Here is the tentative schedule for PoPRocks sessions this semester. We will be meeting, usually, on Thursday or Friday evenings from 7:00 pm to 9:00 pm in the 2nd floor seminar room at the NYU philosophy department.
Th. 10/03 Luke Roelofs
Fr. 10/18 Josh Myers
CANCELLED Fr. 10/25 Sam Clarke
Th. 10/31 Simon Brown
Th. 11/14 Noga Gratvol
Fr. 11/22 Cristina Ballarini
Th. 12/12 Rodrigo Diaz
You can still sign up to present! Of course, the earlier you request, the easier it is to schedule a session.
We’re a community of philosophers of language centered in New York City. We have a meeting each week at which a speaker presents a piece of their own work relating to the philosophy of language.
Sept 9
Donka Farkas (Santa Cruz)
Sept 16
John Maackay (U Wisconsin–Madison)
Sept 23
Andrew Bacon (USC)
Sept 30
Eleonore Neufeld (USC)
Oct 7
Eli Alshanetsky (Temple)
Oct 21
Gabe Dupre (UCLA)
Oct 28
Dorit Bar-On (UConn)
Nov 4
Sam Berstler (Princeton)
Nov 11
Robert Henderson (Arizona)
Nov 18
Sam Cumming (UCLA)
Nov 25
Harvey Lederman (Princeton)
Dec 2
Sarah Fisher (Reading)
Dec 9
Michael Glanzberg (Northwestern)
Our situation is dangerous, there are uncertainties and elements of chaos in our environment, in international relations, in biotechnology, in sexual relations… But it is here that we should remember Mao’s old motto: “There is great disorder under heaven, so the situation is excellent!” Let’s not lose nerves, let’s exploit the confusion as a chance to propose a new radical vision. In January 2019, an international team of scientists proposed “a diet it says can improve health while ensuring sustainable food production to reduce further damage to the planet.” We are talking about a radical reorganization of our entire food production and distribution—so how to do it? Is it not clear that a strong global agency is needed with the power to coordinate such measures? And is not such an agency pointing in the direction of what we once called “Communism”? And does the same not hold for other threats to our survival as humans? Is a similar global agency not needed also to deal with the problem of increasing numbers of refugees and immigrants, with the problem of digital control over our lives? Let’s not be afraid to tackle the problem of the new order that the ongoing disorder is calling for.
Slavoj Žižek will be introduced by Xudong Zhang, Professor of Comparative Literature & East Asian Studies, and Director of China House at NYU.
About the speakers:
Slavoj Žižek, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, and visiting professor at a number of U.S. Universities (Columbia, Princeton, New School for Social Research, New York University, University of Michigan). He obtained his Ph.D. in Philosophy in Ljubljana studying Psychoanalysis and also studied at the University of Paris. Slavoj Zizek is a Hegelian philosopher, Lacanian psychoanalyst, and Marxist social analyst. He is the author of The Indivisible Remainder; The Sublime Object of Ideology; The Metastases of Enjoyment; Looking Awry: Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture; The Plague of Fantasies; The Ticklish Subject; Disparities; and Antigone. His latest publication, Like a Thief in Broad Daylight: Power in the Era of Post-Human Capitalism (Seven Stories Press), will be on sale at the event by the NYU Bookstore.
Xudong Zhang is Professor of Comparative Literature and East Asian Studies at NYU, and founding director of the International Center for Critical Theory (a consortium of Peking University, New York University, University of Tokyo and Eastern China Normal University). He is also Director of China House NYU. He has published widely on critical theory and transcultural comparisons of Chinese and European modernities.
As part of NYU Skirball Talks, the NYU Department of German and Deutsches Haus at NYU present Disorder under Heaven with Slavoj Žižek.
Attendance information:
This event is free and open to the general public. Please RSVP here.
“SKIRBALL TALKS: SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: DISORDER UNDER HEAVEN” is a DAAD-supported event.
A number of puzzles concerning how truth-ascriptions are grounded have recently been discovered by several theorists, following Fine (2010). Most previous commentators on these puzzles have taken them to shed light on the theory of ground. In this paper, I argue that they also shed light on the theory of truth. In particular, I argue that the notion of ground can be deployed to clearly articulate one strand of deflationary thinking about truth, according to which truth is “metaphysically lightweight.” I will propose a ground-theoretic explication of the (entirely bearable) lightness of truth, and then show how this broadly deflationary view yields a novel solution to the puzzles concerning how truth is grounded. So, if the proposal I sketch is on target, the theory of truth and the theory of ground interact fruitfully: we can apply the notion of ground to offer a clear explication of the deflationist claim that truth is “metaphysically lightweight” that both captures the motivations for that claim and solves the puzzles.
Although the Colloquium on Legal, Political, and Social Philosophy is on hiatus this year, it will convene a special “pop-up” session on Thursday, October 17 from 4-7 p.m. in the Faculty Library on the third floor of Vanderbilt Hall. Professor Joseph Raz, who has long been an important member of the Colloquium community, will present a pre-circulated paper on this occasion, which marks the end of many years during which he has taught regularly at Columbia Law School each fall. Professor Raz’s paper will be posted on the Colloquium website in due course.
Theoretical reasoning is a process by which we form doxastic states on the basis of our previously-held attitudes. One of the foundational questions about the nature of reasoning is with which mental states we can reason. Many discussions of reasoning assume that we can only reason with doxastic states such as beliefs. In this paper, I argue that we can also reason with imaginings. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that epistemic uses of the imagination instantiate a number of markers which, taken together, are very good evidence for a process counting as reasoning. These include (rule-based) operation on contents, the transmission of justification, transitions between mental states that we can be held epistemically responsible for, and the ability of imaginings to enter into explicit conscious deliberation. Second, I argue that reasoning with imagination is not reducible to reasoning with beliefs. Imaginings and beliefs make different kinds of epistemically appropriate transitions available. This is, in part, due to the distinctive way that imaginative episodes develop their content over time. Thus, the markers of reasoning that epistemic uses of the imagination instantiate cannot be explained away. One interesting upshot is that, although reasoning with imagination and reasoning with beliefs are quite psychologically different in certain important respects, they share an underlying epistemic structure.
Here is the tentative schedule for PoPRocks sessions this semester. We will be meeting, usually, on Thursday or Friday evenings from 7:00 pm to 9:00 pm in the 2nd floor seminar room at the NYU philosophy department.
Th. 10/03 Luke Roelofs
Fr. 10/18 Josh Myers
Fr. 10/25 Sam Clarke
Th. 10/31 Simon Brown
Th. 11/14 Noga Gratvol
Fr. 11/22 Cristina Ballarini
Th. 12/12 Rodrigo Diaz
You can still sign up to present! Of course, the earlier you request, the easier it is to schedule a session.
Over the last decades, the humanities have come under pressure from the scientific worldview. To many, it seems as if the humanities provide us at best with less-than-objective knowledge claims. Arguably, there are at least two overall reasons for this. On the one hand, the scientific worldview tends to associate objectivity with the kind of knowledge-acquisition, explanation, and justification characteristic of the natural sciences. On the other hand, the humanities themselves have contributed to the impression that they might be less relevant than the natural sciences to epistemic progress due to internal problems having to do with the very concept(s) of knowledge, reality and objectivity.
New Realism is a term for a whole series of current trends in philosophy that has important consequences for our understanding of knowledge in general. In particular, it reshapes our account of the human being qua source and object of knowledge claims. In this context, New Realism draws on a crucial indispensability thesis: we simply cannot eliminate the standpoint from which humans gather information about human and non-human reality alike from our account of reality itself. In light of this thesis, it turns out that the humanities are fully-fledged contributions to objective knowledge about reality – a fact we cannot ignore without succumbing to illusion. Against this background, the talk concludes that the so-called “scientific worldview” is untenable: it is built upon a denial of knowledge we actually possess, and so, by not being scientific enough, it fails to respect its own premises.
About the speaker:
Markus Gabriel holds the chair in epistemology, modern and contemporary philosophy at the University of Bonn. He is the director of the International Center for Philosophy and the multidisciplinary Center for Science and Thought. With Jocelyn Benoist he also directs Bonn-Paris Center for Research on New Realisms. His work focuses on contemporary philosophy, in particular epistemology and ontology, in an attempt to spell out the consequences of various trends in philosophy in a conversation with the humanities. Currently, he is working on a book called Fictions which deals with topics at the intersection of philosophy, literary studies and sociology.
The NYU Department of German and Deutsches Haus at NYU present “Objectivity and the Humanities – Prospects for a New Realism,” a talk by Professor Markus Gabriel.
Attendance information:
Events at Deutsches Haus are free of charge. If you would like to attend this event, please send us an email to deutscheshaus.rsvp@nyu.edu. Space at Deutsches Haus is limited; please arrive ten minutes prior to the event. Thank you!
“Objectivity and the Humanities – Prospects for a New Realism” is a DAAD-supported event.
We’re a community of philosophers of language centered in New York City. We have a meeting each week at which a speaker presents a piece of their own work relating to the philosophy of language.
Sept 9
Donka Farkas (Santa Cruz)
Sept 16
John Maackay (U Wisconsin–Madison)
Sept 23
Andrew Bacon (USC)
Sept 30
Eleonore Neufeld (USC)
Oct 7
Eli Alshanetsky (Temple)
Oct 21
Gabe Dupre (UCLA)
Oct 28
Dorit Bar-On (UConn)
Nov 4
Sam Berstler (Princeton)
Nov 11
Robert Henderson (Arizona)
Nov 18
Sam Cumming (UCLA)
Nov 25
Harvey Lederman (Princeton)
Dec 2
Sarah Fisher (Reading)
Dec 9
Michael Glanzberg (Northwestern)
Speakers:
Biyu Jade He (NYU Medical Centre)
Hakwan Lau (UCLA)
Victor Lamme (University of Amsterdam)
Johannes Fahrenfort (University of Amsterdam)
Where in the brain are the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness? Some leading theories of consciousness, including global workspace and higher-order thought theories, hold that these correlates centrally involve prefrontal cortex. Other leading theories, including first-order and integrated information theories, hold that these correlates centrally involve sensory cortices, with prefrontal cortex playing at most a secondary role. In recent years much experimental evidence has been brought to bear on both sides of the question.
In this debate, Hakwan Lau (UCLA) and Biyu Jade He (NYU) will defend the view that neural activity in prefrontal cortex is important for conscious perception, while Victor Lamme (Amsterdam) and Johannes Fahrenfort (Amsterdam) will argue that prefrontal activity is not important for conscious perception.
We’re a community of philosophers of language centered in New York City. We have a meeting each week at which a speaker presents a piece of their own work relating to the philosophy of language.
Sept 9
Donka Farkas (Santa Cruz)
Sept 16
John Maackay (U Wisconsin–Madison)
Sept 23
Andrew Bacon (USC)
Sept 30
Eleonore Neufeld (USC)
Oct 7
Eli Alshanetsky (Temple)
Oct 21
Gabe Dupre (UCLA)
Oct 28
Dorit Bar-On (UConn)
Nov 4
Sam Berstler (Princeton)
Nov 11
Robert Henderson (Arizona)
Nov 18
Sam Cumming (UCLA)
Nov 25
Harvey Lederman (Princeton)
Dec 2
Sarah Fisher (Reading)
Dec 9
Michael Glanzberg (Northwestern)