David Bates, in conversation with Stefanos Geroulano and Joanna Stalnaker
We imagine that we are both in control of and controlled by our bodies—autonomous and yet automatic. This entanglement, according to David W. Bates, emerged in the seventeenth century when humans first built and compared themselves with machines. Reading varied thinkers from Descartes to Kant to Turing, Bates reveals how time and time again technological developments offered new ways to imagine how the body’s automaticity worked alongside the mind’s autonomy. Tracing these evolving lines of thought, David Bates discusses his new book, An Artificial History of Natural Intelligence, which offers a new theorization of the human as a being that is dependent on technology and produces itself as an artificial automaton without a natural, outside origin.
David Bates is Professor of Rhetoric at the University of California Berkeley. His research focuses on the history of legal and political ideas, and the relationship between technology, science, and the history of human cognition.
Stefanos Geroulanos is the Director of the Remarque Institute and Professor of European Intellectual History at NYU. He usually writes about concepts that weave together modern understandings of time, the human, and the body. His new book is a history of the concepts, images, and sciences of human origins since 1770, forthcoming from Liveright Press as The Invention of Prehistory: Empire, Violence, and Our Obsession with Human Origins in 2024.
Joanna Stalnaker is Professor of French at Columbia. She works on Enlightenment philosophy and literature, with a recent interest in how women shaped the Enlightenment. Her new book, The Rest Is Silence: Enlightenment Philosophers Facing Death, will be published by Yale University Press in the Walpole series.
How does objectivity shape power, and how does power shape objectivity?
Welcome to “Unmasking Objectivity: A Critical Examination of the Nexus between Universal Truth Claims and Emergent Power Structures,” a conference that plunges into the intricate relationship between knowledge and power. In this conference, we will uncover how epistemological standpoints intersect with systems of coercion, marginalization, and oppression. Our topic extends to alternative visions of knowledge, truth, and learning, offering the potential for shared beliefs while addressing the adverse impacts of entrenched power structures.
How have claims to absolute, objective, or scientific truth driven oppression through ideologies like religious absolutism, colonialism, technocracy, and scientific sexism and racism? Contemporary debates further emphasize the significance of this intersection.
Our discourse will also scrutinize epistemic injustice, examining whether universalist epistemologies privilege specific knowledge systems while silencing valid alternatives. We aim to shed light on social and political issues overlooked by dominant knowledge frameworks through inclusive dialogues. This conference fosters critical exploration and inclusive discourse, drawing on interdisciplinary studies in philosophy, sociology, and political theory.
Together, we will assess the ethical implications of our epistemological practices and explore pathways to creating more equitable systems of knowledge and social learning. Join us at “Unmasking Objectivity” as we navigate the intricate web of knowledge and power, aiming for a just and inclusive future where the notion of objectivity is both scrutinized and harnessed for social transformation.
Democracy is often presented as the sine qua non of politics today. Yet our own democratic political orders across the West consistently fail to deliver the desiderata they promise to provide. Does this failure arise in part from the theoretical insufficiency of conventional diagnoses of democracy’s challenges and ills? As the primaries for the 2024 U.S. presidential election open, we invite participants to consider critically the status of democracy with an eye toward the concerns that have defined Telos over its 55-year history.
The main advantage of democracy over other political forms is that, by allowing broader participation in decision-making, it prevents domination of the many by the few. In theory, it also fosters decision-making that is comparatively effective and meaningful by allowing views and information from the many to be communicated efficiently to political leaders, while also holding the latter to account for their actions. At the same time, a major difficulty of democracy is that the rule by the many requires some procedure for translating a multitude of opinions into unified decisions and action. In addition, precisely by exercising its majority will, the many can trammel the integrity of the individual—the key threat that liberalism seeks to hold at bay.
These advantages—and, especially, these challenges—have produced two competing visions of democracy in the contemporary West. Their division reflects differences about the politics of representation and decision-making. On one hand, liberals view democracy as the following of appropriate procedures for channeling the opinions of the multitude through the election of representatives. On the other hand, populists might disregard such procedural restrictions to arrive at outcomes that are acclaimed by the people directly.
While both sides nod to the importance of the popular will, both are in fact willing to denigrate it. The liberal camp reacts in horror when democratic elections result in the election of populists, who are said to lack proper governing expertise, as in the 2016 victory of Donald Trump. The populist camp charges conspiracy when electoral results fail to reflect their own conception of the people’s will, as in Trump’s reaction to his 2020 ouster. Depending on which camp is describing the times, the false mediator of popular will is either the demagogue or the bureaucrat—Telos has long opposed both.
Different narratives, in turn, have taken hold about democracy’s present challenges. From the point of view of the liberal proceduralist critique of demagogues, the means of moving from a multiplicity of opinions to a unified decision inevitably involves discourse within a public sphere. This discourse depends on a common understanding of historical facts, as well as a public sphere that allows different perspectives to face each other in debate. In our contemporary world, however, the breakdown of previous limits to accessing the public sphere has led to an inability to arrive at a consensus on the difference between fact and fiction, as well as an increasing tendency of citizens to exist within a social media echo chamber of their own views, undermining the common ground that a public sphere presupposes.
At the same time, public debate necessarily implicates values and identities that have an ultimately mythic basis that cannot be rationally determined. People’s opinions, moreover, are invariably shaped by leaders as much as the people shape what leaders ought to do. Experts lament how this representational dynamic undermines the procedures that govern and channel the representation of the popular will. Yet the narrative aspect of representation is an ineradicable element of the way in which the popular will coalesces. The process of narrativized representation will never be an entirely rational one, and the prominence of media personalities such as Reagan, Trump, and Zelensky as politicians underlines the futility of attempting to rid the public sphere of drama and spectacle.
For the populist, by contrast, the primary threat to democracy lies in bureaucracy. In his 2016 end run around the political establishment, Trump’s electoral success was driven by a broader critique of the administrative state’s undermining of democratic process. The rise of the managerial bureaucratic state that was set in motion by the development of the welfare state in the twentieth century has created a class divide between managers and managed that has shifted decision-making power over the conditions of everyday life away from individuals and toward government and corporate bureaucracies. Because more and more of our economic and social welfare is under the direct influence of the state, the resultant bloated administrative state has now become prey to a frenzy of lobbyists, who further distance the people from political decision-making. The protections of minority rights that constitute the liberal aspect of today’s democracies have turned communities into special interests that lobby administrators to pass on privileges to favored groups. The result has been a growing restriction of freedom of expression in the public sphere and an eroding of a unifying basis for constructing a political order now dominated by the collusion of bureaucracy with corporations.
While the liberal critique of demagoguery resorts to more government controls that exacerbate the expansion of bureaucracy, the populist critique of bureaucracy has attempted to dismantle government without considering how to establish mechanisms that would take over the functions that bureaucracies have coopted. Focusing on opposition to government, the populist perspective often lacks any sense of alternative institutional structures that could remedy the administration and commodification of everyday life.
Both sides have contributed to a polarization of views that threatens the underlying consensus necessary for democratic politics. The political gridlock that has ensued from their diverging diagnoses has meant that our political orders consistently fail to deliver peace, prosperity, and accountable government. Moreover, regardless of the rhetoric or credentials of those in power, democracy today seems always to leave us with broadly the same basic policies, despite some of them being deeply unpopular.
We invite those who are interested in presenting at the 2024 Telos Conference to consider critically the status of democracy today by addressing one or more of the following questions:
Democratic Values
- Does democracy have a value of its own independent of its practical consequences?
- What kinds of basic agreements on principles are necessary to maintain a democracy?
- Is there a limit to diversity in a democracy?
- To what extent is polarization itself a threat to democracy?
- What is the relationship between democracy and liberalism?
Democracy and the Administrative State
- To what extent is the consistent reality of all self-styled “democracies” of the world today a form of managerial governance that resists change from below?
- What role is left in an age of managerialism for the popular will?
- Might the appropriate response to managerialism not be more democracy, both at the level of the state but also inside corporate and workplace structures, e.g., through workers’ self-management?
Democracy and the Public Sphere
- What is the role of representation in a democracy, and how do today’s representational processes threaten democratic decision-making?
- How have social media and artificial intelligence changed the way in which democratic processes function, and what changes to these processes might be necessary in the future to accommodate these new technological developments?
- To what extent and in what ways does the public sphere function in today’s democracies? What kinds of limitations are necessary to guarantee the functioning of the public sphere as a space for democratic debate and decision-making?
Democracy and Religion
- What role is there for religion in today’s democracies?
- To what extent does either secularization or religion pose a threat to democracy?
Democracy and Authoritarianism
- What is the relationship between democracy and authoritarianism? Do the current ills of democracy promote a global shift toward authoritarian government?
- What are the key components of democracy that differentiate it from authoritarianism? Where do countries such as Hungary, Turkey, India, and Russia fall on the continuum from democracy to authoritarianism?
Abstract Submissions
Whatever specific questions you address, we invite you to present your analysis with an eye toward the long-standing concerns of the Telos-Paul Piccone Institute and thereby to help develop a trenchant, independent view of democracy that can inform both critique and practical action within our present historical moment. Please submit a short c.v. and an abstract of up to 250 words by October 15, 2023, to telosnyc2024@telosinstitute.net and place “The 2024 Telos Conference” in the email’s subject line. Please direct questions to Professor Mark G. E. Kelly, Western Sydney University, M.Kelly@westernsydney.edu.au.
Conference Location
The conference will take place at the John D. Calandra Italian American Institute in New York City from Friday, March 22, to Saturday, March 23, 2024.
The graduate students and faculty of Columbia University and New York University invite graduate students* to submit papers to present at the 24th Annual Columbia-NYU Graduate Conference in Philosophy, to be held March 30th, 2024!
The keynote speaker for this event will be Robert Brandom (University of Pittsburgh).
The conference will take place in person at Columbia University.
This conference is a generalist conference. Any topic suitable for presentation for a general philosophical audience is welcome!
Requirements for submission. Papers submitted should be:
(1) 3,000 to 5,000 words in length, suitable for a presentation of 30 to 40 minutes.
(2) Prepared for blind review, in PDF format.
(3) Accompanied with a separate cover sheet with the author’s name, home institution, contact information, topic area(s) of the paper, and an abstract of approximately 300 words.
Submissions should be sent to forms.gle/tVo3jhHUY2LyyeUD7. The deadline is 01/15/2024. Decisions will be sent out by 02/12/2024.
For any further information or inquiries, please contact columbianyu.philgradconference@gmail.com.
*Submissions from graduate students at NYU and Columbia will not be considered for acceptance.
Comparative philosophy is gaining traction in professional academic philosophy, with specialist journals, organizations, books, and public campaigns. These inroads have been made in canonical areas of philosophy, including epistemology, metaphysics, logic, and value theory. Yet comparative philosophy still plays little role in practical applied ethics, an interdisciplinary research area in which work with practice and policy implications are dominated by the anglophone world. In this article, I explain why comparative work might be especially difficult in this type of applied ethics, and I suggest how comparative philosophers might overcome these challenges to connect their theoretical work with contemporary practical issues.
With responses from Wenqing Zhao (CUNY Baruch)
NOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
RSVP IS REQUIRED FOR DINNER:. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further information. RSVPs are limited.
Comparative Philosophy Seminar:
- January 19 – Alex Watson (Ashoka University)
- February 2 – Davey Tomlinson (Villanova University)
- April 5 – Laura Specker (Fordham University)
- May 3 – Daniel Stephens (University at Buffalo)
The Long Island Philosophical Society is seeking submissions for its Spring 2024 conference which will be held Saturday, April 13, 2024 on the attractive campus of Molloy University, located in Rockville Centre, NY.
The Long Island Philosophical Society has been a dynamic forum for the exchange of ideas since 1964. LIPS is an internationally recognized organization that is a valuable philosophical resource for the Greater New York area. Its conferences have drawn scholars from over 35 states and from the international community, including six continents.
Papers can be on any topic of philosophical interest. Presentations are limited to 25-30 minutes, to be followed by a 10-15 minute discussion period. Both professional philosophers (full-time, part-time, unaffiliated) and graduate students are welcome to submit. Paper submissions are also welcome from those in different disciplines who have an interest in philosophical issues.
The submission deadline is March 15, 2024.
Please submit papers, including contact information and affiliation (if any) to Dr. Glenn Statile at StatileG@stjohns.edu or Dr. Leslie Aarons at laarons@lagcc.cuny.edu
We are seeking submissions for our 14th annual conference hosted in Spring, 2024.
Send abstracts to newyorkcityearlymodern [at] gmail.com by December 8, 2023.
https://philevents.org/event/show/114750
Speakers:
Organisers:
The New York University Center for Bioethics is pleased to invite submissions of abstracts for the 4th Annual Philosophical Bioethics Workshop, to be held at NYU on Friday and Saturday, May 3-4, 2024.
We are seeking to showcase new work in philosophical bioethics, broadly understood. This includes (but is not limited to) neuroethics, environmental ethics, animal ethics, reproductive ethics, research ethics, ethics of AI, data ethics, public health ethics, gender and race in bioethics, and clinical ethics.
Our keynote speaker will be Professor Shelly Kagan, Yale University. There will be five additional slots for papers chosen from among the submitted abstracts, including one slot set aside for a graduate student speaker. The most promising graduate student submission will be awarded a Graduate Prize, which includes an award of $500, and may include coverage of travel expenses, depending upon university policies at the time of the award. Please indicate in your submission email whether you would like to be considered for the Graduate Prize.
Please submit extended abstracts of between 750 and 1,000 words to philosophicalbioethics@gmail.com by 11:59 pm Eastern Time on Wednesday, January 31, 2024. Abstracts should be formatted for blind review, and papers should be suitable for presentation in 30-35 minutes. Email notifications of acceptance will be sent out by Friday, February 16, 2024.
When submitting your abstract, please also indicate whether you would be interested in serving as a commentator-chair in the event that your abstract is not selected for presentation. We will be inviting five additional participants to serve as commentator-chairs.
This year’s Philosophical Bioethics Workshop is organized by S. Matthew Liao, Daniel Fogal, Claudia Passos-Ferreira, Dan Khokar, and Jonathan Knutzen of the NYU Center for Bioethics.
The Rutgers Epistemology Conference is a pre-read conference. The papers, the finalized schedule, and further information about the conference will be posted soon.
Registration
There is no registration fee for the conference, but please notify Caroline von Klemperer, the conference manager, if you plan to attend by sending an email to rutgersepistemologyconference@gmail.com. If you wish to participate in the meals, please send a check made out to “Rutgers University” to Caroline von Klemperer by April 15 ($80 if you are a faculty member or a postdoc; $60 if you are a graduate student or an undergraduate). Checks should be sent to Caroline von Klemperer; Rutgers Epistemology Conference; 106 Somerset St, 5th Floor; New Brunswick, NJ 08901. Everyone signed up for conference meals by April 15 will be listed as a participant on the conference website.
https://philevents.org/event/show/112086
Where to stay
All sessions will be held at the Hyatt Regency in New Brunswick, NJ. A limited number of reduced-priced rooms are available to those attending the conference. The reduced rate is $170 per night for a single or double room. You can reserve a room here: https://www.hyatt.com/en-US/group-booking/EWRRN/G-RE01.
If you are a graduate student or a postdoc and would like to attend the conference and stay with a Rutgers graduate student, please contact the conference manager at rutgersepistemologyconference@gmail.com. We will try to provide all graduate students and postdocs a place to stay, but we cannot make any promises.
Accessibility
Information about accessibility of the conference venue can be found here.
How to get there
Plane & Train: If you are flying, it is best to fly into Newark Airport. It is about 25 miles from the Hyatt Regency in New Brunswick. The best way to get from the airport to New Brunswick is via NJ Transit. The train stops at the airport and it is a 25 min train ride from the airport to New Brunswick. When you arrive at Newark Airport, follow the signs to the monorail “airtrain”. The airtrain will take you to the NJ transit train stop. Trains run from Newark Airport to New Brunswick about every half hour. A oneway ticket Newark Airport – New Brunswick is about $14. You can buy tickets at the vending machines at the Newark Airport train station or on the mobile app MyTix. The Hyatt is a 5 min walk from the New Brunswick train station.
Train: The best way to get to New Brunswick from New York or Philadelphia is via NJ Transit. The Hyatt is a 5 min walk from the New Brunswick train station.
Speakers
Commentators
CANCELLED – RESCHEDULED FOR NEXT SEMESTER
ABSTRACT: Spurred partly by recent attempts to ethically assess various negative effects of the attention economy, philosophers have begun to pay more attention to the role that attention plays in our ethical lives. This has included some more general discussion of the ethics of attention. In this talk, I add to this recent discussion by outlining a proposal for a comprehensive ethics of attention. On my proposal, an ethics of attention includes norms that stem from the role that attention plays in the formation of our character, in constituting our relationships and social roles, and in our other ethical decision making and behavior. Because of attention’s nature as a finite resource, and because our various roles and relationships involve interpersonal expectations for how others allocate their attention, an ethics of attention should provide norms that govern how we collectively allocate our attention among these morally important purposes. Because these morally important purposes are all competing for our attention, one goal of an ethics of attention should be to find practices that help to synergize how people meet these demands. I call such a set of practices a “social-attentional scheme”, and propose that the ultimate goal of an ethics of attention is to find an optimal social-attentional scheme. I conclude by discussing the various ways in which we can understand early Confucian ethics as providing us with one such social-attentional scheme, and propose some lessons we can take from this Confucian example as we try to continue developing a contemporary ethics of attention.
With responses from Elizabeth Edenberg (CUNY Baruch)
Presented by THE COLUMBIA SOCIETY FOR COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY
NOTE ON ENTRY FOR NON-COLUMBIA GUESTS: The door to Philosophy Hall will only open with a Columbia University ID card. If you do not have this card please arrive early where someone will be standing outside until the meeting begins. If you arrive late, you can ask someone walking nearby to let you in or contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu. Please only contact Cole as a final resource so as not to interrupt the talk.
RSVP IS REQUIRED FOR DINNER:. Dinner will take place at a nearby restaurant. Please contact Cole at cf2798@columbia.edu for further information. RSVPs are limited.