PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
“What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”
If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness.
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
“What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”
If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness.
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
“What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”
If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness.
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
Babette Babich (Fordham University)
Nietzsche on “the Triumph of Scientific Method over Science”
Flom Auditorium
Walsh Family Library
Rose Hill Campus
Many cognitive processes rely on the preservation of contents across mental transitions or processes. Inference, for example, is a certain sort of content preserving mental transition from premises to conclusions. Content preservation is also important in communicating the contents of perception for further processing and for the influence of desires and belief on action. But what is content preservation? …
Embodied cognition theorists emphasize the role of the body and the environment in constituting mental processes. By examining how our brains interact with the rest of our bodies and how our entire bodies interact with the environment, we can learn much about human behavior and the human mind. Tools can be understood as extensions of the body, and in some cases as becoming part of the body. Does our mind extend to our tools? How does this change our world? How should we understand this relationship? In order to help us think through these fascinating questions, we will hear from an archaeologist who has theorized about the evolution of this human capacity, a biomedical engineer who uses computers to make robotic prostheses more fluidly extend human bodies, and a music theorist who shows how musical instruments become part of our bodies.
This event is free and open to the public, however, registration is required via Eventbrite.
Speakers:
— Lambros Malafouris (Johnson Research and Teaching Fellow in Creativity, Cognition and Material Culture; University of Oxford)
— Sunil Agrawal (Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Rehabilitation/Regenerative Medicine; Columbia University)
— Jonathan De Souza (Assistant Professor of Music Theory; University of Western Ontario)
Respondent:
— Lan Li (Presidential Scholar in Society and Neuroscience, Center for Science & Society)
This event is co-sponsored by the Center for Science and Society and the Society of Fellows and Heyman Center for the Humanities.
What we are hoping for is a free, open, wide-ranging and informal conversation about a number of topics that people have lately been thinking more and more about – and that seem likely to play increasingly central roles, over the next several years, in the foundations of physics. These include questions of the emergence/fundamentality of space and time, the philosophical analysis and scientific role of chance, the relationship between physics and agency, and the possibility, desirability and scientific appropriateness of a complete and fundamental theory of nature.
Location: Pupin Hall Theory Center (8th floor), Columbia University.
Directions: Pupin Hall is located at the northwest end of the campus, in between the Northwest Corner building and Schapiro (south side of 120th Street). The Center for Theoretical Physics is located on the left once you arrive on the 8th floor in Pupin Hall.
RSVP: Please send an email to sr3109@columbia.edu if you would like to attend.
Workshop schedule:
Friday October 26, First Session: “Questions of chance”
– 10:00 – 11.15: Lay-of-the-land talk by Barry Loewer (Rutgers): “The metaphysics of laws and chance in physics”
– 11.15 – 11.30: Break
– 11.30 – 1:00: Panel with Jeff Barrett (UCI), Sean Carroll (Caltech), Mario Hubert (Columbia) and Charles Sebens (UCSD)
– 1:00 – 1:30: General Discussion
– 1:30 – 3:00: Lunch in Columbia area
Friday October 26, Second Session: “Physics and agency”
– 3:00- 4:15: Lay-of-the-land talk by Jenann Ismael (Columbia): “Physics and agency: the missing piece of the puzzle”
– 4:15 – 4:30: Break
– 4:30 – 6:00: Panel with David Albert (Columbia), Thomas Blanchard (IWU), Alison Fernandes (Trinity College Dublin) and Michael Strevens (NYU).
– 6:00 – 6:30: General Discussion
– 7:00: Conference Dinner
Saturday October 27, First Session: “The future of space and time”
– 10:00 – 11.15: Lay-of-the-land talk by Carlo Rovelli (Aix-Marseille): “Do we all mean the same, when we say ‘space’ and ‘time’?”
– 11.15 – 11.30: Break
– 11.30 – 1:00: Panel with Gordon Belot (Michigan), Sean Carroll (Caltech), Nick Huggett (UIC) and Jill North (Rutgers)
– 1:00 – 1:30: General Discussion
– 1:30 – 3:00: Lunch in Columbia area
Saturday October 27, Second Session: “Fundamentality and the ultimate aspirations of physics”
– 3:00- 4:15: Lay-of-the-land talk by Kerry McKenzie (UCSD): “Delusions of a final theory: the problem of progress in physics and metaphysics”
– 4:15 – 4:30: Break
– 4:30 – 6:00: Panel with David Albert (Columbia), Michael Miller (Toronto), Rachel Rosen (Columbia) and Porter Williams (USC)
– 6:00 – 6:30: General Discussion
Sponsor: The event is jointly organized by the Department of Philosophy and the Department of Physics at Columbia University, in association with the MA programme in the Philosophical Foundations of Physics. We would like in particular to acknowledge the generous and invaluable support both to the MA programme and to the workshop from Guerman Aliev.
I argue that we do not understand gauge theory as well as we think we do, when boundaries are present. I will briefly explain the conceptual and technical issues that arise at the boundary. I will then propose a tentative resolution, which requires us to think of theories not in space-time, but in field-space.
Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989) is well-known for his “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) in which he criticizes empiricist theories of knowledge acquisition. Empiricism, he argues there, relies on what he calls “the Myth of the Given.” The Myth of the Given is often understood as a dilemma for epistemological foundationalism. However, Sellars also remarks that not even Kant and Hegel (“that great foe of immediacy” EPM §1) were entirely free of “the entire framework of givenness”). This suggests that the Myth of the Given is not limited to the epistemological foundationalism of pre-critical dogmatic metaphysics. I shall argue (following James O’Shea) that the Myth of the Given is primarily a problem about how we should account for our cognitive awareness of the categorial structure of experience. I shall then argue that Sellars should be interpreted as arguing for a non-semantic mind-world relation, which he calls “picturing”, to explain how the Myth of the Given should be overcome.
By doing so Sellars shows how to avoid both the Given and idealism, thus overcoming a long-standing opposition within the history of philosophy since Kant. This argument is also relevant for the divide between “left-wing Sellarsians” (Rorty, McDowell, Brandom, Williams) and “right-wing Sellarsians” (Churchland, Dennett, Millikan); the left-wing Sellarsians developed the criticism of the Myth of the Given and the right-wing Sellarsians developed picturing into an account of animal cognition. On my interpretation, this divide itself is unfortunate because it leads us to overlook a fundamental coherence to Sellars’s views.
What do the worlds of global finance and nationalist populism have in common? How can we understand the rise of today’s ‘new fascisms’ through the prism of financialization? This one-day workshop brings together scholars from across disciplines to debate these key questions for our understanding of contemporary capitalism. The workshop is part of Public Seminar’s Imaginal Politics initiative and is organised jointly with the Department of Social Science, University College London. The workshop will include three panel discussions and will close with a talk by Judith Butler on ‘Anti-gender ideology and the new fascism’.
10-11.45am – Panel 1 (Wolff Conference Room, D1103)
12.-1.30pm -Panel 2 (Wolff Conference Room, D1103)
Chiara Bottici ( The New School)
4.30-6pm – Closing plenary & discussion (UL104, University Center)
‘The New Fascism of the Anti-Gender Ideology Movement’