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Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989) is well-known for his “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) in which he criticizes empiricist theories of knowledge acquisition. Empiricism, he argues there, relies on what he calls “the Myth of the Given.” The Myth of the Given is often understood as a dilemma for epistemological foundationalism. However, Sellars also remarks that not even Kant and Hegel (“that great foe of immediacy” EPM §1) were entirely free of “the entire framework of givenness”). This suggests that the Myth of the Given is not limited to the epistemological foundationalism of pre-critical dogmatic metaphysics. I shall argue (following James O’Shea) that the Myth of the Given is primarily a problem about how we should account for our cognitive awareness of the categorial structure of experience. I shall then argue that Sellars should be interpreted as arguing for a non-semantic mind-world relation, which he calls “picturing”, to explain how the Myth of the Given should be overcome.
By doing so Sellars shows how to avoid both the Given and idealism, thus overcoming a long-standing opposition within the history of philosophy since Kant. This argument is also relevant for the divide between “left-wing Sellarsians” (Rorty, McDowell, Brandom, Williams) and “right-wing Sellarsians” (Churchland, Dennett, Millikan); the left-wing Sellarsians developed the criticism of the Myth of the Given and the right-wing Sellarsians developed picturing into an account of animal cognition. On my interpretation, this divide itself is unfortunate because it leads us to overlook a fundamental coherence to Sellars’s views.

In this paper, I explore the role that metaphor plays in the development of new scientific models. My goal is to illustrate metaphor’s fecundity in this regard, the way in which it extends our understanding in surprisingly diverse ways. As Mary Hesse put this point, “it is precisely in its extension that the fruitfulness of the model may lie” (1980, 114).

The particular focus of my paper is on the history of what John Haugeland called mind design: the use of mechanical models to reverse-engineer how minds work (1997, 1). My history focuses on two such models: the clockwork model and the computer model. In each case, I show how a metaphorical understanding of the model led to conceptual innovation in two distinct ways. First, it provided an interpretive frame that guided new research by offering an abstract, hypothesized structure to be later filled in by empirical research (Camp 2020). Second, it provided a concrete exemplar to contrast with human minds (Daston 1994). For instance, while on the one hand Descartes invoked the clockwork model to explain how color vision works (Adams 2015), he also invoked it as a vivid illustration of how human reasoning does not work (Riskin 2016).

It is this second source of conceptual innovation that is the real core of the paper; it reveals what I call the dialectic of mind design. This dialectic is especially evident in our tendency to redefine what it is to be human in response to new technological developments. For instance, it is evident when we take something that was previously assumed to be paradigmatic of mental acuity, such as the ability to play chess, and redefine it as something merely mechanical (Ensmenger 2012). But it is equally well evident when we take something that was previously taken to be mechanical—such as color vision—and redefine it as paradigmatically mental (Chalmers 1997; cf. Adams and Browning 2020). The concept of mindedness is, in this sense, a constantly moving goalpost that is perennially being redefined in response to new technological developments.