The brain is often compared to a computer. But the two are not as similar as one would think. Computers process information whereas the brain interrogates and explores. It seeks information from the environment with a purpose—to answer a question, solve a problem or make a decision. Neuroscience has made great advances in our understanding of how the brain makes decisions, why some are speedy and some are slower and more deliberative. Decisions matter for all animals. For humans, they hold the key to thought, ideation and creative expression. What was once the purview of psychology and philosophy is now a staple of biomedical science. And by elucidating the underlying neural mechanisms that make all this possible, Dr. Shadlen hopes to identify new strategies to confront the neurological and psychiatric disorders that impair cognitive function.
Dr. Shadlen argues that the brain follows simple rules to make both simple and complex decisions. To test this, he studies the brain’s parietal cortex, which helps the brain make sense of what we see in order to guide our behaviors. With implications for medicine, his research could shed light on why people with damage to the parietal cortex have trouble with various skills, such as understanding numbers. It could also lead to new ways to treat the effects of this damage.
Speaker: Michael N. Shadlen, MD, PhD, is a Professor of Neuroscience and Principal Investigator at Columbia’s Zuckerman Institute.
RSVP by Wednesday, January 31, 2018 Registration is required via EventBrite; Seating is first come, first served. This lecture will also be live streamed on February 7, 2018.
For more information about this event, please contact the Zuckerman Institute at zuckermaninstitute@columbia.edu
This talk is part of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Brain Insight Lecture series, offered free to the public to enhance understanding of the biology of the mind and the complexity of human behavior. The lectures are hosted by Columbia’s Mortimer B. Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute and supported by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation.
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
“What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”
If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness.
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
In perception, the world is represented by me. So goes a very naive thesis about perception. Yet when faced with phenomena of hallucination and illusion many theorists come to accept that in perception one merely represents a possible world that can more or less accurately match the actual world. Recently, a much more radical thesis arose: Perception is probabilistic. This would mean that in perception one does not simply represent one possible world, but one represents multiple possible worlds at the same time each to a certain degree. Should we come to accept this preposterous claim? I argue for the conservative position that perception is not probabilistic. We do find sub-personal probabilistic representations in certain neural populations of the perceptual apparatus. Yet, contrary to what has been suggested elsewhere, for instance the role perception plays in justifying beliefs merely requires a degreed notion which is not of probabilistic structure. And, most importantly, our phenomenology does not involve conflicting alternative hypothesis with certain degrees.
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
“What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”
If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness.
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
“What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”
If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness.
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
“What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”
If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness.
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
PoPRocks (formerly known as ‘WoPoP’) is an ongoing series in the NYC area for early career researchers – typically grad students and postdocs – working on philosophy of psychology/mind/perception/cognitive science/neuroscience/… . We usually meet roughly once every 2 weeks to informally discuss a draft paper by one of our members. Typically presenters send a copy of their paper around 1 week in advance, so do join the mailing list (by emailing poprocksworkshop@gmail.com or one of the organizers) or email to ask for a copy of the paper. We aim for a friendly, constructive discussion with the understanding that the drafts discussed are typically work in progress.
Summer Program:
Friday May 25th – Stephan Pohl (NYU)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday July 13th – Kate Pendoley (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
“What’s So Special About Cognitive Reappraisal? Problems with the empirical work on emotion regulation”
If you find that you are despondent over a minor rejection, or excessively guilty about making an inconsequential mistake, you might try to reduce the intensity of your emotion by ‘looking on the bright side’ and taking a different perspective on the situation at hand. The empirical literature calls this strategy of emotion regulation cognitive reappraisal, and it is the most studied form of emotion regulation. Cognitive reappraisal is also widely lauded in the empirical literature as the most effective strategy for regulating emotions, and enjoys a foundational role in cognitive behavioral therapy partially on this basis. However, my paper argues that the experimental design of most of these studies is ecologically invalid: Experimenters prompt and train subjects such that the subjects are not performing the kind of cognitive reappraisal that we use outside the laboratory. Hence these studies fail to illuminate the target phenomenon. Moreover, the empirical literature’s notion of effectiveness is overly narrow and fails to appreciate the important relationship between effectiveness, ecological validity, and healthiness in the domain of emotion regulation. In light of these concerns I suggest improvements to experimental design and propose a more nuanced notion of effectiveness.
Friday August 3rd – Nicolas Porot (CUNY)
716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia (Morningside Heights Campus)
Friday August 24th – Olivia Odoffin (Rutgers)
Room TBA
Friday August 31st – David Barack (Columbia)
Room TBA
Many cognitive processes rely on the preservation of contents across mental transitions or processes. Inference, for example, is a certain sort of content preserving mental transition from premises to conclusions. Content preservation is also important in communicating the contents of perception for further processing and for the influence of desires and belief on action. But what is content preservation? …
Embodied cognition theorists emphasize the role of the body and the environment in constituting mental processes. By examining how our brains interact with the rest of our bodies and how our entire bodies interact with the environment, we can learn much about human behavior and the human mind. Tools can be understood as extensions of the body, and in some cases as becoming part of the body. Does our mind extend to our tools? How does this change our world? How should we understand this relationship? In order to help us think through these fascinating questions, we will hear from an archaeologist who has theorized about the evolution of this human capacity, a biomedical engineer who uses computers to make robotic prostheses more fluidly extend human bodies, and a music theorist who shows how musical instruments become part of our bodies.
This event is free and open to the public, however, registration is required via Eventbrite.
Speakers:
— Lambros Malafouris (Johnson Research and Teaching Fellow in Creativity, Cognition and Material Culture; University of Oxford)
— Sunil Agrawal (Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Rehabilitation/Regenerative Medicine; Columbia University)
— Jonathan De Souza (Assistant Professor of Music Theory; University of Western Ontario)
Respondent:
— Lan Li (Presidential Scholar in Society and Neuroscience, Center for Science & Society)
This event is co-sponsored by the Center for Science and Society and the Society of Fellows and Heyman Center for the Humanities.
It is commonly claimed that mind-body dualism is entirely foreign to China—or “the East” more generally. This talk will explore how engaging with the cognitive sciences and digital humanities undermines claims such as this, and more broadly can help us to do our work as scholars of comparative philosophy. Embracing an embodied view of human cognition gets us beyond strong social constructivism and its accompanying cultural essentialism. In addition, new tools from the science and digital humanities can, in combination with traditional archaeological and textual evidence, allow us to more accurately and rigorously assess claims about the philosophical and religious historical record. Specifically, I will focus on novel large-scale textual analysis techniques, online databases for sharing scholarly knowledge, and work in contemporary evolutionary anthropology and cognitive science relevant to the mind-body issue. I will conclude by considering how early Chinese views of mind-body relations do, in fact, differ from some modern Western conceptions, and how taking a more reasonable view of cultural differences can allow us to genuinely learn from other cultures.
With a response from:
Paul Goldin (University of Pennsylvania)