2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
2/7: Uriah Kriegel Philosophy, Rice University
2/21: Megan Peters Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine
2/28: Iris Berent Psychology, Northeastern University
3/6: Michael Glanzberg Philosophy, Rutgers University
3/20: Sam Coleman Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire
4/3: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini Philosophy, Rutgers University
4/26: Nicholas Shea Institute of Philosophy, University of London Philosophy, University of Oxford
5/8: Diana Raffman Philosophy, University of Toronto
With responses from Mark Siderits (Illinois State University)
ABSTRACT: Buddhist philosophers often draw a distinction between two different kinds of truth: conventional truth (saṃvṭi-satya) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). Abhidharma Buddhists philosophers typically understand this distinction in terms of an ontological distinction between two different kinds of entities: ultimately real entities (paramārtha-sat) and conventionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat). Similar to contemporary philosophical discussions about ordinary objects, Buddhist philosophers debate the ontological status of conventional entities and the semantics of discourse concerning them. Mark Siderits (2015, 2021, 2022) has influentially argued for an eliminitivist position he calls “Buddhist reductionism” that interprets the Abhidharma position as one that denies conventional entities exist but that retains discourse involving apparent reference to them. However, in a recent article Kris McDaniel (2019), a prominent defender of ontological pluralism, challenges that view by proposing that the Abhidharma Buddhist distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth be “defined up” from a more basic distinction between two different ways an entity can exist: conventionally or ultimately. In this paper I argue that Saṃghabhadra’s account of conventional reality and truth does lends itself well to McDaniel’s proposal but I will also argue that the account of conventional and ultimate truth that results differs in important ways from the models he offers. I will end by offering a modification of McDaniel’s account of conventional truth that is derived from Saṃghabhadra’s pluralist ontology. That view will, unlike the views suggested by both Siderits and McDaniel, allow for there to be ultimate truths about what is conventionally true.
Dinner will be kindly offered by the Columbia University Seminars.
RSVP is required for dinner. Please email Lucilla with eating requirements at lm3335@columbia.edu.
This event will feature a thought-provoking panel discussion with sexual and reproductive justice experts on the value of the sexual and reproductive justice framework and how it can be applied to diverse stakeholders, settings, and contexts. Panelists will also highlight examples from around the world of momentum towards sexual and reproductive justice.
Event Information
Free and open to the public; registration is required for both in-person and online attendance. For additional information, please visit the event webpage. Please email Malia Maier at mm5352@cumc.columbia.edu with any questions. All in-person attendees must follow Columbia’s COVID-19 policies.
Hosted by the Global Health Justice and Governance Program at Columbia University.
Poets and singers in a number of medieval vernacular languages reached non-native audiences and inspired speakers of other languages to compose in theirs; and many imagined their compositions enjoying a universality similar to that of cosmopolitan languages like Latin and Arabic. An interesting rationalization of these aspirations can be discerned in a short verse narrative of a well-known episode in the youth of Alexander the Great, conqueror of India, together with his tutor, the philosopher Aristotle. Not only does it involve Greeks and Indians singing French songs and cosplaying French lovers, but the philosopher is induced to pretend to be a horse and then justifies his behavior as “natural,” with far-reaching implications which this talk will explore.
Sarah Kay is Professor Emerita in the Department of French Literature, Thought and Culture at New York University and Life Fellow at Girton College, University of Cambridge. In Spring 2023, she is Distinguished Visiting Scholar in the Columbia Society of Senior Scholars.
This talk is presented by the Columbia Maison Française, Society of Fellows and Heyman Center for the Humanities, The Society of Senior Scholars, the Department of Music, and Medieval and Renaissance Studies.