Measuring Borderline States of Consciousness
Time: 10:00 am – 6:00 pm
There are famous difficulties in measuring subjective states of consciousness. Nevertheless, a number of techniques have recently been developed for measuring states of consciousness in clinical settings. These techniques have been applied to borderlines states of consciousness: in particular, those found in brain-damaged patients diagnosed with vegetative state, and those found in patients under anesthesia. Measures using fMRI imaging, electroencephelography, and various other technologies have been developed.
These measures pose any number of scientific and philosophical questions.
- What is the best measure of consciousness in these cases?
- How can we justify these measures, given the private and subjective nature of consciousness?
- What is the best way to use these measures clinically?
- What ethical issues do they raise?
- What might these measures tell us about the nature of consciousness?
All of these questions and more will be discussed at the workshop. Speakers will include:
Tim Bayne (The University of Manchester), Melanie Boly (University of Wisconsin), Joseph Fins (Weill Cornell Medical College), L. Syd Johnson (Michigan Technological University), Stephen Laureys (Belgian National Fund of Scientific Research), Marcello Massimini (University of Milan), Lionel Naccache (Hôpital de la Pitié-Salpêtrière), Adrian Owen (Western University), Nicholas Schiff (Weill Cornell Medical College).
Organizing Committee: Ned Block, David Chalmers, S. Matthew Liao & Nicholas Schiff.
Location:53 Washington Square South, 1st Floor Auditorium New York, NY 10012
Friday, October 24th-Saturday, October 25th from 10:00am – 6:00 pm*
*Conference registration will begin at 9:00 am in the 1st floor lobby.
Registration is free but required. Click here to register.
Friday, December 4 – Saturday, December 5
Kimmel Center and Jurow Hall, New York University
REGISTER HERE
On December 4-5, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness
will host a conference on “Is the Brain Bayesian?”.
Bayesian theories have attracted enormous attention in the cognitive
sciences in recent years. According to these theories, the mind
assigns probabilities to hypotheses and updates them according to
standard probabilistic rules of inference. Bayesian theories have
been applied to the study of perception, learning, memory, reasoning,
language, decision making, and many other domains. Bayesian
approaches have also become increasingly popular in neuroscience, and
a number of potential neurobiological mechanisms have been proposed.
At the same time, Bayesian theories have been controversial, and they
raise many foundational questions. Does the brain actually use
Bayesian rules? Or are they merely approximate descriptions of
behavior? How well can Bayesian theories accommodate apparent
irrationality in cognition? Do they require an implausibly uniform
view of the mind? Are Bayesian theories near-trivial due to their
many degrees of freedom? What are their implications for the
relationship between perception, cognition, rationality, and
consciousness?
All of these questions and more will be discussed at the conference. The conference will bring together both scientists and philosophers, and
both proponents and opponents of Bayesian approaches, to discuss and debate a number of central issues.
Speakers and panelists will include:
Jeffrey Bowers (Bristol), David Danks (Carnegie Mellon), Ernest Davis (NYU), Karl Friston (University College London), Weiji Ma (NYU), Larry Maloney (NYU), Eric Mandelbaum (CUNY), Gary Marcus (NYU), John Morrison (Barnard/Columbia), Nicoletta Orlandi (UC Santa Cruz), Michael Rescorla (UC Santa Barbara), Laura Schulz (MIT), Susanna Siegel (Harvard), Eero Simoncelli (NYU), Joshua Tenenbaum (MIT) and others
The conference sessions will run from 9:30am to 6pm on Friday and Saturday December 4-5. Friday sessions will be in Kimmel Center 914
(60 Washington Square South) and Saturday sessions will be in Jurow Hall in the Silver Center (100 Washington Square East). Conference
registration and coffee will begin at 9am both days. A full schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date.
Registration is free but required. REGISTER HERE.
Philosophers have employed two different varieties of felt necessity to explain central aspects of agency in addiction and love, respectively. In the case of addiction, the relevant felt need is often described in terms of an appetite, whereas love is characterized by necessities arising from a particular kind of caring. On Dr. Wonderly’s view, the extant literature offers an instructive, but incomplete picture of the roles of felt necessity in addiction and love. Dr. Wonderly argues that a third form of felt necessity – attachment necessity – often better captures central aspects of agency in love and addiction. Recognizing the role of attachment necessity will not only illuminate how felt necessity can impact the value of certain relationships, but it will also allow us to discern important features of addiction and love that remain obscured on extant approaches.
Monique Wonderly is the Harold T. Shapiro Postdoctoral Research Associate in Bioethics. She is primarily interested in puzzles at the intersection of ethics and the nature of emotions. She has published in the areas of applied ethics, philosophy of emotion, and history of philosophy. Her current research focuses on emotional attachment – and in particular, on questions concerning moral agency and ethical treatment that arise when considering certain attachment-related pathologies, including psychopathy and (some forms of) addiction. For more, visit here.
Reception to follow.