CALL FOR PAPERS
SWIP-Analytic
2017 Graduate Student Essay Prize
SWIP-Analytic invites women graduate students to submit abstracts and papers in the areas of language, mind, metaphysics, logic, ethics, epistemology, & philosophy of science for consideration for a two-hour presentation at SWIP-Analytic in NYC.
https://philevents.org/event/show/29366
One student’s paper will be accepted for presentation on April 21st, 2017. The student will be awarded the 2017 SWIP-Analytic Graduate Student Paper Prize of $250. The winner will also be reimbursed for up to $250 of travel expenses.
Submission Requirements
(1) a pdf, .doc, or .docx of a maximum 300 word abstract and 5,000 word paper prepared for blind review
(2) document of identification with name, institution, and email address
Email both to swipanalytic@gmail.com by February 15th, 2017.
Notifications of decisions will be sent by March 15th 2017. The winning student paper presentation will take place on Friday, April 21st 2017 in New York City.
Please send any questions to swipanalytic@gmail.com.
SWIP-Analytic is made possible through the generous support of NYU’s New York Institute of Philosophy, The John H. Kornblith Family Chair, and The CUNY Graduate Center Department of Philosophy, and The Committee for Interdisciplinary Science Studies.
SWIP-Analytic continues the Society for Women in Philosophy’s commitment to being a resource for all women in philosophy by providing a forum for women working in language, mind, metaphysics, logic, ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. Let us know at swipanalytic@gmail.com if you’d like to subscribe or unsubscribe from the SWIP-Analytic email list.
What justifies the allocation of funding to research in physics when many would argue research in the life and social sciences may have more immediate impact in transforming our world for the better? Many of the justifications for such spending depend on the claim that physics enjoys a kind of special status vis-a-vis the other sciences, that physics or at least some branches of physics exhibit a form of fundamentality. The goal of this talk is to articulate a conception of fundamentality that can support such justifications. I argue that traditional conceptions of fundamentality in terms of dynamical or ontic completeness rest on mistaken assumptions about the nature and scope of physical explanations.
A reception will follow at the Philosophy Department, Room 7113.
SWIP-Analytic Spring 2017 Events
Friday February 10th, 11am- 1pm
GC, CUNY, The Committee for Interdisciplinary Science Studies, Room 5307
Roundtable Discussion: “Women in Philosophy: Publishing, Jobs, and Fitting In”
Speakers:
Elise Crull (City College)
Una Stojnik (NYU)
Denise Vigani (Drew College)
Friday March 10th, 10am- 12pm
NYU, Philosophy Department, Room 202
Speaker: Romina Padró (The Saul Kripke Center, GC, CUNY)
Title to be confirmed
Friday April 21st, 10am- 12pm
NYU, Philosophy Department, Room 202
Speaker: Winner of the SWIP-Analytic Essay Prize (TBD)
Friday May 5th, 11am- 13pm
GC, CUNY (Room TBA).
Speaker: Alyssa Ney (UC Davies)
“Physics and Fundamentality”
Karen Bennett (Cornell), September 15, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Patricia Blanchette (Notre Dame), October 20, NYU Philosophy Department
Nina Emery (Mount Holyoke), November 3, The Graduate Center, CUNY
In my talk, I wish to outline an alternative to a chapter in the history of modern philosophy, and present Kant’s tenets in the Critique of Pure Reason in the spirit of the Vienna Circle, the origin of analytic philosophy.
According to the traditional narrative, Kant overcame the limitations of British empiricism (Hume) and German rationalism (Leibniz) and with his “transcendental philosophy” raised philosophy to a new and superior level. Contemporary Leibnizian critics failed to appreciate the novelty of his approach. Although Kant complimented Salomon Maimon (1753-1800) for having best understood him among his critics, he saw no reason to accept Maimon’s criticism.
From the point of view of the Vienna Circle in the 1920-1930, the traditional narrative should be reversed. In the view of its members, there are no synthetic judgments a priori, and the Kantian project was therefore misconceived in principle. The “Kantian intermezzo”, as Neurath called it, should be skipped and philosophy should rather return to Hume and Leibniz. Exactly this was Maimon’s position. He characterized himself as a “rational dogmatist and empirical skeptic”, referring explicitly to Leibniz and Hume respectively.
I will present Maimon’s criticism of Kant’s synthetic judgments a priori and claim that it is valid. With this, questions concerning the progress of philosophy and its historiography will naturally rise.
–
Gideon Freudenthal is professor emeritus at the Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas, Tel-Aviv University.
He is the author (or co-author) of:
Atom and Individual in the Age of Newton (1986)
Exploring the Limits of Preclassical Mechanics (1991)
Classical Marxist Historiography of Science: The Hessen-Grossmann-Thesis (2009)
No Religion without Idolatry. Mendelssohn’s Jewish Enlightenment (2012)
Presented by The New School for Social Research (NSSR) Philosophy Department.
The standard way to show the consistency of a theory, or the independence of a given statement from that theory, is to exhibit a model. But there’s more than one thing that’s been called a “model” as this notion has evolved from its original role in 19th century foundations of geometry to its current role as a universallyapplicable tool in logic. This talk investigates some of the changes that bring us to the modern notion, and asks to what extent various kinds of model do, or don’t, successfully demonstrate various kinds of consistency and independence.
When: Friday October 20, 11:00am-1:00pm (with reception to follow)
Where: NYU Philosophy Department, 5 Washington Place, Room 202
Nina Emery (Mount Holyoke), November 3, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Karen Bennett (Cornell), September 15, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Patricia Blanchette (Notre Dame), October 20, NYU Philosophy Department
Nina Emery (Mount Holyoke), November 3, The Graduate Center, CUNY
CUNY-Milan Annual Interdisciplinary Workshop in Philosophy, a joint initiative of both institutions’ philosophy departments, is aimed at promoting advanced studies in core analytic topics. This year’s workshop, first in a series of annual events, will focus on belief. Albeit this workshop’s main objective is to advance research in Philosophy of Mind and Logic, the organizers are committed to maintain the interdisciplinary character of the workshop.
This year’s inaugural conference will focus on belief. It is the aim of the organizers to provide an interdisciplinary perspective on the topic of belief. Some of the topics to be discussed include:
Mental states/attitudes and beliefs; the connection between imagination and belief; group beliefs; logic of belief; belief and logical omniscience; beliefs about blame and forgiveness; the difference between conscious and unconscious beliefs; confabulations of belief; the experience of belief; what it is like to believe; norms of beliefs; knowledge and belief; metaphysics of belief; religious beliefs; political beliefs; manipulation of belief; content of belief; belief and bias; belief and language; belief as constituting sexual, racial and gender based identity; delusional beliefs; continental perspectives on belief; historical perspectives on belief.
Keynote speakers:
Organisers:
SWIP-Analytic Fall 2018 Events
Thursday, September 20, 4:00pm-6:00pm
CUNY Graduate Center, Room 9205
Meghan Sullivan (Notre Dame), “Temporal Discounting in Psychology and Philosophy: Four Proposals for Mutual Research Aid”
Thursday, October 18, 4:00pm-6:00pm
Location TBA
Amie Thomasson (Dartmouth), Title TBA
Thursday, November 8, 4:00pm-6:00pm
Location TBA
Jessica Wilson (Toronto), Title TBA
More details will be added as they become available. Click here to download the flyer as a PDF.
SWIP-Analytic Fall 2018 Events
Thursday, September 20, 4:00pm-6:00pm
CUNY Graduate Center, Room 9205
Meghan Sullivan (Notre Dame), “Temporal Discounting in Psychology and Philosophy: Four Proposals for Mutual Research Aid”
Thursday, October 18, 4:00pm-6:00pm
Location TBA
Amie Thomasson (Dartmouth), Title TBA
Thursday, November 8, 4:00pm-6:00pm
Location TBA
Jessica Wilson (Toronto), Title TBA
More details will be added as they become available. Click here to download the flyer as a PDF.
On the face of it, we live in a world rife with materially composed objects. But what is it exactly for some (smaller, spatiotemporally located) objects to materially compose, or ‘make up’, another? Intuitively, this has something to do with causal interactions among the parts, but causal accounts of composition have been surprisingly rare, due to their seeming to face pressing difficulties associated with extensional inadequacy, vague existence, and causal overdetermination. Here I motivate, present, and defend a causal account of composition, highlighting along the way its advantages over accounts based in classical mereology.
SWIP-Analytic Fall 2018 Events
Thursday, September 20, 4:00pm-6:00pm
CUNY Graduate Center, Room 9205
Meghan Sullivan (Notre Dame), “Temporal Discounting in Psychology and Philosophy: Four Proposals for Mutual Research Aid”
Thursday, October 18, 4:00pm-6:00pm
Location TBA
Amie Thomasson (Dartmouth), Title TBA
Thursday, November 8, 4:00pm-6:00pm
Location TBA
Jessica Wilson (Toronto), Title TBA
More details will be added as they become available. Click here to download the flyer as a PDF.