Jun
21
Fri
Public Philosophy and Theology in a Digital Context @ Public Square Larini Room
Jun 21 all-day

This conference will discuss the role of digital spaces such as social media in being a public philosopher or theologian. The conference will choose papers that explore different digital platforms, how these platforms can aid in being a public philosopher or theologian, as well as the specific challenges these spaces pose. Sessions will explore how digital spaces have become arenas for philosophers and theologians to discuss ideas with other scholars and with the public, and how the discussion of concepts in this format affects the delivery and reception of the ideas. We will solicit papers that specifically discuss how digital spaces can positively facilitate the goals of public philosophy. Internet spaces are an important tool for the contemporary public philosopher and the full implications of their usage has not yet been fully explored.

Main speakers: Barry Lam, Vassar College

Contact Information

Katherine G. Schmidt, Ph.D.
Theology and Religious Studies
1000 Hempstead Avenue
Rockville Centre, NY 11571-5002
516.323.3362
Kimberly S. Engles, Ph.D.
Theology and Religious Studies
1000 Hempstead Avenue
Rockville Centre, NY 11571-5002
516.323.3341

http://connect.molloy.edu/s/869/alumni/index.aspx?sid=869&pgid=2173&gid=1&cid=3727&ecid=3727&post_id=0

May
10
Fri
Modal definability and Kripke’s theory of truth. James Walsh (NYU) @ CUNY Grad Center 9207
May 10 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm

The Saul Kripke Center is pleased to announce that James Walsh (Assistant Professor, Philosophy, NYU) will deliver a talk on Friday, May 10th, 2024, from 4:15 to 6:15 pm at the CUNY Graduate Center (Room 9207). The talk is free and open to all.

Title: Modal definability and Kripke’s theory of truth

Abstract: In Outline of a Theory of Truth, Kripke introduces some of the central concepts of the logical study of truth and paradox. He informally defines some of these–such as groundedness and paradoxicality–using modal locutions. We introduce a modal language for regimenting Kripke’s informal definitions and characterize the modally definable sets. Though groundedness and paradoxicality are expressible in the modal language, we prove that intrinsicality–which Kripke emphasizes but does not define modally–is not.