Dec
3
Wed
Probing with Severity: Beyond Bayesian Probabilism and Frequentist Performance @ Rutgers Hill Center 552
Dec 3 @ 3:20 pm – 4:20 pm

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS AND BIOSTATISTICS www.stat.rutgers.edu

Seminar θSpeaker:     Professor Deborah Mayo, Virginia Tech

Title:           Probing with Severity: Beyond Bayesian Probabilism and Frequentist Performance

Time:          3:20 – 4:20pm, Wednesday, December 3, 2014 Place:         552 Hill Center

ABSTRACT

Probing with Severity: Beyond Bayesian Probabilism and Frequentist Performance Getting beyond today’s most pressing controversies revolving around statistical methods, I argue, requires scrutinizing their underlying statistical philosophies.Two main philosophies about the roles of probability in statistical inference are probabilism and performance (in the long-run). The first assumes that we need a method of assigning probabilities to hypotheses; the second assumes that the main function of statistical method is to control long-run performance. I offer a third goal: controlling and evaluating the probativeness of methods. An inductive inference, in this conception, takes the form of inferring hypotheses to the extent that they have been well or severely tested. A report of poorly tested claims must also be part of an adequate inference. I develop a statistical philosophy in which error probabilities of methods may be used to evaluate and control the stringency or severity of tests. I then show how the “severe testing” philosophy clarifies and avoids familiar criticisms and abuses of significance tests and cognate methods (e.g., confidence intervals). Severity may be threatened in three main ways: fallacies of statistical tests, unwarranted links between statistical and substantive claims, and violations of model assumptions.

Feb
23
Mon
How to be an Atheist (and why you should): A conversation with Philip Kitcher @ Book Culture
Feb 23 @ 7:00 pm – 8:00 pm

Please join us in conversation with Philip Kitcher as we discuss themes from his new book, Life after Faith.  While atheist writers gleefully cataloguing religion’s intellectual and moral vices have been numerous of late, too few have treated their target with the respect it deserves for successfully providing emotional comfort and social cohesion. Kitcher changes that, acknowledging religion’s virtues even as he constructs a secular humanist alternative to replace it.

Talk with him about this on Monday, February 23, 2015 at 7:00pm at Book Culture, 536 West 112th St., NY, NY  (212) 865-1588

May
23
Sat
The Philosophy of Statistics: Bayesianism, Frequentism and the Nature of Inference @ Mariot Marquis
May 23 @ 2:00 pm – 3:50 pm

The Philosophy of Statistics: Bayesianism, Frequentism and the Nature of Inference,
2015 APS Annual Convention
Saturday, May 23 2:00 PM- 3:50 PM in Wilder
(Marriott Marquis 1535 B’way)

Presenters:

Andrew Gelman, Professor of Statistics & Political Science, Columbia University

Stephen Senn, Head of Competence Center for Methodology and Statistics (CCMS) Luxembourg Institute of Health

D.G. Mayo, Professor of Philosophy, Virginia Tech

Richard Morey, Session Chair & Discussant, Senior Lecturer School of Psychology, Cardiff University

Apr
22
Fri
The Unstructured Conference @ Rutgers Philosophy Dept. (5th Floor)
Apr 22 – Apr 23 all-day

Conceptions of unstructured content take contents to be sets of possibilities, or circumstances, or conditions (or functions from such things to truth values). In recent years, a great variety of new conceptions of unstructured content have been developed and applied, often with great formal ingenuity. Debates on relativism and context-sensitivity more generally, on expressivism, de se attitudes, counterfactual attitudes, vagueness, truthmaker semantics, and many more bear witness to these developments. At the same time, not as much attention has been paid to the philosophical foundations of unstructured conceptions.

In sharp contrast, proponents of structured propositions have recently spent a great amount of their time developing and clarifying the foundations of their conceptions in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. This conference encourages new reflexion on the foundations of unstructured conceptions of content, the availability of existing foundational stories to new technical conceptions, the competitiveness of unstructured conceptions vis-a-vis structured conceptions as well as the relationship between the two conceptions. It also aims to establish renewed dialogue between, on the one hand, proponents of structured conceptions and of unstructured conceptions and, on the other hand, between proponents of the various conceptions and applications of unstructured content.

Speakers:

Kit Fine, New York University
Jeffrey King, Rutgers University
Sarah Murray (TBC), Cornell University
John Perry, Stanford University
Susanna Schellenberg, Rutgers University
Robert Stalnaker, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
J. Robert G. Williams, University of Leeds
Stephen Yablo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

In addition to invited talks, there will be a CFA for 2-4 further talks.

(Non-exhaustive) list of topics:

  • Foundations in philosophy of mind of conceptions of unstructured content
  • Kinds of unstructured content \& the nature of representation
  • Philosophical and / vs formal motivations for unstructured content
  • What are the relationships between structured and unstructured conceptions of content? Competition? Complementation?
  • Promiscuity on permissible sets of n-tuples: anything goes? (worlds-hyperplans, worlds-languages, worlds-standards of taste, …)
  • What is it that gets characterised, or modelled, by a set of possibilities, or circumstances, or conditions?
  • What are outstanding problems of fineness of grain?
  • What progress has been made on the the problems of deduction / logical omniscience as they arise for unstructured content?
  • The role of (unstructured) content in semantic theory
  • Truthmaker semantics
  • Notions of hyperintensionality with unstructured content
  • Mental fragmentation/compartmentalisation
  • Metaphysical foundations of unstructured content
  • Possible worlds/points in the possibility-space: primitive or construed (e.g. out of structured things/sentences)?

Organisers: Andy Egan (Rutgers), Dirk Kindermann (University of Graz)

Please direct all queries to dirk.kindermann@uni-graz.at. If you’d like to attend the event, please informally register at dirk.kindermann@uni-graz.at.

Nov
19
Sat
Philosophical Understanding of Visual Intelligence @ Institute for Visual Intelligence
Nov 19 all-day

The Institute for Visual Intelligence

is thrilled to announce its inaugural symposium in New York City in November 2016. We are seeking a philosophical understanding of visual intelligence.

Keynote Speakers:

Dr. Ahmed Elgammal
Director of the Art & AI at Rutgers University

Professor at the Department of Computer Science, Rutgers University. He is the founder and director of the Art and Artificial Intelligence at Rutgers, which focuses on data science in the domain of digital humanities. He is also an Executive Council Faculty at Rutgers University Center for Cognitive Science. Prof Elgammal has published over 140 peer-reviewed papers, book chapters, and books in the fields of computer vision, machine learning, and digital humanities. He is a senior member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). He received the National Science Foundation CAREER Award in 2006.  Dr Elgammal’s recent research on knowledge discovery in digital humanities received wide international media attention, including reports on the Washington Post, New York Times, NBC News, the Daily Telegraph, Science News, and many others.

Dr. Gary Hatfield
Director of the Visual Studies Program at the University of Pennsylvania

Adam Seybert Professor in Moral and Intellectual Philosophy and Director of the Visual Studies Program at the University of Pennsylvania. He works in the history of modern philosophy, the philosophy of psychology, theories of vision, and the philosophy of science.  In 1990, he published The Natural and the Normative: Theories of Spatial Perception from Kant to Helmholtz; at HOPOS 2016, the 25th anniversary of the book was celebrated. In 2009, Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology appeared from the Clarendon Press; a revised version of his book on Descartes’ Meditations appeared in 2014. He is a member of the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, the Penn Perception group, and the History and Sociology of Science Graduate Group.  He has directed dissertations in history of philosophy, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy and history of science.  He has long been fascinated by visual perception and the mind–body problem.

Dr. Sun-Joo Shin
Professor of Philosophy at Yale University

At Yale Sun-Joo Shin teaches logic, philosophy of logic, history of logic, philosophy of linguistics and, philosophy of language.

In her book “The Iconic Logic of Peirce’s Graphs” Shin explores the philosophical roots of the birth of Peirce’s Existential Graphs in his theory of representation and logical notation. She demonstrates that Peirce is the first philosopher to lay a solid philosophical foundation for multimodal representation systems.

 

We would consider papers with parameters of the following:

Philosophy of language
Logic
Artificial intelligence
Aesthetics
Analytic philosophy
Philosophy of psychology
Visual studies
Philosophy of science
Data science
Philosophy of mind
Art history & criticism

 

http://philevents.org/event/show/26754

Dec
9
Fri
Elizabeth Miller (Yale), Jonathan Bain (NYU): What Explains the Spin-Statistics Connection? @ NYU Philosophy Dept. rm 101
Dec 9 @ 2:30 pm – 4:30 pm

Metro Area Philosophy of Science Presents:

Elizabeth Miller (Yale),

Title: TBA.

Jonathan Bain (NYU)

What Explains the Spin-Statistics Connection?

The spin-statistics connection plays an essential role in explanations of non-relativistic phenomena associated with both field-theoretic and non-field-theoretic systems (for instance, it explains the electronic structure of solids and the behavior of Einstein-Bose condensates and superconductors). However, it is only derivable within the context of relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) in the form of the Spin-Statistics Theorem; and moreover, there are multiple, mutually incompatible ways of deriving it. This essay attempts to determine the sense in which the spin-statistics connection can be said to be an essential property in RQFT, and how it is that an essential property of one type of theory can figure into fundamental explanations offered by other, inherently distinct theories.