Presented by Metro Area Philosophers of Science
Seen from a distance, competing views of laws of nature attend to different aspects of their target concept. The Best System Analysis (‘BSA’) focuses on the role of laws in systematizing our thoughts about particular facts, while non-Humean (‘realist’) views focus on whatever it is – N-relations among universals, powers – that pushes the universe from one state to another. Nothing stops us from combining these views: with the BSA, we can restrict the laws of science to summarizing particulars, while at the same time, with our preferred realism, positing a ‘driver’ that makes those particulars as they are.
So far, there have been only a few attempts to hybridize the BSA with some form of realism, and then only with the powers view. I argue that there is a deep assumption woven into the fabric of realism from Descartes’s time on: that the laws of a science report on facts, which in turn either are or involve the realist’s chosen driver. I argue that the best-known attempt to hybridize the BSA with a power’s view – Heather Demarest’s potency-BSA – still makes this Cartesian assumption, and faces significant objections as a result. The lesson is that anyone attempting to create hybrids should abandon that assumption entirely. After formulating what I take to be a more defensible powers-BSA hybrid, I go on to show how one might cross-breed the BSA with primitivism and with the universals view. By abandoning the Cartesian assumption, we can create hybrids that are considerably more defensible than their realist parents.
Location: Plaza View Room, 12th Floor, Lowenstein Building of Fordham Lincoln Center (113 W 60th St).
Directions: Enter at the corner of 60th and Columbus, and have a university ID ready. Please tell the security that you are attending an event hosted by the philosophy department. To get the Plaza View Room, take the escalators one floor up to find the elevators. Only some elevators go up to the 12th floor; for those that only go to the 11th floor, go to 11 and turn to the center of the main hallway to see a stairway to 12. Upon arriving at the 12th floor, take a right and walk all the way to the end through the doors. Please email Peter Tan (ptan8@fordham.edu) for any issues.
Due to technical limitations, the talk will be in-person only.
In this paper, I explore the role that metaphor plays in the development of new scientific models. My goal is to illustrate metaphor’s fecundity in this regard, the way in which it extends our understanding in surprisingly diverse ways. As Mary Hesse put this point, “it is precisely in its extension that the fruitfulness of the model may lie” (1980, 114).
The particular focus of my paper is on the history of what John Haugeland called mind design: the use of mechanical models to reverse-engineer how minds work (1997, 1). My history focuses on two such models: the clockwork model and the computer model. In each case, I show how a metaphorical understanding of the model led to conceptual innovation in two distinct ways. First, it provided an interpretive frame that guided new research by offering an abstract, hypothesized structure to be later filled in by empirical research (Camp 2020). Second, it provided a concrete exemplar to contrast with human minds (Daston 1994). For instance, while on the one hand Descartes invoked the clockwork model to explain how color vision works (Adams 2015), he also invoked it as a vivid illustration of how human reasoning does not work (Riskin 2016).
It is this second source of conceptual innovation that is the real core of the paper; it reveals what I call the dialectic of mind design. This dialectic is especially evident in our tendency to redefine what it is to be human in response to new technological developments. For instance, it is evident when we take something that was previously assumed to be paradigmatic of mental acuity, such as the ability to play chess, and redefine it as something merely mechanical (Ensmenger 2012). But it is equally well evident when we take something that was previously taken to be mechanical—such as color vision—and redefine it as paradigmatically mental (Chalmers 1997; cf. Adams and Browning 2020). The concept of mindedness is, in this sense, a constantly moving goalpost that is perennially being redefined in response to new technological developments.
What is critique? According to the Kantian tradition, it is an investigation of the transcendental conditions for the possibility of thinking and experience. While later critics shifted the focus to material conditions, core metaphysical commitments and procedures of critique remained unchanged. Critique of Critique (Stanford UP, 2023), the subject of this talk, probes critique as an orientation of thought through its historical manifestations from Plato to the Frankfurt school and present-day critical theory. In the process, it asks us to consider what critical thinking is and whether it can assume orientations other than critique.
Bio: Roy Ben-Shai, a New School graduate, is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Sarah Lawrence College. His recently published book, Critique of Critique (Stanford University Press, 2023), is the first volume in a trilogy on the concept of “orientation” in critical thought. He is currently working on the second volume, Emancipatory Thinking, or the Art of Thinking Otherwise.