A distinguished tradition in philosophy holds that historical and aesthetic understanding are distinctive in being individualizing. While science seeks to grasp phenomena by bringing them under general concepts and laws, the historian and the appreciative spectator seek to make sense of their objects of study in all their individuality. This project will investigate the idea of individualizing understanding, and how far it characterizes aesthetic and historical practice. It will attempt to articulate various options for what individualizing understanding might be. It will do so by considering the aesthetic case, and then ask how far the historical case fits those options. Although it is not likely that historical understanding, in particular, can be understood solely in these terms, this project’s working hypothesis is that some important strands in historical inquiry, and perhaps the central aspects of aesthetic interrogation, are usefully conceived in these ways. Click here for a more detailed description.
The project will feature three workshops and a final conference hosted at New York University and the University of Sheffield. Participants will include philosophers of art and history, archaeologists, and historians, including historians of both philosophy and of history itself. For more information about individual events, please use the links to the left.
Speakers:
Gabrielle Starr (NYU) and Alva Noe (UC Berkeley)
Casa Italiana, 24 W 12th St
Conceptions of unstructured content take contents to be sets of possibilities, or circumstances, or conditions (or functions from such things to truth values). In recent years, a great variety of new conceptions of unstructured content have been developed and applied, often with great formal ingenuity. Debates on relativism and context-sensitivity more generally, on expressivism, de se attitudes, counterfactual attitudes, vagueness, truthmaker semantics, and many more bear witness to these developments. At the same time, not as much attention has been paid to the philosophical foundations of unstructured conceptions.
In sharp contrast, proponents of structured propositions have recently spent a great amount of their time developing and clarifying the foundations of their conceptions in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. This conference encourages new reflexion on the foundations of unstructured conceptions of content, the availability of existing foundational stories to new technical conceptions, the competitiveness of unstructured conceptions vis-a-vis structured conceptions as well as the relationship between the two conceptions. It also aims to establish renewed dialogue between, on the one hand, proponents of structured conceptions and of unstructured conceptions and, on the other hand, between proponents of the various conceptions and applications of unstructured content.
Speakers:
In addition to invited talks, there will be a CFA for 2-4 further talks.
(Non-exhaustive) list of topics:
- Foundations in philosophy of mind of conceptions of unstructured content
- Kinds of unstructured content \& the nature of representation
- Philosophical and / vs formal motivations for unstructured content
- What are the relationships between structured and unstructured conceptions of content? Competition? Complementation?
- Promiscuity on permissible sets of n-tuples: anything goes? (worlds-hyperplans, worlds-languages, worlds-standards of taste, …)
- What is it that gets characterised, or modelled, by a set of possibilities, or circumstances, or conditions?
- What are outstanding problems of fineness of grain?
- What progress has been made on the the problems of deduction / logical omniscience as they arise for unstructured content?
- The role of (unstructured) content in semantic theory
- Truthmaker semantics
- Notions of hyperintensionality with unstructured content
- Mental fragmentation/compartmentalisation
- Metaphysical foundations of unstructured content
- Possible worlds/points in the possibility-space: primitive or construed (e.g. out of structured things/sentences)?
Organisers: Andy Egan (Rutgers), Dirk Kindermann (University of Graz)
Please direct all queries to dirk.kindermann@uni-graz.at. If you’d like to attend the event, please informally register at dirk.kindermann@uni-graz.at.
Does art have anything interesting to do with pleasure? The aesthetic hedonist answers positively, claiming that the value of artworks qua artworks lie in their power to please those who are properly engaged with them. Recent critics of hedonism answer the question in the negative, arguing that the power to please cannot properly explain the value of artworks. In this paper, I point to a blind spot in the dialectic between the hedonic orthodoxy and its recent critics: though the hedonist is wrong to claim that artworks are valuable because they are endowed with the power to please, the contemporary critic of hedonism mistakenly disconnects art from pleasure. The bulk of the paper consists in a challenge to the two assumptions that underlie this dialectic: (1) the assumption that pleasure is merely subjective and so incapable of disclosing the value of its object, and (2) the assumption that pleasure can be connected to art only hedonically, as the answer to the question “what makes artworks valuable?” By undermining these assumptions, I carve out space for a neglected alternative between aesthetic hedonism and its non-affective denial: this is the view that, though pleasure does not constitute the value of artworks, it does constitute proper aesthetic evaluation. On this neglected alternative, pleasure is connected to artworks insofar as it is the proper response merited by their value, value that the pleasure discloses. It is the value of artworks that gives us reasons to feel pleasure rather than the feeling of pleasure that gives us reasons to attribute value to them.
Reception to follow in 6th floor lounge.
In split-brain patients, the cerebral hemispheres have been separated by severing the corpus collosum. These patients sometimes behave as if they have one mind and sometimes as if they have two. Do these patients have a single consciousness that is in some respects fragmented? Or does each hemisphere support a distinct experiencing subject with a separate mind?
Joseph LeDoux (Center for Neural Science, NYU)
Yaïr Pinto (Psychology, University of Amsterdam)
Elizabeth Schechter (Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis)
Elizabeth Schechter, author of the recent book Self-consciousness and ‘Split-brains’: The Mind’s I, will argue for the two-minds view. Yair Pinto, author of the recent article “The Split Brain Phenomenon Revisited: A Single Conscious Agent with Split Perception”, will argue for the one-mind view. Joseph Ledoux, author of the 1977 article “A Divided Mind: Observations on the Conscious Properties of the Separated Hemispheres”, will argue for an intermediate position.
Over the course of his 49 year career (48 years of which were spent at Rutgers), Peter established himself as a giant in the field of aesthetics, especially in the philosophy of music. Sadly, Peter passed away in 2017. To honor his memory, the Rutgers Philosophy Department is hosting a one-day conference on October 26, 2018, celebrating his life’s philosophical work.
The Conference will include talks by Christy Mag Uidhir (Houston), Jenefer Robinson (Cincinnati), Jerrold Levinson (Maryland), and David Davies (McGill). In addition, Aaron Meskin (Leeds) will introduce and read Peter Kivy’s unpublished ‘The Case of (Digital) Wagner.’ Finally, there will be a time set aside for remembrances from Peter’s friends and colleagues.
All are welcome to attend the conference. There is no registration fee; however, attendees are encouraged to pre-register (so that we have an accurate headcount for the lunch and reception). To pre-register, please email us at kivymemorial@philosophy.rutgers.edu
Conference Information
October 26, 2018
9:30 am – 5:00 pm – Conference
5:00 am – 6:15 pm – Reception
The conference and reception will take place at the Teleconference Room on the 4th Floor of Alexander Library (169 College Avenue, New Brunswick, NJ). In addition to the reception at the close of the conference, a catered lunch will be served.
The exact conference schedule will be posted soon.
Questions can be directed to kivymemorial@philosophy.rutgers.edu