A distinguished tradition in philosophy holds that historical and aesthetic understanding are distinctive in being individualizing. While science seeks to grasp phenomena by bringing them under general concepts and laws, the historian and the appreciative spectator seek to make sense of their objects of study in all their individuality. This project will investigate the idea of individualizing understanding, and how far it characterizes aesthetic and historical practice. It will attempt to articulate various options for what individualizing understanding might be. It will do so by considering the aesthetic case, and then ask how far the historical case fits those options. Although it is not likely that historical understanding, in particular, can be understood solely in these terms, this project’s working hypothesis is that some important strands in historical inquiry, and perhaps the central aspects of aesthetic interrogation, are usefully conceived in these ways. Click here for a more detailed description.
The project will feature three workshops and a final conference hosted at New York University and the University of Sheffield. Participants will include philosophers of art and history, archaeologists, and historians, including historians of both philosophy and of history itself. For more information about individual events, please use the links to the left.
Speakers:
Gabrielle Starr (NYU) and Alva Noe (UC Berkeley)
Casa Italiana, 24 W 12th St
Even though ancient philosophy and rhetoric have many overlapping interests (education, persuasion, politics, etc.), their relationship has long been a contentious subject, especially among ancient philosophers. Contemporary scholarship on the topic is equally divided: philosophers tend to approach the topic primarily through the works of Plato and Aristotle and regard rhetoric (and rhetorical compositions) as a second-rate notion/discipline which has little interest in shedding light on philosophically relevant questions about human nature and society, whereas classicists research oratorical compositions to get a better understanding of Greek prose style, historical details and context, but often shy away from philosophical questions that the texts might hint at. This workshop aims to bring together scholars working on ancient rhetoric and argumentative techniques on the one hand, and scholars working on ancient philosophy, on the other in order to open up a space for a constructive engagement with philosophy/rhetoric, one which might enrich our understanding of ancient texts as well as the context in which they were produced.
Confirmed speakers: Jamie Dow (Leeds), Richard Hunter (Cambridge), Joel Mann (St Norbert), Jessica Moss (NYU), Usha Nathan (Columbia), James Porter (Berkeley), Edward Schiappa (MIT), Nancy Worman (Barnard). All papers will be followed by a response and general discussion.
Attending the workshop is free, but in order to have an idea of numbers it would be greatly appreciated if those interested in participating in the event would email the organizers, Laura Viidebaum and Toomas Lott.
This Workshop is generously sponsored by the Department of Philosophy (NYU), Department of Classics (NYU) and NYU Center for Ancient Studies.
The full program can be viewed here.
The workshop will bring together philosophers working in ancient epistemology with those working in contemporary epistemology to discuss issues relevant to the debates in both fields.
It was assumed until recently that the distinction between doxa and epistêmê, key players in ancient epistemology, maps directly onto the contemporary distinction between knowledge and belief. Recent interpreters of Plato and Aristotle have challenged this assumption. Some argue that epistêmê is closer to understanding than to knowledge because (for example) it requires explanation rather than justification, cannot be transmitted by testimony, is hard to come by, and can only be had of a restricted range of objects. Others argue that doxa is narrower than belief, perhaps closer to opinion, because (for example) doxa is excluded by epistêmê while belief is entailed by knowledge, doxa is imprecise and unclear while these are not essential features of belief, and doxa too has a restricted range of objects.
Contemporary epistemology tackles issues that are related to the debates above. Is knowledge to be distinguished from understanding and if so, which one should be seen as the proper goal of inquiry? Does understanding have value over and above the value of knowledge? Much like Plato and Aristotle, epistemologists aim to elucidate the conceptual relations between knowledge, understanding, justification, explanation, epistemic authority, and testimony. In addition, contemporary epistemologists sometimes produce fictional genealogies of epistemic concepts to arrive at an improved understanding of our epistemic practices. If epistêmê and doxa are distinct from knowledge and belief in a way indicated above, then it seems appropriate to raise the question whether the actual history of epistemic concepts can help to improve these fictional genealogies.
The presentations are followed by a response and a general discussion.Papers by speakers who specialize in Ancient epistemology will be assigned to commentators who specialize in contemporary epistemology and vice versa.
Presenters: Gail Fine (Cornell), Richard Foley (NYU), Jane Friedman (NYU), Allison Hills (Oxford), Robert Pasnau (Colorado), Whitney Schwab (Baltimore/NYU), Katja Vogt (Columbia), Ralph Wedgwood (USC).
Respondents: John Bengson (Harvard), Hugh Benson (Oklahoma), Paul Boghossian (NYU), Toomas Lott (NYU/Tartu), Jessica Moss (NYU), James Pryor (NYU), Michael Strevens (NYU).
Organisers:
September 7, 2017, 7:00pm EST
email tl1972 at nyu
Does art have anything interesting to do with pleasure? The aesthetic hedonist answers positively, claiming that the value of artworks qua artworks lie in their power to please those who are properly engaged with them. Recent critics of hedonism answer the question in the negative, arguing that the power to please cannot properly explain the value of artworks. In this paper, I point to a blind spot in the dialectic between the hedonic orthodoxy and its recent critics: though the hedonist is wrong to claim that artworks are valuable because they are endowed with the power to please, the contemporary critic of hedonism mistakenly disconnects art from pleasure. The bulk of the paper consists in a challenge to the two assumptions that underlie this dialectic: (1) the assumption that pleasure is merely subjective and so incapable of disclosing the value of its object, and (2) the assumption that pleasure can be connected to art only hedonically, as the answer to the question “what makes artworks valuable?” By undermining these assumptions, I carve out space for a neglected alternative between aesthetic hedonism and its non-affective denial: this is the view that, though pleasure does not constitute the value of artworks, it does constitute proper aesthetic evaluation. On this neglected alternative, pleasure is connected to artworks insofar as it is the proper response merited by their value, value that the pleasure discloses. It is the value of artworks that gives us reasons to feel pleasure rather than the feeling of pleasure that gives us reasons to attribute value to them.
Reception to follow in 6th floor lounge.
In split-brain patients, the cerebral hemispheres have been separated by severing the corpus collosum. These patients sometimes behave as if they have one mind and sometimes as if they have two. Do these patients have a single consciousness that is in some respects fragmented? Or does each hemisphere support a distinct experiencing subject with a separate mind?
Joseph LeDoux (Center for Neural Science, NYU)
Yaïr Pinto (Psychology, University of Amsterdam)
Elizabeth Schechter (Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis)
Elizabeth Schechter, author of the recent book Self-consciousness and ‘Split-brains’: The Mind’s I, will argue for the two-minds view. Yair Pinto, author of the recent article “The Split Brain Phenomenon Revisited: A Single Conscious Agent with Split Perception”, will argue for the one-mind view. Joseph Ledoux, author of the 1977 article “A Divided Mind: Observations on the Conscious Properties of the Separated Hemispheres”, will argue for an intermediate position.