What constitutes evidence is rarely self-evident. We need theories to make sense of evidence—to transform patterns of physical occurrences into something meaningful, i.e., data. This relationship between theory and evidence is often at least partially opaque, particularly in a field like neuroscience that often aims to use physical evidence to characterize mental, and in some cases social, events. Neuroscience navigates this relationship by purporting to offer mechanistic descriptions of “how” mental processes operate. Yet, this inquiry relies on theoretical assumptions that are not fully tethered to data. Neuroscience can certainly generate predictions from theories that have practical implications and link them with mechanistic knowledge of the physical (e.g., anatomy and physiology). But changing the basis of our assumptions can change the kinds of questions we ask and how we interpret experimental findings. So, exactly what kind of knowledge does neuroscience offer? How independent is it from psychology? How do we navigate this potential divide, particularly in cases in which we would want to use neuroscience to characterize constructs that are heavily influenced by theoretical priors?
This event addresses this question from a range of perspectives in neurology, psychiatry, philosophy, and economics. We consider the relationship between theory and evidence by exploring how practitioners, theorists, and experimentalists negotiate the multiple dimensions of evidence in neuroscience.
Speakers:
Peter Bearman, Jonathan R. Cole Professor of the Social Sciences, Columbia University
Suzanne Goh, Co-Founder & Chief Medical Officer, Cortica
Moderator:
Aniruddha Das, Associate Professor of Neuroscience, Columbia University
More speakers to be confirmed soon.
Free and open to the public, but RSVP is required via Eventbrite. This event is part of the Seminars in Society and Neuroscience series.
as our understanding of the universe and its basic building blocks extends to shorter and shorter distances, experiments capable of probing these scales are becoming increasingly difficult to construct. Fundamental particle physics faces a potential crisis: an absence of data at the shortest possible scales. Yet remarkably, even in the absence of experimental data, the requirement of theoretical consistency puts stringent constraints on viable models of fundamental particles and their interactions. In this talk I’ll present some of these constraints and discuss their applications for cosmology, string theory and more.
There will be dinner after the talk. If you are interested, please send an email with “Dinner” in the heading to nyphilsci@gmail.com (please note that all are welcome, but only the speaker’s dinner will be covered). If you have any other questions, please email isaac.wilhelm@rutgers.edu.
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UPCOMING:
Abstract: conventional wisdom holds that since the advent of the first full theories of quantum mechanics in the mid-1920s, the Copenhagen interpretation has been the default interpretation of quantum mechanics, and has enjoyed the support of a majority of physicists ever since. This is not the case. While it is indeed true that a majority of physicists have long professed that they subscribe to the Copenhagen interpretation, the plain fact of the matter is that there is no single coherent position known as the Copenhagen interpretation, nor has there ever been one. Moreover, none of the positions that go by the name “Copenhagen interpretation” do a good job of solving the measurement problem, the central interpretive problem at the heart of quantum foundations. Nor do they evade the nonlocality that is dictated by Bell’s theorem. In this talk, I will give an overview of the history of the Copenhagen interpretation from 1926 to the present, explain its multiple inconsistencies and failures, and attempt an answer at a persistent puzzle: why does the Copenhagen interpretation remain popular among physicists despite its manifest flaws and the existence of multiple superior alternatives
About the speaker: Adam Becker is the author of What is Real? The Unfinished Quest for the Meaning of Quantum Physics. He has a PhD in physics from the University of Michigan and he is the recipient of an Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Book Grant. He is currently a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley’s Office for History of Science and Technology.
Abstract: TBD.
Abstract: TBD.
Abstract: My main aim is to make a remark about the relation between (i) dualities between theories, as `duality’ is understood in physics and (ii) equivalence of theories, as `equivalence’ is understood in logic and philosophy. The remark is that in physics, two theories can be dual, and accordingly get called `the same theory’, though we interpret them as disagreeing—so that they are certainly equivalent, as `equivalent’ is normally understood. So the remark is simple: but, I shall argue, worth stressing—since often neglected.
My argument for this is based on the account of duality by De Haro and myself: which is illustrated here with several examples, from both elementary physics and string theory. Thus I argue that in some examples, including in string theory, two dual theories disagree in their claims about the world.
I also spell out how this remark implies a limitation of proposals (both traditional and recent) to understand theoretical equivalence as either logical equivalence or a weakening of it.
Abstract: TBD.
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
“What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”
If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness.
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
In perception, the world is represented by me. So goes a very naive thesis about perception. Yet when faced with phenomena of hallucination and illusion many theorists come to accept that in perception one merely represents a possible world that can more or less accurately match the actual world. Recently, a much more radical thesis arose: Perception is probabilistic. This would mean that in perception one does not simply represent one possible world, but one represents multiple possible worlds at the same time each to a certain degree. Should we come to accept this preposterous claim? I argue for the conservative position that perception is not probabilistic. We do find sub-personal probabilistic representations in certain neural populations of the perceptual apparatus. Yet, contrary to what has been suggested elsewhere, for instance the role perception plays in justifying beliefs merely requires a degreed notion which is not of probabilistic structure. And, most importantly, our phenomenology does not involve conflicting alternative hypothesis with certain degrees.
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
“What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”
If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness.
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
“What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”
If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness.
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
“What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”
If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness.
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
“What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”
If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness.
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
What we are hoping for is a free, open, wide-ranging and informal conversation about a number of topics that people have lately been thinking more and more about – and that seem likely to play increasingly central roles, over the next several years, in the foundations of physics. These include questions of the emergence/fundamentality of space and time, the philosophical analysis and scientific role of chance, the relationship between physics and agency, and the possibility, desirability and scientific appropriateness of a complete and fundamental theory of nature.
Location: Pupin Hall Theory Center (8th floor), Columbia University.
Directions: Pupin Hall is located at the northwest end of the campus, in between the Northwest Corner building and Schapiro (south side of 120th Street). The Center for Theoretical Physics is located on the left once you arrive on the 8th floor in Pupin Hall.
RSVP: Please send an email to sr3109@columbia.edu if you would like to attend.
Workshop schedule:
Friday October 26, First Session: “Questions of chance”
– 10:00 – 11.15: Lay-of-the-land talk by Barry Loewer (Rutgers): “The metaphysics of laws and chance in physics”
– 11.15 – 11.30: Break
– 11.30 – 1:00: Panel with Jeff Barrett (UCI), Sean Carroll (Caltech), Mario Hubert (Columbia) and Charles Sebens (UCSD)
– 1:00 – 1:30: General Discussion
– 1:30 – 3:00: Lunch in Columbia area
Friday October 26, Second Session: “Physics and agency”
– 3:00- 4:15: Lay-of-the-land talk by Jenann Ismael (Columbia): “Physics and agency: the missing piece of the puzzle”
– 4:15 – 4:30: Break
– 4:30 – 6:00: Panel with David Albert (Columbia), Thomas Blanchard (IWU), Alison Fernandes (Trinity College Dublin) and Michael Strevens (NYU).
– 6:00 – 6:30: General Discussion
– 7:00: Conference Dinner
Saturday October 27, First Session: “The future of space and time”
– 10:00 – 11.15: Lay-of-the-land talk by Carlo Rovelli (Aix-Marseille): “Do we all mean the same, when we say ‘space’ and ‘time’?”
– 11.15 – 11.30: Break
– 11.30 – 1:00: Panel with Gordon Belot (Michigan), Sean Carroll (Caltech), Nick Huggett (UIC) and Jill North (Rutgers)
– 1:00 – 1:30: General Discussion
– 1:30 – 3:00: Lunch in Columbia area
Saturday October 27, Second Session: “Fundamentality and the ultimate aspirations of physics”
– 3:00- 4:15: Lay-of-the-land talk by Kerry McKenzie (UCSD): “Delusions of a final theory: the problem of progress in physics and metaphysics”
– 4:15 – 4:30: Break
– 4:30 – 6:00: Panel with David Albert (Columbia), Michael Miller (Toronto), Rachel Rosen (Columbia) and Porter Williams (USC)
– 6:00 – 6:30: General Discussion
Sponsor: The event is jointly organized by the Department of Philosophy and the Department of Physics at Columbia University, in association with the MA programme in the Philosophical Foundations of Physics. We would like in particular to acknowledge the generous and invaluable support both to the MA programme and to the workshop from Guerman Aliev.
I argue that we do not understand gauge theory as well as we think we do, when boundaries are present. I will briefly explain the conceptual and technical issues that arise at the boundary. I will then propose a tentative resolution, which requires us to think of theories not in space-time, but in field-space.