Feb
12
Fri
Expression and Recognition – Daniel Putnam (Yale University) @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 202
Feb 12 @ 3:30 pm – 4:30 pm
The idea that people should stand in relationships of equal respect is almost a truism. But controversy begins the moment we try to specify what this means and what this requires. In this paper, I argue that a relatively modest assumption about respect for persons has some surprising implications for freedom of expression. If nothing else, respecting someone as a person requires recognizing her important interests as reasons for action in one’s practical deliberation. At least in a great many cases, the way we learn about other people’s interests is through their expression in behavior. So limitations on freedom of expression reduce a person’s opportunities to be recognized by others. And unequal freedom of expression generates unequal access to relationships of recognition. The link between expression and recognition reveals a category of limitations on freedom of expression that goes beyond the traditional First Amendment conception of a state-imposed restriction on people’s freedom to assert their beliefs. At the same time, it demonstrates by example that the relational view of equality does indeed have substantive normative implications.
Apr
25
Mon
SWIP-Analytic: 2016 Essay Prize Winner Presentation Arianna Falbo @ NYU Philosophy Department, rm 202
Apr 25 @ 1:00 pm – 3:00 pm

Arianna Falbo
Simon Fraser University
“Why Two (or more) Belief-Dependent Peers are Better Than One”

1:00-3:00 PM, Room 202
NYU Philosophy Department
5 Washington Place, NYC
Joint NYU Department Tea & SWIP-Analytic Reception to Follow

ABSTRACT: The following principle is widely assumed in the literature surrounding the epistemology of peer disagreement: When S disagrees with a group of epistemic peers P1, P2, P3. . . Pn concerning the truth of p, if S has already taken into account the dissent of P1, then S’s disagreement with P2, P3. . . Pn does not need to be accounted for if the beliefs of these subsequent dissenters are not independent of P1’s belief that p. Hence, S can be rationally excused from considering these subsequent dissenters. I call this assumption ‘Belief-Dependence Excusal’ and argue that it is false. This is because the epistemic perspective of a peer can itself be evidentially significant irrespective of whether or not her beliefs are independent of other dissenters that I have already rationally accounted for. I focus on testimonial belief-dependence as it applies to a group of dissenters whose beliefs are all (at least partly) justified by the same report.

PrizeWinnerFlyer-page-0

Everyone (men & women, philosophers & non-philosophers) is welcome at our public events.

 

SWIP-Analytic is a branch of the New York Society for Women in Philosophy dedicated to providing a forum for women in the New York area working on language, mind, metaphysics, logic, ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. It strives to continue NYSWIP’s commitment to being resource for all women in philosophy in the New York area.

Nov
16
Wed
Mark Steiner: Lectures on Wittgenstein and Hume @ CUNY, rm 9205
Nov 16 @ 2:00 pm – 4:00 pm

Lectures on Wittgenstein and Hume
delivered by
Mark Steiner
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

2-4 pm
Wednesday,
Nov 16, Nov 30, Dec 7
The CUNY Graduate Center,
Room 9205/6

Nov
30
Wed
Mark Steiner: Lectures on Wittgenstein and Hume @ CUNY, rm 9205
Nov 30 @ 2:00 pm – 4:00 pm

Lectures on Wittgenstein and Hume
delivered by
Mark Steiner
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

2-4 pm
Wednesday,
Nov 16, Nov 30, Dec 7
The CUNY Graduate Center,
Room 9205/6

Dec
7
Wed
Mark Steiner: Lectures on Wittgenstein and Hume @ CUNY, rm 9205
Dec 7 @ 2:00 pm – 4:00 pm

Lectures on Wittgenstein and Hume
delivered by
Mark Steiner
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

2-4 pm
Wednesday,
Nov 16, Nov 30, Dec 7
The CUNY Graduate Center,
Room 9205/6

Mar
10
Fri
Romina Padró (The Saul Kripke Center, GC, CUNY) @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 202
Mar 10 @ 10:00 am – 12:00 pm

SWIP-Analytic Spring 2017 Events

 

Friday February 10th, 11am- 1pm
GC, CUNY, The Committee for Interdisciplinary Science Studies, Room 5307

Roundtable Discussion: “Women in Philosophy: Publishing, Jobs, and Fitting In”

Speakers:
Elise Crull (City College)
Una Stojnik (NYU)
Denise Vigani (Drew College)

 

Friday March 10th, 10am- 12pm
NYU, Philosophy Department, Room 202

Speaker: Romina Padró (The Saul Kripke Center, GC, CUNY)
Title to be confirmed

 

Friday April 21st, 10am- 12pm
NYU, Philosophy Department, Room 202

Speaker: Winner of the SWIP-Analytic Essay Prize (TBD)

Friday May 5th, 11am- 13om
GC, CUNY (Room TBA).

Speaker: Alyssa Ney (UC Davies)
“Physics and Fundamentality”

Apr
21
Fri
SWIP-Analytic 2017 Graduate Student Essay Prize and Presentation @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 202
Apr 21 @ 10:00 am – 12:00 pm

CALL FOR PAPERS

SWIP-Analytic

2017 Graduate Student Essay Prize

SWIP-Analytic invites women graduate students to submit abstracts and papers in the areas of language, mind, metaphysics, logic, ethics, epistemology, & philosophy of science for consideration for a two-hour presentation at SWIP-Analytic in NYC.

https://philevents.org/event/show/29366

One student’s paper will be accepted for presentation on April 21st, 2017. The student will be awarded the 2017 SWIP-Analytic Graduate Student Paper Prize of $250. The winner will also be reimbursed for up to $250 of travel expenses.

Submission Requirements

(1) a pdf, .doc, or .docx of a maximum 300 word abstract and 5,000 word paper prepared for blind review

(2) document of identification with name, institution, and email address

Email both to swipanalytic@gmail.com by February 15th, 2017.

Notifications of decisions will be sent by March 15th 2017. The winning student paper presentation will take place on Friday, April 21st 2017 in New York City.

Please send any questions to swipanalytic@gmail.com.

SWIP-Analytic is made possible through the generous support of NYU’s New York Institute of Philosophy, The John H. Kornblith Family Chair, and The CUNY Graduate Center Department of Philosophy, and The Committee for Interdisciplinary Science Studies.

SWIP-Analytic continues the Society for Women in Philosophy’s commitment to being a resource for all women in philosophy by providing a forum for women working in language, mind, metaphysics, logic, ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. Let us know at swipanalytic@gmail.com if you’d like to subscribe or unsubscribe from the SWIP-Analytic email list.

May
13
Sat
Between Philosophy and Rhetoric: NYU Spring Workshop in Ancient Philosophy @ Depts. of Philosophy & Classics
May 13 – May 14 all-day

Even though ancient philosophy and rhetoric have many overlapping interests (education, persuasion, politics, etc.), their relationship has long been a contentious subject, especially among ancient philosophers. Contemporary scholarship on the topic is equally divided: philosophers tend to approach the topic primarily through the works of Plato and Aristotle and regard rhetoric (and rhetorical compositions) as a second-rate notion/discipline which has little interest in shedding light on philosophically relevant questions about human nature and society, whereas classicists research oratorical compositions to get a better understanding of Greek prose style, historical details and context, but often shy away from philosophical questions that the texts might hint at. This workshop aims to bring together scholars working on ancient rhetoric and argumentative techniques on the one hand, and scholars working on ancient philosophy, on the other in order to open up a space for a constructive engagement with philosophy/rhetoric, one which might enrich our understanding of ancient texts as well as the context in which they were produced.

Confirmed speakers: Jamie Dow (Leeds), Richard Hunter (Cambridge), Joel Mann (St Norbert), Jessica Moss (NYU), Usha Nathan (Columbia), James Porter (Berkeley), Edward Schiappa (MIT), Nancy Worman (Barnard). All papers will be followed by a response and general discussion.

Attending the workshop is free, but in order to have an idea of numbers it would be greatly appreciated if those interested in participating in the event would email the organizers, Laura Viidebaum and Toomas Lott.

This Workshop is generously sponsored by the Department of Philosophy (NYU), Department of Classics (NYU) and NYU Center for Ancient Studies.

Sep
22
Fri
Attachment and Felt Necessity: Engaging with Value in Love and Addiction @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 202
Sep 22 @ 4:00 pm – 6:00 pm

Philosophers have employed two different varieties of felt necessity to explain central aspects of agency in addiction and love, respectively. In the case of addiction, the relevant felt need is often described in terms of an appetite, whereas love is characterized by necessities arising from a particular kind of caring. On Dr. Wonderly’s view, the extant literature offers an instructive, but incomplete picture of the roles of felt necessity in addiction and love. Dr. Wonderly argues that a third form of felt necessity – attachment necessity – often better captures central aspects of agency in love and addiction. Recognizing the role of attachment necessity will not only illuminate how felt necessity can impact the value of certain relationships, but it will also allow us to discern important features of addiction and love that remain obscured on extant approaches.

Monique Wonderly is the Harold T. Shapiro Postdoctoral Research Associate in Bioethics. She is primarily interested in puzzles at the intersection of ethics and the nature of emotions. She has published in the areas of applied ethics, philosophy of emotion, and history of philosophy. Her current research focuses on emotional attachment – and in particular, on questions concerning moral agency and ethical treatment that arise when considering certain attachment-related pathologies, including psychopathy and (some forms of) addiction. For more, visit here.

Reception to follow.

Oct
20
Fri
“What Does a Model Show?” Patricia Blanchette (Notre Dame) @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 202
Oct 20 @ 11:00 am – 1:00 pm

The standard way to show the consistency of a theory, or the independence of a given statement from that theory, is to exhibit a model. But there’s more than one thing that’s been called a “model” as this notion has evolved from its original role in 19th century foundations of geometry to its current role as a universallyapplicable tool in logic. This talk investigates some of the changes that bring us to the modern notion, and asks to what extent various kinds of model do, or don’t, successfully demonstrate various kinds of consistency and independence.

When: Friday October 20, 11:00am-1:00pm (with reception to follow)
Where: NYU Philosophy Department, 5 Washington Place, Room 202

 

Nina Emery (Mount Holyoke), November 3, The Graduate Center, CUNY