May
25
Fri
Philosophy of Psychology Workshop @ Columbia University Philosophy Dept. 716
May 25 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm

PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.

Summer Program:

Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

 “What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”

If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness. 

Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)

 Room TBA

Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)

 Room TBA

Philosophy of Psychology Workshop – Stephan Pohl @ Columbia University Philosophy Dept. 716
May 25 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm

In perception, the world is represented by me. So goes a very naive thesis about perception. Yet when faced with phenomena of hallucination and illusion many theorists come to accept that in perception one merely represents a possible world that can more or less accurately match the actual world. Recently, a much more radical thesis arose: Perception is probabilistic. This would mean that in perception one does not simply represent one possible world, but one represents multiple possible worlds at the same time each to a certain degree. Should we come to accept this preposterous claim? I argue for the conservative position that perception is not probabilistic. We do find sub-personal probabilistic representations in certain neural populations of the perceptual apparatus. Yet, contrary to what has been suggested elsewhere, for instance the role perception plays in justifying beliefs merely requires a degreed notion which is not of probabilistic structure. And, most importantly, our phenomenology does not involve conflicting alternative hypothesis with certain degrees.

PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.

Summer Program:

Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)

 Room TBA

Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)

 Room TBA

Jul
13
Fri
Philosophy of Psychology Workshop @ Columbia University Philosophy Dept. 716
Jul 13 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm

PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.

Summer Program:

Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

 “What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”

If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness. 

Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)

 Room TBA

Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)

 Room TBA

Aug
3
Fri
Philosophy of Psychology Workshop @ Columbia University Philosophy Dept. 716
Aug 3 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm

PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.

Summer Program:

Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

 “What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”

If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness. 

Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)

 Room TBA

Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)

 Room TBA

Aug
24
Fri
Philosophy of Psychology Workshop @ Columbia University Philosophy Dept. 716
Aug 24 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm

PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.

Summer Program:

Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

 “What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”

If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness. 

Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)

 Room TBA

Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)

 Room TBA

Aug
31
Fri
Philosophy of Psychology Workshop @ Columbia University Philosophy Dept. 716
Aug 31 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm

PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.

Summer Program:

Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

 “What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”

If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness. 

Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)

 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)

Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)

 Room TBA

Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)

 Room TBA

Sep
27
Thu
David Barack ‘Stream of Thought’ @ Columbia University Philosophy Dept. 716
Sep 27 @ 7:30 pm – 9:30 pm

Many cognitive processes rely on the preservation of contents across mental transitions or processes. Inference, for example, is a certain sort of content preserving mental transition from premises to conclusions. Content preservation is also important in communicating the contents of perception for further processing and for the influence of desires and belief on action. But what is content preservation? …

Oct
15
Mon
Embodied Cognition and Prosthetics: Are Our Tools Part of Our Bodies and Minds? @ Heyman Center Second Floor Common Room
Oct 15 @ 4:00 pm – 6:00 pm

Embodied cognition theorists emphasize the role of the body and the environment in constituting mental processes. By examining how our brains interact with the rest of our bodies and how our entire bodies interact with the environment, we can learn much about human behavior and the human mind. Tools can be understood as extensions of the body, and in some cases as becoming part of the body. Does our mind extend to our tools? How does this change our world? How should we understand this relationship? In order to help us think through these fascinating questions, we will hear from an archaeologist who has theorized about the evolution of this human capacity, a biomedical engineer who uses computers to make robotic prostheses more fluidly extend human bodies, and a music theorist who shows how musical instruments become part of our bodies.

This event is free and open to the public, however, registration is required via Eventbrite.

Speakers:

Lambros Malafouris (Johnson Research and Teaching Fellow in Creativity, Cognition and Material Culture; University of Oxford)
Sunil Agrawal (Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Rehabilitation/Regenerative Medicine; Columbia University)
Jonathan De Souza (Assistant Professor of Music Theory; University of Western Ontario)

Respondent:

Lan Li (Presidential Scholar in Society and Neuroscience, Center for Science & Society)

This event is co-sponsored by the Center for Science and Society and the Society of Fellows and Heyman Center for the Humanities.

Feb
14
Thu
Carl Sachs: “Avoiding Foundationalism And Idealism: How Sellarsian Picturing Overcomes the Myth of the Given” @ Wolff Conference Room, D1103
Feb 14 @ 6:00 pm – 8:00 pm

Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989) is well-known for his “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) in which he criticizes empiricist theories of knowledge acquisition. Empiricism, he argues there, relies on what he calls “the Myth of the Given.” The Myth of the Given is often understood as a dilemma for epistemological foundationalism. However, Sellars also remarks that not even Kant and Hegel (“that great foe of immediacy” EPM §1) were entirely free of “the entire framework of givenness”). This suggests that the Myth of the Given is not limited to the epistemological foundationalism of pre-critical dogmatic metaphysics. I shall argue (following James O’Shea) that the Myth of the Given is primarily a problem about how we should account for our cognitive awareness of the categorial structure of experience. I shall then argue that Sellars should be interpreted as arguing for a non-semantic mind-world relation, which he calls “picturing”, to explain how the Myth of the Given should be overcome.
By doing so Sellars shows how to avoid both the Given and idealism, thus overcoming a long-standing opposition within the history of philosophy since Kant. This argument is also relevant for the divide between “left-wing Sellarsians” (Rorty, McDowell, Brandom, Williams) and “right-wing Sellarsians” (Churchland, Dennett, Millikan); the left-wing Sellarsians developed the criticism of the Myth of the Given and the right-wing Sellarsians developed picturing into an account of animal cognition. On my interpretation, this divide itself is unfortunate because it leads us to overlook a fundamental coherence to Sellars’s views.

Feb
21
Thu
New Fascism Mass Psychology & Financialization @ Wolff Conference Room, NSSR, D1103/ UL104
Feb 21 @ 10:00 am – 1:30 pm

What do the worlds of global finance and nationalist populism have in common? How can we understand the rise of today’s ‘new fascisms’ through the prism of financialization? This one-day workshop brings together scholars from across disciplines to debate  these key questions for our understanding of contemporary capitalism. The workshop is part of Public Seminar’s Imaginal Politics initiative and is organised jointly with the Department of Social Science, University College London. The workshop will include three panel discussions and will close with a talk by Judith Butler on ‘Anti-gender ideology and the new fascism’.

Organised by Aris Komporozos-Athanasiou (University College London) and Chiara Bottici (The New School)

10-11.45am – Panel 1 (Wolff Conference Room, D1103)

Julia Ott (The New School)
Arjun Appadurai (NYU)
Saskia Sassen (Columbia)
Moderator:  Jeffrey Goldfarb

12.-1.30pm -Panel 2 (Wolff Conference Room, D1103)

Nancy Fraser (New School)
Aris Komporozos-Athanasiou (UCL)
Moderator: Rahel Jaeggi 
1.30 – 2.30pm -lunch-

2.30-4.15pm – Panel 3 (UL104, University Center)
Eli Zaretsky (The New School) 
Jamieson Webster (Psychoanalyst, DU)
Chiara Bottici ( The New School)
Moderator: Aris Komporozos-Athanasiou

4.30-6pm – Closing plenary & discussion (UL104, University Center)

Judith Butler (UC Berkeley)
‘The New Fascism of the Anti-Gender Ideology Movement’ 
Moderator: Cinzia Arruzza
Please note that this event takes place in two different locations. 
6 E 16 Street Room D1103 (Wolff) and 63 5 Ave Room UL104.