03.02.09
Posted in ethics, internet, philosophy, science, wittgenstein at 3:01 am by nogre
… Another alternative would have been to give you what’s called a popular scientific lecture, that is a lecture intended to make you believe that you understand a thing which actually you don’t understand, and to gratify what I believe to be one of the lowest desires of modern people, namely the superficial curiosity about the latest discoveries of science.
This quote is from the beginning of Wittgenstein’s “A Lecture on Ethics” or whatever the untitled transcript of the talk he gave to The Heretics Society is called. I’ve seen this part of the lecture omitted; admittedly it has little to do with his later arguments. However, I always felt that this barb was something interesting.
The quote has little force as an argument: it is merely his opinion that a superficial curiosity about the latest discoveries of science is bad. No contradictions or other nonsense is pointed out, nor does it even evoke a parallel between those he is disparaging and some accepted foul thing.
But it is clear, concise and otherwise totally unlike everything else that Wittgenstein is known for, while touching upon the topics of belief, understanding, science, and desire. Odd, no?
What the quote is, is a smear; it is an insult: Calling something a lowest desire, without reason, is merely to insult it. What’s going on here?
Say I have a superficial curiosity about the latest discoveries of science. So what? If the latest scientific research has little to do with my profession, say I’m a restaurateur, then what harm is there in having a passing interest in what other smart people do? It might even be considered commendable that I make such an effort.
Now Wittgenstein is saying that my earnest effort is nowhere near commendable, but all the way at the bottom, the basest, of desire. Since he accusing “modern people” it is not just ‘me’, but everyone. This is insulting and unwarranted.
However, this isn’t exactly what Wittgenstein was after: he disliked superficial curiosity in scientific discoveries not because of the impulse of people to learn and take interest in others, but because it made people believe that they understood a thing which actually they didn’t understand. Understanding difficult things is an accomplishment, and scientific research is difficult. In enjoying a superficial curiosity about the latest discoveries of science, he is accusing us of feeling a sense of accomplishment when we have done nothing to merit it: he is accusing us of mental masturbation. Ouch.
We can also now understand why this criticism is “modern”. Before modern times, there was no way to have a “popular scientific lecture”: only in the last century or so have we had the communications technology and an available public which allows for such a thing. You couldn’t expect feudal peasants to leave their farms or be educated enough to appreciate such a lecture. But by November 1929, the date of this lecture, mass media was in full swing with the wide distribution of newspapers and books, and the start of national radio broadcasts. Only with widespread media distribution did the danger of popular science becoming a narcotic exist.
Wittgenstein saw that with the modern increase in information distribution capability came a danger of intellectual drugging of the population. It disgusted him that people would take pleasure from the feeling that they understood difficult theories with which they only had the most superficial engagement. Unfortunately he had no argument or solution to prevent this, and so he resorted, as we all do when we are out of good arguments, to insults.
One can only think that the internet has made this an even more pervasive problem. It blows our information distribution capability off the charts. And we are, unsurprisingly, completely addicted to it. It’s too bad dear Ludwig never really commented more on modernity, he seems to have been rather perceptive.
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01.09.09
Posted in ethics, language, logic, metaphysics, ontology, philosophy, science at 1:04 pm by nogre
Truth is whatever you are willing to wager your sanity on. This works because sanity is relative to people, so if you are willing to wager your sanity on something, so should other people.
Deontology has a problem because no one can definitively tell you what it is to follow a rule. So deontologists can’t fault others for appealing to unexplained concepts without undermining their own argument.
Whereas the meanings of particular words may be conventional and subject to historical accident, there are distinctions that the words create that are not conventional. If logical operators are conventional, but must exist is every possible world (you must define the world using such operators), then conventional loses its meaning: it ceases to be a convention and is instead a necessity of the universe.
The concept of structure in ’structural realism’ is ontological, causing problems for ontic structural realists. By calling the theory structural, structural realists are attempting to exploit the concepts associated with ’structure’ from areas other than philosophy of science. This means that the term is not being used ontically because the concept of structure is taken to have real properties. So at every turn ontic structural realists are appealing to an ontological concept.
—–
oh and information aesthetics is back from break! woohoo!
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12.09.08
Posted in ethics, philosophy at 1:14 pm by nogre
Our ethical responsibility is to do our best to enrich the lives of others and to give others the opportunity to enrich us.
Everyone understands what it is to have an enriched life: everyone has had a friend, learned something of worth, or made the world a better place at some point (even by accident). Moreover, once you understand how your life has been enriched, then you understand how you could act in a similar manner for someone who is now in the position that you were in.
——————————–
Since I doubt anyone will read the few sentences above and simply agree that I have a good theory, I suppose some benefits of this theory should be mentioned*:
- Like deontology and unlike consequentialism, mutual enrichment only governs a limited number of actions: when you have an opportunity to enrich a life then you should, but if not, no big deal. Consequentialism can be a bit overbearing in the sense that it can place ethical value on every single act as part of some great equation to increase happiness; deontology and mutual enrichment can find some acts meritorious/immoral and others as ethically neutral, which is less stressful.
- Like deontology and consequentialism, but unlike virtue ethics, mutual enrichment gives you a better strategy for making decisions: you consider what has enriched your life or you believe will enrich someone’s life, and then attempt to act in such a way to provide enrichment. By appealing to experience and knowledge that a person already has, there is no need to worry about what a virtuous person would do, or what exactly counts as virtuous.
- Like virtue ethics and unlike deontology or consequentialism, mutual enrichment focuses on moral development, friendship, culture and moral wisdom. I believe this to be a benefit because it is a more personal relationship to ethics than the ‘formulaic’ theories, which I find a bit detached. Even more than virtue ethics, mutual enrichment focuses on personal relationships and may then have more resources to give guidance in such situations, and also on culture as a major factor in enrichment. Insofar as culture and tradition are enriching, these things may be appealed to in decision making.
- Unlike all the other theories handling of contrary intuitions, i.e. conflicting deontological commitments, deciding which consequences are the best consequences or deciding which virtue takes priority in a particular situation, mutual enrichment uses personal experience as a guide so there is less conflict. You do what you know. In the instance of no personal experience, then the person’s best judgment based upon his or her knowledge and tradition may be appealed to. However, if the person has no experience in a particular situation, then he or she cannot be blamed for inaction, but should be praised for rising to such an occasion if he or she were to do so.
A few important distinctions: Mutual enrichment is not simply nourishment or pleasure. We are not enriched by merely eating; having a good meal with family can be enriching, but it is not the consumption of food alone that does this. Nor is mutual enrichment simply pleasure. Getting stoned may be fun, but everyone recognizes that, fun as it may be, it is not considered enriching.
If anyone can think of any problems please do tell. Until something better comes along or someone skewers it, this is my working ethical theory.
——————
* Much thanks to Dr. Richard Brown for inspiring me to write anything. You can have my steak when you pry it from my cold dead hands.
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11.23.08
Posted in ethics, philosophy, random idiocy at 9:24 pm by nogre
I was at a bar on Friday. One of my friends says, “Hey Noah, there’s another philosopher here, come talk.” So I go and chat.
She wrote a MA thesis on Levinas. But somehow we got to ethics. I started making fun of virtue ethics, which she believed in. Something about me saying she had tomatoes being cultivated in her head got her riled up. Since I had said I was unimpressed with Singer earlier, she figured me for a deontologist.
“You love rules. You love following rules.. You looove Kant. You want to fuck Kant. You want to fuck Kant!”
This was said in a progressively louder voice, with the last sentence being heard by everyone. For some reason it turned heads and made her friend think it was time to leave.
But not before I got her number.
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11.10.08
Posted in art, epistemology, ethics, language, logic, metaphysics, mind, ontology, philosophy, preterphysics, science at 4:12 pm by nogre
What follows is the second part of my metaphysics, which includes the basic outline of just about everything in this world: nature, science, ethics, language and more. Again it is impossibly short, but the overall structure is correct, so you get a flavor of how I think about everything non-preterphysical.
————
1 Metaphysical Ontology
1.1 Undisciplined Substances
To be disciplined is to take other people’s ontological position into consideration. Since it is impossible, without being crazy, to do otherwise, what is meant by `undisciplined’ is the minimal position: to take other people’s ontological position into consideration as little as possible.
1.1.1 Objects, Processes and Nature
Objects cannot exists alone. To observe an object, to recognize its existence, requires observing some process that the object is part of. Rational beings can lose their rationality; the process of losing rationality identifies a rational being, because the process could not occur without the existence of one.
Objects and processes are what make up Nature.
1.1.2 Words, Descriptions and Language
Words cannot exist alone; they are inseparable from descriptions. For a word to exist is for that word to be part of some description. Without being part of a description, a word is indistinguishable from anything else.
Words and descriptions are what make up Language.
1.1.3 Commitments, Values and Responsibility
Commitments cannot exist alone; they are inseparable from values. Values are how commitments are ranked. Without values all commitments are equal, and hence non-existent.
Commitments and values are what make up Responsibility.
1.2 Disciplined Substances
When you take other people into consideration when considering substance, then you have disciplined substance.
1.2.1 Science, Art and Craft
When we describe objects and processes in a disciplined way then we are describing nature scientifically. This means that the objects and processes are described in a way that is not limited to a particular person or place.
Craft is a level of discipline that is not as universalized: when you describe nature such that it refers to a group of people or various places, then you are describing craft.
1.2.2 Grammar, Logic and Rhetoric
When we describe words and descriptions in a disciplined way then we are are talking about the language’s grammar. This means that the words and descriptions are described in a way that is not limited to a particular description. If we are describing features that all languages have, then this is called logic.
Rhetoric is a level of discipline that is not as universalized: when you describe grammar such that it refers to a group of words or descriptions, then you are describing rhetoric.
1.2.3 Ethics, Worldview and Society
When we describe commitments and values in a disciplined way then we are talking about ethical responsibilities. This means that the commitments and values are described in a way that is not limited to a particular person or place. If we are describing features that all ethics have then this is a worldview.
Society is a level of discipline that is not as universalized: when you describe ethics such that it refers to a group of commitments or values, then you are describing a society.
File translated from TEX by TTH, version 3.79. On 10 Nov 2008, 14:59.
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03.18.08
Posted in biology, ethics, evolution, fitness, mind, philosophy, technology at 9:47 pm by nogre
The only ways to enhance the mind is to learn or evolve. Since evolution is out of our hands, all that is left is to learn.
Drugs that purport psychopharmacological enhancement do not do what their name states: they may change certain psychological factors but there is no drug that will make you smarter. This would be to eat from the tree of knowledge.
However drugs may be able to let you do things that you were unable previously, but this is nothing mysterious. If you do not breath enough oxygen, you will not be able to run. You get enough oxygen, you will be able to do more things. Now is oxygen a performance enhancing drug? It depends: the World Anti-Doping Agency recently ruled on oxygen tents (tents that vary the amount of oxygen inside) because using these tents can affect red blood cell counts. This example illustrates two things: that there is nothing inherently special about any particular chemical, be it oxygen or a newfangled drug, and secondly, that drugs only affect intermediary situations, not the final outcome.
The first point is that there is no moral dimension associated with the chemicals themselves. If it is possible to use the most fundamental of chemicals required for our survival in a way that could be seen as inappropriate, then any other chemical could be equally accused. If any chemical can be equally accused, then there is nothing unique about any individual chemical that makes its use morally wrong.
The second point is that drugs only have a specific range of effects. In the above example, the oxygen tents affect red blood cell count. An increased red blood cell count can be used to boost endurance, but this benefit will only appear under certain situations. The tents themselves do not increase endurance: they merely increase red blood cells. If a different drug was consumed to weaken the muscles, then the two ‘drugs’ would counteract each other and there would be no change in ability. Therefore it is not a drug that gives people an ability, such as endurance, but a drug may change how an ability is expressed.
The question is (and always was), “What do you want?” Since drugs have no moral dimension nor imbue the user with unknown (super-human) ability, the only issue is of fair play. Fair play in terms of other people and with your own goals. If you want to be able to lift heavy things, then you can use a machine, you can use drugs or you can work hard. Using a machine or drugs is to use someone else’s technology to assist whatever ability you have. If you use discipline to achieve the same results, then the technology that is being used is your own. Therefore if you are trying to play fair with others, then you have to ensure everyone has access to the same technology, be it machine or drug. If you are trying to achieve something yourself, then only you know whether or not using drugs makes a difference.
As we learn what is safe(r), we are going to have a fun future. Nothing changes our natural born ability or the hard work we have put in, but that has never stopped us from trying. Better drugs are on the way and this means options will be open to us that weren’t possible in the past. Good luck, be safe, have fun.
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12.20.07
Posted in art, ethics, philosophy at 10:50 pm by nogre
There is a television show coming out in the new year called “Terminator: The Sarah Connor Chronicles”. At first I was massively excited. My father said that he thought it is taking place in between the first and second movies when Sarah was learning to be a hardcore bad-ass. I thought this was a brilliant idea: someone traveling through Mexico and the U.S. with a baby engaged in what amount to ostensibly terrorist activities. All sorts of questions about our society and terrorism would get brought up and, instead of the usual ‘us versus them’ situation, we would be rooting for the terrorist on our own soil. Any casualties/collateral damage would always be a decent person just doing their job: no one could foresee the rise of the machines. And what ends would Sarah go to when faced with a serious problem – she is working to save the future of humanity and she is the only one who knows it. We know she won’t shoot through a kid to kill the father, but that leaves a lot open, and she is under a good deal of stress. Never mind having a baby/toddler along for the ride who will grow to be the messiah.
Then I saw a recent commercial and it was a bunch of pretty 20 somethings in some US city. No crazy military types, no terrorist training, no her struggling to provide for a kid while keeping free of any public records, no Mexico, no her trying to convince people she isn’t psychotic. Granted, they were blowing something up in the commercial, but then I saw that there were multiple new terminators. Back to ‘us versus them’.
I’ll still give it a chance but my expectations are much lower now.
(update: caught the tail end of a new commercial in which I heard some female say, “You pack the bombs, I’ll make pancakes.” Some potential…)
—-
On the subject of TV there is one other point that is very important. CBS is channel 2. NBC is 4. Fox is 5. ABC is 7. I really have trouble accepting other channel lineups. They don’t count. I know this is ridiculous but I don’t care.
I surmise I feel this way because the news is exciting around here (NYC area) and the anchors are awesome. When I leave the area the stations just don’t have the same feel.
Happy birthday to Jim Rosenfield of CBS 2 news (December 18).
Other matters of some concern:
Boston Legal is the only scripted show I (somewhat regularly) watch. Those characters are my heroes. No ‘reality’ TV unless This Old House counts. NFL football/MLB baseball depending on season. I once had a logic midterm during the world series. Forget studying. So we convinced the teacher not to give us the test, the morning of the test. Not postponed, canceled. He pulled the test from his bag to pass out and we got him to change his mind. This was in a (Leiter-rated) grad school. Damn right we were that good.
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10.27.07
Posted in art, ethics, movies at 11:23 pm by nogre
Go see ‘Gone Baby Gone‘. It’s got good acting, some twists and good ol’ fashion moral ambiguity. The kind of ambiguity that was around before everything started feeling like a politically correct press release and is going to be around once again when we come to our senses. And nothing against PR departments and carefully crafted images but I happen to like the areas in between what we we are comfortable with: when we can ask questions of ourselves and not have ready answers we may learn something about ourselves and possibly others. I think of it like how Jefferson rationalized writing a constitution to protect the inalienable rights of citizens while sleeping with his slaves. Props to the Afflecks for making this movie, Ben direction, Casey lead; Morgan Freeman, Ed Harris, and a slew of other excellent authentic performances.
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06.08.07
Posted in art, ethics, fun, philosophy at 6:45 pm by nogre
The Birth of Comedy out of the Suicide of Tragedy
Or:
Letterman and Leno
Nietzsche felt that the rise of the comedic play signaled the end of the traditional Greek tragedy, and with it, great art. However, this new comedy still retained much of the old theory behind his conception of the tragedy. The two primitive artistic impulses represented by the Gods Apollo and Dionysus are still critical, but in comedy the old duality is split into a ternary system with Aesthetic Socratism opening up a ground in between. This middle acts as sounding board that evaluates the merits of the artistic impulses against the average and normative feelings of everyday life. With this new and utterly familiar impulse, the old Gods can at best be hinted at, as the everyday normality that Socratism brings cannot be escaped from.
Tragedies were necessarily made from the interaction of two opposing impulses. Apollo represented the dream state that employed forms and images to generate grand illusions. This aspect of the tragedy gave the general form of the story: Mount Olympus, oracles, Gods, etc., as well as the literary style employed. Dionysus, however, embodied the drunken ecstasy that strips away all representation and reincorporates the body into the world without intermediate thought or consideration. Solely content is given to the tragedy by the Dionysian component. In this Nietzschean tragedy the characters were all merely masks of Dionysus thrust into an Apollonian context. With this union of the Apollonian forms with the Dionysian content comes forth a work of tragic art.
When tragic art was created in such a way, Nietzsche held that it was beyond our mental faculties to completely comprehend it. He says on page 80 (of The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of Wagner, trans. W. Kaufmann), “Even the clearest figure always had a comet’s tail attached to it which seemed to suggest the uncertain, that which could never be illuminated,” and that there was always an “incommensurability in every feature and every line.” Regardless, the tragedies enjoyed almost universal success.
Socrates did not like the old tragedies though. He held that, “Knowledge is virtue,” (84) and as a corollary, “To be beautiful everything must be intelligible,” (ibid.). Under this scheme the absolute lack of intelligibility that was fundamental to the tragedy was no longer of first-rate artistic value. Moreover the new requirements, “man only sins from ignorance; he who is virtuous is happy” (91), made tragedy low, base and to be avoided as sinful and without virtue. The very aspect that previously gave the tragedy its greatness became its downfall in Aesthetic Socratism.
With this full reversal of values, the suicide of tragedy becomes clear. Neither the Apollonian nor Dionysian can withstand this change. The Apollonian is an impulse towards the ideal, to the form of the world and cannot be fully explained insofar as the ideal itself is unreachable; the Dionysian attempts to connect life in a more intimate way with its surroundings, such that the impulse is more basic and prior to rational thought.
Where can Nietzsche go from here? He has seemingly broken any connection to his theory with the advent and incorporation of Aesthetic Socratism. However, not all is lost. As the tragedy declined in popularity, a new form of entertainment arose: the comedy. In the comedy, the plot revolved around daily Greek life. Every aspect, every character, every twist and turn of the plot was readily understandable and identifiable to the audience. But how could this be entertaining, especially with the tragedy still in recent memory? Were the Greeks so sick of tragedy and primed for Socrates arrival that they were prepared to abandon all their old aesthetics for new ones?
Nietzsche does not think that the comedy and Aesthetic Socratism killed the old artistic impulses, but instead somehow bastardized then into being merely secondary. In this way both the Apollonian and Dionysian could be retained in some respects, so long as an undercurrent of overall intelligibility was maintained. What then does Aesthetic Socratism amount to, especially in terms of some sort of substructure for the old artistic impulses to be reconstructed on? It is the firm belief that between knowledge and reason one can be “liberated from the fear of death,” and in doing so, essentially make all of life “comprehensible and thus justified,” (96). Therefore the baseline for the artistic impulses must be everyday logical and scientific truths at home with any person endowed with knowledge and reason.
Even though the fundamental belief of Socratism has now been brought out, it is still not clear how this confidence in our abilities to understand can produce anything artistic. However, it is illegitimate to ask for a remnant of the old tragic theory under the new schema: tragedy is long dead. Instead one must take Aesthetic Socratism while still under the influence of the past: the Apollonian and Dionysian must evolve to incorporate intelligibility, as intelligibility cannot incorporate them. Looking down from the height of the Gods, how does this impulse for the everyday human endeavor appear? As our finite reality enters our currently God-like consciousness, “it is experienced as such, with nausea,” (60). This sickness brought on by the absurdity of human existence in comparison with the far reaches of our dreams and ecstasies can only be made bearable again by art: “the comic as the artistic discharge of the nausea of absurdity,” (ibid.). Therefore it is the old artistic impulse, twice used, that produces of a comic work of art: once to conceive of Socrates as a new God (82) and then again to escape from him.
Hence the artistic impulses are not lost in comedy, but what has happened to them in their second iteration, the re-conception of the everyday? However big the “enormous driving-wheel of logical Socratism… behind Socrates,” (88) actually is, the best it can muster is reason (logic) and (scientific) knowledge. Nietzsche realizes that with these two constraints, logic and science, “The Apollonian tendency has withdrawn into the cocoon of logical schematism… the Dionysian into naturalistic affects,” (91).
Finally we have Nietzsche’s conception of a comic art: tragedy restrained by everyday life. But the above formulation is only accurate for one spectator: the playwright. There is no comedy for Euripides; there is only his bathetic tragedy (the comic doesn’t normally laugh at his/her own jokes). Every other member of the audience, on the other hand, does not have the same perspective, but the opposite. They side with that which they know, the Socratic championing of the everyday, and hence the comic art becomes the everyday constrained by tragedy. This brings the Apollonian and Dionysian together as two different impulses away from the Socratic, giving innuendos towards something great and ultimately tragic, but now unreachable.
Now we can see the general form of the comedy is different than the tragedy. Tragedies were born out of the two artistic impulses and hence could really only take one form: Apollonian form with Dionysian content. With the advent of the third and now critical impulse, two new relations were created: Dionysian to Socratic and Apollonian to Socratic. In the case of the first relation, the Dionysian impulses truly cannot give form, and so the Socratic must then act Apollonian, but only in contrast to the Dionysian. Secondly, as Apollonian impulses cannot give content, the Socratic must then be a surrogate Dionysian; again, not in a true sense of the term Dionysian, but in mere contrast, as a pseudo-god. In so far as the Socratic only acts as a foil, the contrasting impulse is also limited. This signals two distinct forms of comedy, using the Socratic as a substitute for weak comparison.
However, from the Socratic spectator’s point of view, the Apollonian and Dionysian are secondary. Instead of being a foil for the Gods, the Socratic is elevated to Godly status by its ability to make clear the artistic impulses. The Dionysian and Apollonian have now become intelligible: when the Socratic, the everyday, acts as content, then we can know the form in its contrast to the Socratic to be Apollonian, and conversely when the Socratic acts as form, the content is the Dionysian in contrast. Hence Nietzsche volunteers, “Cool, paradoxical thoughts replacing Apollonian contemplation-and fiery affects, replacing Dionysian ecstasies,” make up the comedy from Socrates Cyclops eye, “and in no sense [are] dipped into the ether of art” (83).
Critically, we must wonder whether Nietzsche’s theory is viable. Late night comedy is prime hunting ground, but we must start with the Socratic understanding since it is the only intelligible foundation we have.
“The Tonight Show” with Jay Leno on NBC seems to be a prime example of Dionysian comedy. Leno always starts off the show by shaking hands with the audience. Then he goes into a monologue of jokes followed by some sketches. The show then moves into an interview stage with celebrities and ends usually with a musical performance and sometimes a standup comic. This all seems very normal and could be any sort of variety show. However, this is the first clue to Leno’s comic insight: a Dionysian comedy requires that the form be entirely mundane and everyday, entirely Socratic. Now the way he even starts, by shaking hands with the audience, can be seen as part of his comic routine: it binds him to the everyday people in a communal way. Next comes the monologue. Perhaps not every, but nearly all of the jokes have a similar format: the build-up to the punch line is in entirely normal, everyday speech; he might as well be a reporter. But then comes the punch line: it has some sort of strong reference to some fiery affect, a feeling of drunken ecstasy. For example, a few days ago (probably on or around 4/18) he began a joke by saying how the troops searching Saddam Hussein’s palaces had recently found hordes of pornographic magazines. The punch line: the magazines are being referred to as “weapons of mass–turbation.”
After the monologue comes a skit or two. Some sketches are regulars and appear consistently on certain nights. Every Monday night a bit called “Headlines” is done. Very simply, Leno collects clippings sent to him from around the country that he finds funny due to a misprint or just carelessness and puts them on display for everyone to see. Each headline itself is inconsequential or just an honest mistake and always found in some legitimate source, but when he puts his spin on them, they take on extra Dionysian shades of meaning that were not meant to be there. Tonight (4/23), Leno had a debate similar to the new “Point, Counterpoint” debate on “60 Minutes”. Instead of having two political rivals, he brings together two relative morons and asks them simple questions. The joke seems to be in the universal joy of not saying the stupid things that they say: their ignorance is laughed at, but it only is funny in the setting comparable to simple, serious, everyday questions asked.
“The Late Show” with David Letterman on CBS makes for an excellent illustration of Apollonian comedy. He too begins his show with a funny monologue before having some skits and eventually interviewing guests and ending with some musical performance. However, his monologue is much shorter than Leno’s. Instead he moves directly into skits and stunts. Sometimes he even interviews a guest before the stunts. Recently he has been doing a short little segment that pokes fun at Dr. Phil the TV psychologist. It is called “Dr. Phil’s Words of Wisdom” and essentially consists of a short cut of Dr. Phil saying something apparently stupid. The funny thing about the segment is not the clip itself, which is obviously taken grossly out of context, but the entirely new context given: words of wisdom. This contradiction in name and content is the Apollonian impulse away from the Socratic; the displacement of the form of presentation is the Apollonian comedic insight.
Letterman also has a great segment called, “Is this anything?” A performer does an act and then Letterman and Paul Shaffer decide if what the performer did was either something or nothing. The absurdity of the situation is that the whole thing is treated as a kind of game show, as if the performer could lose something by the act being determined to be nothing. All the while, Letterman has two performers, the “Late Night Grinder Girl” and the “Late Night Hula-Hoop Girl”, and models flanking the person judged, not as a distraction, but as to create an even grander sense of performance. This great build up to a relatively inconsequential decision again shows the Apollonian comedic insight.
Lastly, Letterman’s “Top Ten” is a prime example of the Apollonian form with Socratic content. Nothing in the “Top Ten” is usually that far-fetched or unusual. The genius was to group these ten things together and to order them for a purpose, and that is where the comedy was created.
Many more examples from both shows can be given to support the above claims. Interestingly, both comics are not limited to only their own style of comedy even if they are reluctant to venture too far. The Socratism each uses gives them access to a reflection of the artistic impulse they are unfamiliar with and the illusion that they “know” it. Recently Letterman made a Dionysian joke: he began by commenting on how we could determine if Saddam Hussein had died under rubble since we had his DNA. Then he proceeded to show us a picture of the person who obtained the DNA: Monica Lewinsky. As soon as the joke was over, he began to apologize: the form was not up to his usual Apollonian standards and that made the punch line a comparative low blow to the rest of his jokes. Interestingly Leno had made a similarly “tasteless” joke the same night; his response was to announce that he would not apologize.
Leno too makes some attempts at Apollonian comedy. He has a “Jeopardy” style skit in which he has comedian fill the roles of people in the news. The comedians give answers, reflective of their character, to legitimate questions. This phony game show setup would be similar to a game Letterman might play, but Leno is unsure of this kind of comedy and guarantee’s laughs by having comedians fill the roles. The above-mentioned “Point/ Counterpoint” could be seen as an artificial and Letterman-like game as well. Leno does not focus on this though: the setup is still a current event, not an arbitrary construction as “Is It Anything?” is, and finds the comedy in the content, the contestants.
Comedy, sparked by the tragic and mediated by everyday life, has a special place in between great art and not being art at all. To incorporate Socrates the Gods Apollo and Dionysus had kids: Letterman and Leno. These lords of late night talk shows are able to handle the tragic Godly insights as well as keep one hand on the pulse of the nation. In the synthesis that followed, each developed a unique style antithetical to the other. Leno takes things out of context; Letterman puts things out of context. Ultimately neither could survive without the other, just as Dionysus and Apollo need each other. However, the inheritance of Aesthetic Socratism dooms each into attempting, against their best instincts, the comedy of the other.
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