July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
July 5 — Becky Keller – note Friday meeting because of “some kind of American holiday”July 11 — Alex Kiefer – room will be Philosophy 201B (downstairs to the right)July 18 — Kathryn PendoleyJuly 25 — Andrew LeeAug 1 — Simon BrownAug 8 — tbdAug 12ish— Henry ShevlinAug 22 — Andrew Richmond
Recently, a group of scholars has challenged the moral legitimacy of Confucian democracy from a liberal philosophical standpoint. According to these scholars, including political liberals and moderate perfectionists, any attempt to create a Confucian democratic theory inevitably confronts a dilemma—let us call this the pluralism dilemma—with the following two horns: (a) a free society is characterized by the plurality of mutually incompatible, often conflicting, moral, philosophical, and religious doctrines that guide an individual’s conception of the good life and a truly democratic theory is required to accommodate as many reasonable conceptions of the good and comprehensive doctrines as possible and (b) a Confucian democratic theory gives a privileged normative standing to Confucianism over other competing comprehensive doctrines. This paper defends Confucian democracy against this pluralism challenge by articulating its political purpose and constitutional structure, which are commonly dismissed in the critics’ analytical frameworks.
With responses from: OMAR DAHBOUR (Hunter College & Graduate Center, CUNY)
The Fall dates for the Comparative Philosophy seminar:
September 20 – Justin Tiwald (San Francisco State University)
October 11 – Richard Kim (Loyola University, Chicago
November 8 – Sungmoon Kim (City University of Hong Kong)
December 6 – Paul R. Goldin (University of Pennsylvania)
More details (such as titles, abstracts, and respondents) to follow. Looking forward to seeing you soon.
Hagop Sarkissian
Associate Professor & Chair, Department of Philosophy, The City University of New York, Baruch College
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center
Co-Director, Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy
https://www.cbs.columbia.edu/cscp/
The rich philosophical and mathematical disputes that took place between Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz at the start of the eighteenth century have received more historical attention than any other exchange in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless, in this talk, Robert Iliffe discusses a prominent but neglected aspect of their disagreement, namely the mutual claim that their opponents’ conceptual foundations were fictional, and were the product both of diseased thinking and of illegitimately organized intellectual structures. Newton assailed Leibniz’s allegedly debased metaphysics in various prominent places, and mobilized allies such as Roger Cotes and John Keill to do the same. Nevertheless, by far the most sophisticated critique of illicit philosophical assumptions was launched against Newton by Leibniz in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke. In the Fifth letter to Clarke, Leibniz identified core Newtonian positions as infantile, vulgar, and profoundly irreligious, asserting that they were dangerous fictions that were less plausible and much less edifying than the rational romances of writers in the previous century. Although Leibniz saved his most potent intellectual weapons for his final letter to Clarke, Robert Iliffe suggests that his attack on the fictional status of Newton’s work was no mere codicil to his general critique of Newton’s philosophy, but instead lay at the heart of it. This famous debate, while of course somewhat sui generis, is indicative of more general and dynamic features of intellectual debate.
Event Speaker
Robert Iliffe, Professor of the History of Science at the University of Oxford
Event Information
This event is free and open to the public; Registration required. Please contact scienceandsociety@columbia.edu with any questions.
This event is part of the New York History of Science Lecture Series.