Feb
23
Mon
Geoff Holtzman on the Causes and Effects of Gender Discrimination in Philosophy @ Info Commons Lab, Brooklyn Public Library
Feb 23 @ 7:00 pm – 8:00 pm

At long last, Brooklyn Public Philosophers is back for 2015! Coming up on 2/23 at 7:00 P.M., Geoff Holtzman (NYU Polytechnic Institute) will share his work on why philosophy is so male-dominated, and why it’s important that that changes. Here’s a bit more about the talk, in Geoff’s own words:

Rejecting Beliefs, or Rejecting Believers?

The Troublesome Causes and Effects of Excluding Women in the Philosophy Classroom

Why do so few women major in philosophy, and why are there so few female philosophy professors? Some authors have suggested that the dearth of women in philosophy can be attributed to gender differences in philosophical belief. On this view, college-aged women persistently find their intuitions to be at odds with those of their male classmates and their mostly-male professors, and this leads women to feel out of place and to leave philosophy. I think this suggestion is both false and pernicious, and my first aim in this talk will be to debunk this suggestion with data I have been collecting for the past five years. While there may be gender differences in philosophical belief, the evidence of these differences does not explain the paucity of women in professional philosophy.

I will suggest that, in fact, the nature of philosophical debate enables pre-existing gender biases—similar to those that exist in other fields—to take foot in ways they cannot take foot in many other fields in which women have traditionally been underrepresented. This consideration will segue into the second part of the talk, which will concern the social nature of philosophy. Are philosophical claims only about the ways we see the world, or are they sometimes responses to the ways other people see the world and, as such, partly claims about the ways we see those other people?

As usual, we meet in the Info Commons Lab at the central branch of the Brooklyn Public Library (10 Grand Army Plaza). Events are all 100% free and open to the public, and aimed at a general audience.

See you there, I hope!

Nov
3
Tue
Jennifer Ware – Unjust Kidding @ Brooklyn Public Library InfoCommons Lab
Nov 3 @ 7:00 pm – 8:00 pm

“I don’t know where the line is. … In most religions you’re taught that you’re not going to be judged by your actions; you’re going to be judged by your intent. … So if your intent is to gay-bash, yes, you are a gay-basher. Even when you don’t do it. If your intent is to not, then it’s not.

Now, it can still be offensive, but once you explain that to the person that made the mistake, you can pretty much be sure they will go back on that and try to rectify hurting you. Does this make sense?”

– Chris Rock on Fresh Air, 12/8/14

On Tuesday, November 3rd, Jennifer Ware (CUNY Graduate Center) comes to Brooklyn Public Philosophers to answer Chris Rock’s question. (The answer is no.) She’ll talk about stereotypes, slurs, and the psychological and social mechanisms through which jokes can hurt.

Here’s a bit more about the talk in Ware’s own words:

Unjust Kidding: The Insufficiency of Good Intentions

Careful analysis of humor is important because of the amnesty often granted to humorous speech acts.  When someone tells a joke, they seemingly separate themselves from that which they express, and consequently we typically do not hold individuals to the same standards when they are apparently telling a joke. George Carlin, a comic famous for his off-color humor, made the following observation,

“Stand-up is a socially acceptable form of aggression. You get to name the targets, you get to fire the bullets… and the wonderful part is, after you’ve finished, you then say, ‘Hey, can’t you take a joke? This is humor, sir! What’s the matter with you?”

Individuals intending to express a vicious position without having to take full responsibility for their words may use this greater forgiveness divisively, and therefore we should be careful about granting such amnesty.

In this presentation, I will review some of the more common formal and colloquial accounts that aim to explain why and when jokes are offensive. I will go on to develop a position informed by empirical evidence that challenges the view that facts about the speaker largely, if not entirely, determine the moral character of a joke. Instead, I suggest the effects of jokes play a significant role in determining their moral characters.

Tell your friends/students/strangers! Bring someone who knows lots of jokes! See you there, I hope!