Calendar

September 26 – Matthias Fritsch (Concordia), “Deconstructive Normativity”
October 10 – TBA
November 7 – Dimitris Vardoulakis (Western Sydney)

February 13 – Candice Delmas (Northeastern)
March 13 – Robert Gooding-Williams (Columbia)
April 17 – Serene Khader (Brooklyn College/CUNY Grad Center)

Meetings are held on Tuesdays at Fordham’s Lincoln Center campus in Manhattan in the Plaza View Room, 12th Floor, Lowenstein Building (113 W. 60th St). We meet from 5:30 to 6:45 and papers are read in advance. If interested in attending, contact sahaddad@fordham.edu or jeflynn@fordham.edu.
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Embodied cognition theorists emphasize the role of the body and the environment in constituting mental processes. By examining how our brains interact with the rest of our bodies and how our entire bodies interact with the environment, we can learn much about human behavior and the human mind. Tools can be understood as extensions of the body, and in some cases as becoming part of the body. Does our mind extend to our tools? How does this change our world? How should we understand this relationship? In order to help us think through these fascinating questions, we will hear from an archaeologist who has theorized about the evolution of this human capacity, a biomedical engineer who uses computers to make robotic prostheses more fluidly extend human bodies, and a music theorist who shows how musical instruments become part of our bodies.

This event is free and open to the public, however, registration is required via Eventbrite.

Speakers:

— Lambros Malafouris (Johnson Research and Teaching Fellow in Creativity, Cognition and Material Culture; University of Oxford)
— Sunil Agrawal (Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Rehabilitation/Regenerative Medicine; Columbia University)
— Jonathan De Souza (Assistant Professor of Music Theory; University of Western Ontario)

Respondent:

— Lan Li (Presidential Scholar in Society and Neuroscience, Center for Science & Society)

This event is co-sponsored by the Center for Science and Society and the Society of Fellows and Heyman Center for the Humanities.

A standard way to challenge convergence-based accounts of inductive success is to claim that they are too weak to constrain inductive inferences in the short run. We respond to such a challenge by answering some questions raised by Juhl (1994). When it comes to predicting limiting relative frequencies in the framework of Reichenbach, we show that speed-optimal convergence—a long-run success condition—induces dynamic coherence in the short run. This is joint work with Eric Wofsey.

Michael Nielsen (Columbia University).
4:10 pm, Friday, November 16th, 2018
Faculty House, Columbia University

What does it mean that an event C “actually caused” event E? The problem of defining actual causation goes beyond mere philosophical speculation.  For example, in many legal arguments, it is precisely what needs to be established in order to determine responsibility.   (What exactly was the actual cause of the car accident or the medical problem?) The philosophy literature has been struggling with the problem of defining causality since the days of Hume, in the 1700s. Many of the definitions have been couched in terms of counterfactuals. (C is a cause of E if, had C not happened, then E would not have happened.) In 2001, Judea Pearl and I introduced a new definition of actual cause, using Pearl’s notion of structural equations to model counterfactuals.  The definition has been revised twice since then, extended to deal with notions like “responsibility” and “blame”, and applied in databases and program verification.  I survey the last 15 years of work here, including joint work with Judea Pearl, Hana Chockler, and Chris Hitchcock. The talk will be completely self-contained.

The seminar is concerned with applying formal methods to fundamental issues, with an emphasis on probabilistic reasoning, decision theory and games. In this context “logic” is broadly interpreted as covering applications that involve formal representations. The topics of interest have been researched within a very broad spectrum of different disciplines, including philosophy (logic and epistemology), statistics, economics, and computer science. The seminar is intended to bring together scholars from different fields of research so as to illuminate problems of common interest from different perspectives. Throughout each academic year, meetings are regularly presented by the members of the seminar and distinguished guest speakers.

details tba

02/08/2019 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM

03/22/2019 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM

04/19/2018 Faculty House, Columbia University
4:00 PM

There are two approaches to life. The first one, which we are identifying with Sir Karl Popper, is to think before we act and to let our hypotheses die in our stead when the overall outcome is likely to be negative. We act now for a better future, and we think now which action will bring the best future. Both decision theory and backward induction are technical versions of this train of thought.  The second approach, which we will identify with the Buddha, is to live in the present and not allow the future to pull us away from living in the ever present  Now. The Buddha’s approach is echoed in many others who came after him, Jelaluddin Rumi, Kahlil Gibran, and even perhaps Jesus.  It occurs in many contemporary teachers like Eckhart Tolle and Thich Nhat Hanh.  We may call Popper’s approach “futurism” and the Buddha’s approach “presentism.”

In this talk, we will discuss various aspects of the discourse on presentism and futurism. The purpose is to contrast one with the other. We will not attempt to side with one against the other, and instead leave it as a future project to find a prescriptive action-guiding choice between the two. We merely conjecture that a better optimal choice between these two positions may be somewhere in between. (This is joint work with Jongjin Kim.)