undermine public trust in science itself.
There will be dinner after the talk. If you are interested, please send an email with “Dinner” in the heading to nyphilsci@gmail.com (please note that all are welcome, but only the speaker’s dinner will be covered). If you have any other questions, please email isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu.
Upcoming Metro Area Philosophers Talks
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Dustin Lazarovici (UNIL)
4:30-6:30pm Tuesday March 5, NYU 60 Fifth Avenue, room 110.
Title: TBD.
Abstract: TBD.
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Elizabeth Miller (Yale)
4:30-6:30pm Date, location TBD. (sometime in April)
Title: TBD.
Abstract: TBD.
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Nina Emery (Holyoke)
4:30-6:30pm Date, location TBD. (sometime in April)
Title: TBD.
Abstract: TBD.
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Michela Massimi (Edinburgh)
4:30-6:30pm Thursday April 18; CUNY Graduate Center (365 5th Ave, NYC), room 5307.
Title: TBD.
Abstract: TBD.
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What are laws of nature? The predominant view in contemporary philosophy of science is the Humean `best system account’ which holds that the laws of nature are merely descriptive, an efficient summary of contingent regularities that we find in the world. Using the concept of typicality, I will spell out a common anti-Humean intuition into a precise argument: A typical Humean world wouldn’t have any law-like regularities to begin with. Thus (I will argue), Humean metaphysics do not fit the objective order that we find in our universe.
There will be dinner after the talk. If you are interested, please send an email with `Dinner’ in the heading to nyphilsci@gmail.com (please note that all are welcome, but only the speaker’s dinner will be covered). If you have any other questions, please email isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu.
When we’re asked to give examples of philosophical questions, we’re likely to think of questions that are very, very old. Is the physical world all there is? How should I live? How do we know what we know? But some philosophical problems are quite new, made possible or urgent by new developments in science and culture. These are often the most exciting problems to think through.
On March 7th at 7:30 PM, Derek Skillings joins Brooklyn Public Philosophers to share his work on the philosophical consequences of the fact that we are holobionts – biological units composed of hosts and their associated swarms of microorganisms. If you’re interested in health, the problem of personal identity, the philosophy of biology in general, or the philosophical consequences of the fact that we’re made up of a bunch of little things which are themselves alive in particular, you’ll want to check this one out. Here’s the abstract:
“I, holobiont. Are you and your microbes a community or a single entity?”
You are a holobiont – a biological unit made up of a host and its associated microbiome (bacteria, protists, viruses and other microscopic entities). What consequences does this have for how we understand ourselves and other similar organisms? What are our spatial and temporal boundaries, and what does it mean to be a healthy holobiont? In this talk I will look at some alternatives for making sense of both holobiont individuality and “healthy holobiont/microbiome” talk. I will argue that existing accounts of human health are not appropriate for microbiomes, and that notions of ecosystem health face similar shortcomings. I will end by looking at some possibilities for understanding overall host health given the importance and ubiquity of microbiomes.
As usual, we meet at the Dweck Center at the Grand Army Plaza branch of the Brooklyn Public Library. Here’s the Facebook event! Tell everyone, please!