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Temporal ‘de re’ Attitudes (Yael Sharvit)
4:15 pm
Temporal ‘de re’ Attitudes (Yael Sharvit)
@ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Sep 9 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
A sensible approach to the semantics of tense says that present tense and past tense “refer” to the evaluation time and to some pre-evaluation time, respectively. Indeed, this seems to be the case in unembedded sentences (e.g., Mary is thirty-five, Mary was thirty-five). But embedded tenses seem to misbehave: (1) does not express the proposition that two months prior to s* (= the speech time) Joseph was sure about the truth of [Mary is currently thirty-five]; this proposition is expressed by (2). Assuming[...]
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Anti-Exceptionalism and Explanations in Logic (Ole Hjortland and Ben Martin)
4:15 pm
Anti-Exceptionalism and Explanations in Logic (Ole Hjortland and Ben Martin)
@ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Sep 16 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
According to logical anti-exceptionalism we come to be justified in believing logical theories by similar means to scientific theories. This is often explained by saying that theory choice in logic proceeds via abductive arguments (Priest, Russell, Williamson, Hjortland). Thus, the success of classical and non-classical theories of validity are compared by their ability to explain the relevant data. However, as of yet there is no agreed upon account of which data logical theories must explain,[...]
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Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic Workshop
Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic Workshop
@ CUNY Grad Center
Sep 20 – Sep 21 all-day
Logic has frequently played an exceptional role in philosophical projects. The laws of logic have been considered self-evident, obvious or a priori, and therefore epistemologically foundational. As a result, logic has been set apart from the other sciences. According to anti-exceptionalism, however, the privileged epistemological status of logical laws has been exaggerated. Instead, both logical theories and theory-choice in logic are continuous with the theories and methods of other sciences. But what does that tell[...]
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Existence, Verbal Disputes and Equivocation (Alessandro Rossi)
4:15 pm
Existence, Verbal Disputes and Equivocation (Alessandro Rossi)
@ CUNY Grad Center, 7314
Sep 23 @ 4:15 pm – 6:15 pm
Noneism is the theory according to which some things do not exist. Following an established convention, I will call allism the negation of noneism (every thing exists). Lewis [1990] and, more recently, Woodward [2013] argued that the allism/noneism dispute turns on an equivocation about the meaning of ‘exists’ and would thereby be merely verbal. These arguments have been attacked by Priest [2005, 2011, 2013], who took the dispute to be genuine. In this paper, I will present[...]
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