New York University’s Liberal Studies, in Collaboration with Nietzsche Circle, Presents:
Nietzsche and the Disadvantage of History: The rise of Western Oikophobia
More Info & RSVP:
If you like to attend, Please RSVP by sending email to Luke Trusso at luke.trusso@gmail.com
14.30 – 15.30: Kit Fine: A Truthmaker Semantics for Conditional Imperatives
15.30 – 15.45: Coffee Break
15.45 – 16.45: Friederike Moltmann: Underspecification of Attitudes and Truthmaker
Semantics
16.45-17.00: Coffee Break
17.00 – 18.00: Federico Faroldi: Truthmaker Semantics for Justification Logics – Open
Problems (joint work with Tudor Protopopescu)
18.00-18.15: Coffee Break
18.15 – 19.15: Cian Dorr: Truthmaking in the Object Language
K. Fine: A Truthmaker Semantics for Conditional Imperatives
I provide a truth-maker semantics for conditional imperatives and indicate how it might be extended to other conditional constructions.
F. Moltmann: Underspecification of Attitudes and Truthmaker Semantics
It has been argued that the satisfaction conditions of a desire can be underspecified by the complement clause. This provides support for the view according to which the complement clause gives a partial content of the reported desire, where partial content is formulated in terms of truthmaker theory. In this talk, I will discuss the extent of such underspecification and whether it truly supports a truthmaker-based approach to the content of attitudes.
Optional preparatory reading here.
F. Faroldi: Truthmaker Semantics for Justification Logics – Open Problems
Justification logics are a family of logic where "implicit" modal operators are substituted by explicit terms to get formulas of the form t : A, where t could be evidence, a reason, etc. why A is known, believed, obligatory, etc., thus resulting in an “objectual” approach to modalities. In this talk we explore how to give a truthmaker semantics for justification logics, we provide some philosophical reasons to do so, and note some technical open problems.
Cian Dorr: Truthmaking in the Object Language
I consider a simple language with Boolean connectives, sentential variables and quantifiers binding them, and a connective for propositional identity (‘for it to be the case that … is for it to be the case that …’). Using familiar techniques, the possible-worlds model theory for such a language can be ‘internalised’ to derive a theory stated in the language itself, based on the definition of ‘world-proposition’ as ‘maximal consistent proposition’, and this theory can be shown to follow from the theory that propositions form a complete atomic Boolean algebra. In this paper, I will consider to what extent something similar can be done for Fine’s truthmaker semantics. This will involve looking for a way of picking out a class of special propositions to serve as surrogates for the states, and a binary relation among propositions to serve as a surrogate for the verification relation, and using these definitions to rewrite the metalinguistic definition of a model as theory in the object-language. I will make a start at considering to what extent the axioms of this theory can be derived from an independently natural weakening of the theory that propositions form a complete atomic Boolean algebra.
The notion of an occurrence of a proposition in discourse is the subject of the following observation:
(O) A proposition may occur in discourse, now asserted, now unasserted, and yetbe recognizably the same proposition.
I shall argue that the true significance of this observation is utterly distorted by Geach’s manner of construing of it — a construal widely known today as “the Frege-Geach point”. Though it serves as a basis for a contemporary understanding of logical form, strictly thought through, this way of construing (O) can be shown to lead to absurdity. I will further argue that a straightforward, undistorted, acceptance of (O) is the key to a genuine philosophical logic.
— Irad Kimhi (The Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago)
Reception to follow.
We are excited to announce a public talk featuring Elie During as part of French philosopher Gaston Bachelard’s 60th death anniversary. On the face of it, The Dialectic of Duration, Gaston Bachelard’s 1936 essay, is a pungent—if often unfair—criticism of the Bergsonian doctrine of time and creative evolution. The constructive side of this Anti-Bergson has received less attention: it implies a genuine poetics of time based on the intuition of the sporadic and oscillatory nature of becoming. Bachelard’s rhythmic theme is consistent with the idea of “surrationalism” introduced that same year as a formal counterpart to the surrealist experiments carried out on the fringes of conscious experience. Inspired by the explosive potential of scientific revolutions already celebrated in Le Nouvel Esprit Scientifique, the surrationalist project can be interpreted as that of a poetics of reason. André Breton believed it would “act simultaneously as a stimulant and restraining influence” (“Crisis of the Object”). Insights from the scientific investigation of time as well as poetic and musical experience will help us see how this double action is in keeping with the eruptive dynamics of imagination and reason, as much as with Bachelard’s ideal of “self-surveillance”.
Elie During is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris Ouest. His research focuses on the philosophical implications of relativity theory. His publications include an introduction to Poincaré’s philosophy of science (La Science et l’Hypothèse, 2001), an essay on the nature of time (The Future does not Exist, 2014), two critical editions of Bergson, a coedited volume on contemporary metaphysics of realism (Choses en soi, 2018, English translation forthcoming from Edinburgh University Press), and most recently a critical edition of Bachelard’s Dialectique de la durée (2021).
Organized by
Julie Beauté, Aix-Marseille Université, ADES (France)
Alexander Campolo, Durham University (UK)
Jeanne Etelain, New York University (USA)
Sam Kellogg, New York University (USA)
Alexander Miller, Ghent University (Belgium)
Pierre Schwarzer, New York University (USA)
Meg Wiessner, New York University (USA)
Registration is free but required. Registration will open online in early October. All questions about the event should be sent to philo.modernconference@nyu.edu.
Friday, November 15
9:30–9:55 Check–in and Coffee
9:55 Welcome
10:00–12:00 Baruch Spinoza
Speaker: Kristin Primus (University of California, Berkeley)
“Spinoza and Our Eternal Mind”
Commentator: John Grey (Michigan State University)
12:00–2:00 Lunch Break
2:00–4:00 Margaret Cavendish
Speaker: Marcy Lascano (University of Kansas)
“‘There is nothing I Dread More than Death’: Cavendish on Death and the Afterlife”
Commentator: Deborah Boyle (College of Charleston)
4:00–4:30 Coffee Break
4:30–6:00 Immanuel Kant
Speaker: Andrew Chignell (Princeton University)
“Kant’s Theoretical Argument for a Future Life”
Commentator: Jochen Bojanowski (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
6:30–7:30 Reception
Saturday, November 16
9:30–10:00 Check–in and Coffee
10:00–12:00 Søren Kierkegaard
Speaker: Clare Carlisle (King’s College London)
“Close to Death: Kierkegaard on Im/mortality and Philosophy”
Commentator: John J. Davenport (Fordham University)
12:00–2:00 Lunch Break
2:00–4:00 Martin Heidegger
Speaker: Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford University)
“Heidegger and the Possibility of Death”
Commentator: Sean Kelly (Harvard University)
4:00–4:30 Coffee Break
4:30–6:30 Contemporary
Speaker: Michael Cholbi (University of Edinburgh)
“Immortal Lives and the Varieties of Agency”
Commentator: Ben Bradley (Syracuse University)
6:30–7:30 Reception
Don Garrett, Anja Jauernig, John Richardson,
Sponsored by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and the Department of Philosophy.
For a decade, 1993-2003, Jacques Derrida taught at New York University as Global Distinguished Professor. During those years he gave seminars on important topics of his later work: testimony, hospitality and hostility, perjury and pardon, and the death penalty, Shakespeare’s calculative grid and racism. They represent for many the most sustained and considered engagement by deconstruction with political questions. Most of these seminars have now been posthumously published, both in French and in English translation. Commemorating the twentieth anniversary of Derrida’s death in 2004, the Departments of Comparative Literature teams up with the Maison Française and Department of German, which hosted Derrida when he came to NYU. On 21 November 2024 the Maison in conjunction with the two departments invites scholars of Derrida’s work to speak at a one-day conference devoted to the topics of Derrida’s New York teaching.
Full schedule coming soon!