The Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) Chapters of Columbia, The New School, Rutgers, CUNY, NYU, and Princeton invite submissions from graduate students and postdoctoral fellows from underrepresented groups for a workshop series (NY-MAPWorks) in spring 2018.
Dates: Jan 30th (NYU), Feb. 20th (New School), March 6th (CUNY), April 17th (Columbia), May 8th (NYU), 7-9:30pm.
Submission Guidelines:
To apply, please compete the following by December 15th, 2017:
- Send an extended abstract of 750-1,000 words (.pdf or .doc), prepared for blind review, suitable for a 25-30 minute presentation to a general philosophical audience to nymapshop@gmail.com.
- Provide your contact information by completing this google form.
Applications will only be accepted from individuals from groups underrepresented in academic philosophy.
Accepted participants will be notified by January 14th. For further details, see our philpapers posting at https://philevents.org/event/show/37294.
The Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) Chapters of Columbia, The New School, Rutgers, CUNY, NYU, and Princeton invite submissions from graduate students and postdoctoral fellows from underrepresented groups for a workshop series (NY-MAPWorks) in spring 2018.
Dates: Jan 30th (NYU), Feb. 20th (New School), March 6th (CUNY), April 17th (Columbia), May 8th (NYU), 7-9:30pm.
Submission Guidelines:
To apply, please compete the following by December 15th, 2017:
- Send an extended abstract of 750-1,000 words (.pdf or .doc), prepared for blind review, suitable for a 25-30 minute presentation to a general philosophical audience to nymapshop@gmail.com.
- Provide your contact information by completing this google form.
Applications will only be accepted from individuals from groups underrepresented in academic philosophy.
Accepted participants will be notified by January 14th. For further details, see our philpapers posting at https://philevents.org/event/show/37294.
The 21st Annual CUNY Graduate Philosophy Conference will take place on March 23rd, 2018 at the CUNY Graduate Center (365 5th Avenue). This year’s theme is “Self and Other”, broadly construed. The program below features Dr. Akeel Bilgrami (Columbia) and Dr. Daniel Kolak (William Paterson University) as keynote speakers. Eight graduate students from departments across the U.S. and abroad will give 30-minute talks spanning a broad array of philosophical research areas.
Click the links to download PDFs of the the conference flyer and schedule of talks.
Time / Title / Speaker / Affiliation
8:30-9 AM / BREAKFAST
9-9:30 AM / Embedded Love: What it Means for / Love to Structure Your Will / Hunter Gentry / University of Houston
9:30-10 AM / Animal Intimacy: Intra-Species connectivity and care in the Touch / Stephanie Mieko Struble / Western Connecticut State University
10-10:30 AM / BREAK
10:30-11AM / Foundations of Loyalty: Transcending Self and Other / Sara Pope / Fordham University
11-11:30 AM / Self as Other: On the Interpretation of Mirror Self-Recognition / Pengbo Liu / University of Massachusetts
11:30 AM -12:30 PM / LUNCH
12:30-1:30 PM / Keynote
Inquiry and Academic Freedom: Philosophical Reflections on Current Controversies on Campuses
Akeel Bilgrami
Columbia University
1:30-1:45 PM / BREAK
1:45-2:15 PM / Other Minds in Other Traditions: The Problem of Other Minds in Plantinga and Heidegger / Ben Koons / Oxford University, Oriel College
2:15-2:45 PM / The intrinsic epistemic value of primitive introspection / Anna Giustina / Institut Jean Nicod/Ecole Normale Supérieure/PSL Research University
2:45-3 PM / BREAK
3-3:30 PM / Who Do You Speak For? And How? The Management of Identities in Online Abuse / Michael Barnes / Georgetown University
3:30-4 PM / Hospitality and the Political Economy of Care / Lisa M. Madura / Vanderbilt University
4-4:30 PM / BREAK
4:30-5.30 PM / Keynote
Open Individualism: the Five Ways
Daniel Kolak
William Paterson University
5:30 PM / RECEPTION
Two CUNY Philosophy professors (Noël Carroll and Jesse Prinz) will present research alongside PhD student Zoe Cunliffe and alumna Laura Di Summa-Knoop in the upcoming Workshop on “Naturalized Aesthetics of Film”, taking place March 27th from 2-6pm in GC Room 5307. Additional presenters include Joerg Fingerhut (postdoc, Berlin School of Mind and Brain) and Murray Smith (University of Kent). The workshop celebrates Smith’s new monograph Film, Art, and the Third Culture, which defends an interdisciplinary approach to film studies.
See the poster below for additional details (including the workshop schedule).
Click here to download it as a PDF.
The metaphysics of implicit bias has been an area of heated debates involving philosophers and psychologists. Most theorists of implicit bias posit that associations underwrite implicit bias. Recent dissenters have argued that propositional attitudes undergird this pernicious attitude. However, the propositional attitude view of implicit bias does not satisfyingly explain its various manifestations that are underwritten by its diverse contents. In this paper my criticism targets: (1) legitimacy of ascriptions of unconscious mental content, and (2) the phenomenology of implicit bias. The first criticism focuses on a common assumption in philosophy of mind—the equivalence of content in the conscious and unconscious domain—and raises problems regarding the propositional attitude theorist’s strategy to ascribe propositional attitudes to explain implicit biases which they locate in the unconscious mind of the subject. Second, I argue that the similarities between a more familiar mental phenomenon—the phenomenon of moods—and the conscious manifestations of implicit bias have been ignored. I identify several parallels between moods and implicit bias: their context-dependence, the subject’s lack of awareness of their source, their effects on the salience and valence of their targets, and their simultaneous responsiveness and recalcitrance to reasons. I argue that an explanatorily robust view of implicit bias must be commensurate with this analogy. I end with a proposal that I dub the indeterminate content view, which avoids these problems and promises explanatory power.
We will also be giving an award to 2nd-place essay prize winner Elis Miller (Harvard) for her paper “Whether to Suspend Judgment”.
The Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) Chapters of Columbia, The New School, Rutgers, CUNY, NYU, and Princeton invite submissions from graduate students and postdoctoral fellows from underrepresented groups for a workshop series (NY-MAPWorks) in spring 2018.
Dates: Jan 30th (NYU), Feb. 20th (New School), March 6th (CUNY), April 17th (Columbia), May 8th (NYU), 7-9:30pm.
Submission Guidelines:
To apply, please compete the following by December 15th, 2017:
- Send an extended abstract of 750-1,000 words (.pdf or .doc), prepared for blind review, suitable for a 25-30 minute presentation to a general philosophical audience to nymapshop@gmail.com.
- Provide your contact information by completing this google form.
Applications will only be accepted from individuals from groups underrepresented in academic philosophy.
Accepted participants will be notified by January 14th. For further details, see our philpapers posting at https://philevents.org/event/show/37294.
This is a Call for Papers for the 8th Annual CUNY Undergraduate Philosophy Conference. Submissions from any area of philosophy are welcome, but the primary author must be an undergraduate. Papers should be no more than 10 pages in length and should be suitable for 15–20 minute presentations. Electronic submissions should be in Word or PDF format and should ready for blind review. In your submission email, please include your name, the title of your paper, your institutional affiliation, and your preferred email address for correspondence.
Please send your submissions to lagccphilosophy@gmail.com.
The Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) Chapters of Columbia, The New School, Rutgers, CUNY, NYU, and Princeton invite submissions from graduate students and postdoctoral fellows from underrepresented groups for a workshop series (NY-MAPWorks) in spring 2018.
Dates: Jan 30th (NYU), Feb. 20th (New School), March 6th (CUNY), April 17th (Columbia), May 8th (NYU), 7-9:30pm.
Submission Guidelines:
To apply, please compete the following by December 15th, 2017:
- Send an extended abstract of 750-1,000 words (.pdf or .doc), prepared for blind review, suitable for a 25-30 minute presentation to a general philosophical audience to nymapshop@gmail.com.
- Provide your contact information by completing this google form.
Applications will only be accepted from individuals from groups underrepresented in academic philosophy.
Accepted participants will be notified by January 14th. For further details, see our philpapers posting at https://philevents.org/event/show/37294.
One dimension of cognitive success is getting it right, i.e gaining knowledge of facts. Another dimension of cognitive success is using the right concept, i.e. framing a topic in the right way. This view, if correct, tasks inquirers with critically examining the concepts they are using and perhaps replacing those concepts with new and better ones. This task is often known as “conceptual engineering”.
The idea that conceptual engineering is an important task for inquirers in and outside philosophy has recently gained traction. Some philosophers think conceptual engineering is an important task for inquirers to pursue. The conference is focused on foundational issues in connection with conceptual engineering. Topics to be addressed include the following:
- What are the semantic mechanisms that underlie conceptual engineering?
- What are concepts, and which role (if any) do they play in conceptual engineering?
- How can a theory of conceptual engineering be integrated with large-scale semantic theories?
- Which precise changes does a language undergo when its speakers engineer concepts?
- Is conceptual engineering something that speakers can ever purposefully bring about?
- What is the relation between changing concepts and changing reality?
The planned conference will focus especially on the semantic foundations of conceptual engineering and push towards a better understanding of the process.
The conference is organized collaboratively by members of NYU (Vera Flocke and David Chalmers) and members of the research project ConceptLab, located at the University of Oslo (Herman Cappelen and Andrew Peet).
The conference is funded by the New York Institute of Philosophy and ConceptLab.
To attend, please register by following this link no later than August 31, 2018.
In split-brain patients, the cerebral hemispheres have been separated by severing the corpus collosum. These patients sometimes behave as if they have one mind and sometimes as if they have two. Do these patients have a single consciousness that is in some respects fragmented? Or does each hemisphere support a distinct experiencing subject with a separate mind?
Joseph LeDoux (Center for Neural Science, NYU)
Yaïr Pinto (Psychology, University of Amsterdam)
Elizabeth Schechter (Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis)
Elizabeth Schechter, author of the recent book Self-consciousness and ‘Split-brains’: The Mind’s I, will argue for the two-minds view. Yair Pinto, author of the recent article “The Split Brain Phenomenon Revisited: A Single Conscious Agent with Split Perception”, will argue for the one-mind view. Joseph Ledoux, author of the 1977 article “A Divided Mind: Observations on the Conscious Properties of the Separated Hemispheres”, will argue for an intermediate position.