2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
PopRocks is a read-ahead, works-in-progress workshop for graduate students and postdocs in the philosophy of cognitive science and mind. We meet on Fridays to hear and discuss a paper, and try to keep a low-pressure, constructive environment. If that sounds useful to you please get in touch and sign up to present!
Feb 21 – Juliette Vazard
Mar 6 – Stephan Pohl
Mar 27 – David Udell
Apr 3 – Simon Brown
Apr 10 – David Barack
Apr 17 – Kathryn Pendoley
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
PopRocks is a read-ahead, works-in-progress workshop for graduate students and postdocs in the philosophy of cognitive science and mind. We meet on Fridays to hear and discuss a paper, and try to keep a low-pressure, constructive environment. If that sounds useful to you please get in touch and sign up to present!
Feb 21 – Juliette Vazard
Mar 6 – Stephan Pohl
Mar 27 – David Udell
Apr 3 – Simon Brown
Apr 10 – David Barack
Apr 17 – Kathryn Pendoley
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
PopRocks is a read-ahead, works-in-progress workshop for graduate students and postdocs in the philosophy of cognitive science and mind. We meet on Fridays to hear and discuss a paper, and try to keep a low-pressure, constructive environment. If that sounds useful to you please get in touch and sign up to present!
Feb 21 – Juliette Vazard
Mar 6 – Stephan Pohl
Mar 27 – David Udell
Apr 3 – Simon Brown
Apr 10 – David Barack
Apr 17 – Kathryn Pendoley
PopRocks is a read-ahead, works-in-progress workshop for graduate students and postdocs in the philosophy of cognitive science and mind. We meet on Fridays to hear and discuss a paper, and try to keep a low-pressure, constructive environment. If that sounds useful to you please get in touch and sign up to present!
Feb 21 – Juliette Vazard
Mar 6 – Stephan Pohl
Mar 27 – David Udell
Apr 3 – Simon Brown
Apr 10 – David Barack
Apr 17 – Kathryn Pendoley
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
A number of authors have pointed out that the standard arguments for perception’s having nonconceptual content tell us nothing about the content of a state per se, but only instead about the sorts of capacities a subject must have in order to be in some state (i.e., whether the subject need or need not possess the specifying concepts in order to be in some state). Others have argued in response that the only reason for two states to require different conceptual capacities of the subject is precisely because they have different sorts of contents, and so there is no substantive difference between a ‘content’ view and a ‘state’ view. Here, I present evidence for states that do, in fact, share the same content but differ in the required conceptual capacities: exogenous perceptual states, and endogenous, voluntarily produced perceptual states. I argue that this functional difference—voluntary versus involuntary production—constitutes the difference in concept-dependence. I then look to three possibilities for how this claim could affect our understanding of the relationship between cognition and perception.